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Summary
Uniﬁed Messaging Atop a Cloud of Micro-Objects
To communicate is human. From the cradle to the grave people try to com-
municate, by exchanging messages. Tanks to modern technology, there are so
many ways to exchange messages, ranging from the trusted old e-mail system
to more recent systems like WhatsApp, Facebook chat and Twitter. To research
these messaging systems this thesis introduces a taxonomy for messaging sys-
tems, followed by an in-depth review of a few well-known systems. Uniﬁed
messaging is then deﬁned as a messaging system that can mimic the behavior of
all messaging systems thinkable within the taxonomy. A two-layered design is
proposed to implement uniﬁed messaging. The uniﬁed messaging layer sits on
top of a middleware layer that oﬀers location-agnostic large-scale distributed
data-object abstraction or, put more succinctly, sits atop a “data cloud.” The
middleware layer, called the micro-object layer, is designed as an independent
distributed-programming framework. Most distributed-programming frame-
works, like CORBA and Java Enterprise Beans, oﬀer a wrapper that transpar-
ently transforms application objects into distributed application objects, like a
blanket. The micro-object framework, however, oﬀers very small distributed
objects from which distributed application objects can be constructed, like LE-
GO blocks. This thesis further describes the design and implementation of the
two layers and oﬀers a performance and performance/resource trade-oﬀ analysis
and concludes that uniﬁed messaging atop a cloud of micro-objects is feasible.
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Samenvatting
Universele Bericht Uitwisseling op een Mini-Objecten Wolk.
Communiceren is menselijk. Van de wieg tot het graf proberen mensen te com-
municeren, ze wisselen berichten uit. Dankzij de moderne technologie zijn er
vele manieren om berichten uit te wisselen, van het klassieke e-mail systeem tot
de meer recente systemen zoals WhatsApp, Facebook chat en Twitter. Om on-
derzoek te kunnen plegen op bericht uitwisselssystemen word in deze dissertatie
een taxonomie geïntroduceerd gevolgd door een grondige beschouwing van
een aantal bekende systemen. Universele bericht uitwisseling word vervolgens
gedeﬁnieerd als een bericht uitwisselssysteem dat alle functionaliteit heeft van
alle bericht uitwisselsystemen bij elkaar die in de taxonomie passen. Een gelaagd
implementatie ontwerp voor universele berichtuitwissling word gepresenteerd.
De universele bericht uitwissellaag zit boven op een tussenlaag die zorgt voor
lokatie agnostische, groot grootschalige, gespreide gegevens objecten abstractie,
of wat korter, op een “gegevens wolk”. Deze tussenlaag, mini-objecten-laag
genaamd, is apart ontwikkeld als een onafhankelijke werkruimte voor gespreid
programmeren. De meeste van dit soort werkruimten, zoals CORBA en Java
Enterprise Beans, bieden eenwikkel aan die op een transparante wijze applicatie-
objecten om vormt tot gespreide applicatieobjecten, als een deken. De mini-
objecten-werkruimte daar in tegen, biedt hele kleine gespreide objecten aan
waarmee gespreide applicatieobjecten kunnen worden geconstrueerd, net als
LEGO blokjes. Deze dissertatie beschrijft vervolgens het ontwerp en de imple-
mentatie van de twee lagen en biedt een prestatie en prijs/prestatie-verhoudings-
analyse en concludeert dat universele berichtuitwisseling op een wolk van mini
objecten alleszins haalbaar is.
3
4 CONTENTS
❧ ”What is big and hardly researched?” This intriguing ques-
tion was put forward at my ﬁrst meeting with my promoter.
I sat silently and pondered the question. A really big thing
usually is a blissful ignorant’s fact of life. Like supermarket
logistics, clean tap water, or font kerning. However, special-
ists do research those topics. Something has to be hiding in
über ubiquity to hardly be researched. ”LikeE-mail,” I remem-
ber saying out loud. My promoter instantly iterated several
E-mail related research topics. All were about accomplishing
something, none about what E-mail really was. ”But, what
constitutes E-mail?” my return question was. The discussion
spun into a debate on electronic messaging systems and how
many kinds there were. Like counting childhood songs, it was
unstructured and surprisingly ever-elongating. A structured
discussion needed a classiﬁcation of electronic messaging sys-
tems. None could be found quickly. So my ﬁrst assignment
was to ﬁnd or create a taxonomy for electronic messaging sys-
tems. It seemed trivial until I actually tried. Also, it made
me wonder about the large number of electronic messaging
systems. It led me to a moderate ambitious research question:
”Can a single messaging system cover the whole taxonomy?”
❦
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Chapter 1
Massive Messaging
“When the mail was being developed, nobody thought at thebeginning it was going to be the smash hit that it was.”
FrankHeart, the director of the 1969  building team.
To communicate is human. From the cradle to the grave people try to com-
municate, by exchanging messages. This dissertation is about the exchange--not
the content--of messages. Therefore the term “messaging” rather than “commu-
nicating” is used. In line with this, a messaging system is deﬁned as a system that
transports a digitized message from a user-input device over a network to one
or more user-output devices. By this deﬁnition, the cell-phone SMS (Short
Message Service)1 system is a messaging system, and POTS (Plain Old Tele-
phone Service) is not, even though VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) tele-
phone systems are. There are many messaging systems and one could wonder,
since they are all used to exchange messages, if they are all more or less equiv-
alent. These messaging systems might only diﬀer in infrastructure or payment
method. These practical diﬀerences clearly exist, however, in this chapter I will
demonstrate that:
Messaging systems can be fundamentally diﬀerent and they can be sys-
tematically analyzed and classiﬁed.
Only messaging systems capable of handling massive numbers of users sending
massive numbers of messages, have been considered for this writing. These mes-
1On page 184 a list of acronyms and their meaning is supplied.
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System Type Protocol
E-mail telegram SMTP
USENET bulletin board NNTP
Weblog public diary HTTP
Twitter micro blog Kestrel
BitTorrent telefax BitTorrent
AIM chatroom AIM
SMS paging CIMD
I-mail telegram i-mode
Table 1.1: A few examples of messaging systems. The “type” column
contains an attempt to classiﬁcation and the column headed
“protocol” contains one of associated protocols.
saging systems typically handle hundreds of millions of users exchanging a total
of billions of messages per day. Messaging systems of this size are sometimes
referred to as large-scale messaging systems or massive-messaging systems.
1.1 User-to-User Messaging
There are many user-to-user messaging systems. One of the biggest is Internet
E-mail (Electronic Mail). However, E-mail is not the only messaging system on
the Internet and the Internet is not the only infrastructure to feature messaging
systems. Lately, the growth in popularity of cellular handheld devices has trig-
gered the development of many messaging systems like WhatsApp (WhatsApp
Messenger), SMS, MMS (Multimedia Message Service), I-mail (Information
mail), and messaging systems based on WAP (Wireless Application Protocol).
In Table 1.1 a few well known messaging systems are listed with their re-
spective type and supporting protocol. Classiﬁcation of type and protocol in
this table is informal. For example, the table suggests a weblog is a public diary,
this does not do justice to the feedback options that most weblog systems have.
As another example, SMS uses CIMD (Computer Interface to Message Dis-
tribution) as main protocol, but SMPP (Short Message Peer-to-Peer Protocol)
or SS7 (Signaling System 7) could equally well be listed. Without a taxonomy
it is even unclear if a peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing system like BitTorrent actually
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classiﬁes as a messaging system.
In short, what is needed is a more precise description of what a messaging
system is and how it can be classiﬁed. Despite considerable debate, there is
no consensus how to compare or categorize messaging systems. It is not ob-
vious how to compare the fax system to USENET (UNIX USEr NETwork).
There is not even a common set of topics or keywords for papers on messaging
systems. To this end, a taxonomy for messaging systems will be presented in
Section 1.4. First, laying the ground work, an informal reconnaissance of the
ﬁeld of messaging systems will be presented.
1.2 Current Messaging Systems
Depending in the deﬁnition, the most dominant messaging system is probably
Internet E-mail. Measured in bandwidth, the BitTorrent ﬁle sharing system
is larger than the E-mail system. However, the total number of E-mail mes-
sages sent per day vastly outnumbers the number of ﬁles exchanged through
BitTorrent. Also the number of E-mail users is much higher than the number
of BitTorrent users.
Not only is E-mail big, it is also archetypal in the sense that it resembles the
postal system that ﬁnds its roots in organized courier service like the one the
Pharaohs used as early as 2400 BCE or King Ahasuerus (Xerxes) according to
the Old Testament2.
This section, therefore, starts oﬀ with a description of the E-mail messaging
system. The E-mail system is then used as a reference point in the ensuing
description of USENET, IM (Instant Messaging), weblog, and SMS messaging
systems. These four have properties not found in E-mail, which help explain
why they exist as separate messaging systems.
1.2.1 The E-mail Messaging System
When, in 1971, Ray Tomlinson sent the ﬁrst E-mail message across one of
the precursors of the Internet called ARPANET (Advanced Research Project
Agency Network), few foresaw that his logical extension to intra computer
E-mail would become the biggest homogeneous messaging system in the world,
even though Tomlinson’s program SNDMSG quickly became responsible for more
than half of the traﬃc on ARPANET. It might be argued that E-mail was In-
ternet’s ﬁrst killer application (that is, the principal reason for a user to get on
2King James Bible--Esther 8:10 And he wrote in the King Ahasuerus’ name, and sealed it with
the king’s ring, and sent letters by posts on horseback, and riders on mules, camels, and young
dromedaries…
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the Internet). Internet E-mail is starting to rival POTS as the preferred means
of interpersonal contact.
For 2012, the Radicati Group estimated the number of E-mail messages sent
to be around 144.8 billion per day, with about 90% of those being unsolicited
messages. They also estimated the population of active E-mail accounts at 3.4
billion for 2012 and projected a growth rate of over 6% for the next four years,
probably one in four of the world’s human population actively uses E-mail. This
would seem to indicate that every E-mail user would be sending out dozens
of messages a day. Due to spam (not the luncheon meat canned by Hormel
Foods) the mean number of messages will be far lower than that. Regardless,
the E-mail system is big, ubiquitous and still growing. In the USA over 90% of
the Internet population uses E-mail according to the 2009 Internet Investment
Guide of J.P.Morgan. Although rivaled by applications such as IM, peer-to-peer
ﬁle sharing systems, and cellular messaging systems, Internet E-mail is still, the
second most used messaging system the world over, after the SMS system. A
notable exception is China, according to J.P.Morgan, where “only” 57% of the
Internet population use E-mail but 81% use IM (versus 39% in the USA).
The basic model for E-mail is simple: a user sends a message to one or more
explicitly addressed recipients, where it is subsequently stored in the recipient’s
mailbox for further processing. One of the main advantages of this model, to
the user, is the asynchronous nature of communication: the recipient need not
be online when a message is delivered to their mailbox, but instead, can read
the message at any convenient later time.
Principal Operation
The basic organization of the E-mail system is shown in Figure 1.1(a) and con-
sists of several components. From a user’s perspective, amailbox is conceptually
the central component. A mailbox is simply a storage area that is used to hold
messages that have been sent to a speciﬁc user. Each user generally has one or
more mailboxes from which messages can be read and removed. The mailbox is
accessed by means of an MUA (Mail User Agent), which is a management pro-
gram that allows a user to, for example, edit, send, and receive messages. Com-
mon ones include Eudora, Outlook Express, Thunderbird, Entourage, Apple
Mail, /bin/mail, Elm, Mutt, and Pine.
Once a message has been composed with the MUA, it has to be sent out. To
this end, theMUA generally contacts a local MSA (Message Submit Agent) that
temporarily queues outgoing messages. The actual intermachine exchange of
E-mail messages is taken care of by a mail server, called MTA (Message Transfer
Agent). The MTA at the sender’s site is responsible for removing messages that
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queue spool
(a)
Alice
mailbox
MDA
Bob
MUA
MUA
MSA
SMTP SMTP
MTAMTAMTA e mail
mailbox
remote
SMTP
POP
server
IMAP
server
MTA
local
(b)
Internet
ISP
SMTP
home user
MUA
spool
MDA
mailbox
Figure 1.1: (a) The general organization of E-mail. (b) How E-mail is
supported by an ISP.
have been queued by the MSA, and transferring them to their destinations,
possibly routing them across several other MTAs. At the receiving side, the
MTA spools incoming messages, making them available to the MDA (Message
Delivery Agent). The latter is responsible for moving spooled messages into the
mailboxes of the proper users.
Assume that Alice at site A has sent a message m to Bob at site B. Initially,
this message will be stored by theMSA at siteA. When themessage is eventually
to be transferred, the MTA at site A will set up a connection to the MTA at site
B and pass it message m. Upon its receipt, this MTA will store the message for
the MDA at B which, in turn, looks up the mailbox for Bob to subsequently
store m. MTAs exchange messages according to SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol) as speciﬁed in [41].
Note that this organization has a number of desirable properties. In the
ﬁrst place, if the mail server at the destination’s site is currently unreachable,
the MTA at the sender’s site will simply keep the message queued as long as
necessary. Only in extreme cases (e.g., an MTA is oﬄine for several days), will
an error E-mail message be sent back to the listed sender. As a consequence,
the actual burden of delivering a message in the presence of unreachable or
unavailable mail servers is mostly hidden from the E-mail users.
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Remote Access
The organization as sketched in Figure 1.1 assumes that the user agent has con-
tinuous (local) access to the mailbox. In many cases, this assumption does not
hold. For example, many users have an E-mail account at an ISP (Internet
Service Provider). However, it is not customary for a user to physically visit an
ISP’s premises to read or send E-mail. Rather, mail sent to a user is initially
stored in the mailbox located at the ISP, and made remotely accessible by a
special server, as shown in Figure 1.1(b).
The remote access server essentially operates as a proxy for the MUA, al-
lowing the user access from many diﬀerent places. There are two models for
its operation. In the ﬁrst model, which has been adopted in (version 3 of )
the POP (Post Oﬃce Protocol) standard speciﬁed in [28], the remote access
server transfers a newly arrived message to the user, who is then responsible for
storing it locally. Although POP allows to keep a transferred message stored at
the ISP, it is customary to conﬁgure user agents to instruct the server to delete
any message that the agent had just fetched. This setup is often necessary due
to the limited storage space that an ISP provides to each mailbox. However,
even when storage space is not a problem, POP provides only minimal mailbox
search facilities, making the model not very popular for managing messages. It
used to be dominant.
As an alternative, there is also a model in which the access server does not
normally delete messages after they have been transferred to the user. Instead,
it is the ISP that takes responsibility for mailbox management. This model is
supported by (version 4 of ) IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol), as is
speciﬁed in [23]. In this case, the access server provides an interface that allows
a user to browse, read, search, and maintain his mailbox from diﬀerent devices
at diﬀerent locations. IMAP is particularly convenient for mobile users, because
IMAP can be supported by cellular devices.
Another example of the latter model is calledwebmail. Webmail allows users
access to their remote mailbox, using a WWW (World Wide Web) browser.
Usually a webmail server uses IMAP to access E-mail messages, and generates
HTML (HyperText Markup Language) web pages displaying them. Note that
with the pervasiveness of web browsers, webmail comes close to providing roam-
ing access to E-mail. Notable webmail providers are Microsoft (@hotmai.com,
@outlook.com, @live.com), Mail.ru (@mail.ru), Google (@gmail.com), Ceno
Technologies (@ceno.cn), Apple (@mac.com, @me.com, @icloud.com), Ya-
hoo! (@yahoo.com) and AOL (@aol.com, @aol.de).
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; <<>> DiG 9.1.0 <<>> mx cs.vu.nl
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 43753
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 4, ADDITIONAL: 3
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;cs.vu.nl. IN MX
;; ANSWER SECTION:
cs.vu.nl. 86069 IN MX 1 tornado.cs.vu.nl.
cs.vu.nl. 86069 IN MX 2 zephyr.cs.vu.nl.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
tornado.cs.vu.nl. 86069 IN A 192.31.231.152
zephyr.cs.vu.nl. 86069 IN A 192.31.231.66
Figure 1.2: Response to a DNS query using dig MX cs.vu.nl (edited).
Naming
To enable the transfer of messages a scheme for addressing the source and des-
tination is necessary. For Internet E-mail, an address consists of two parts: the
name of the site to where a message needs to be sent which, in turn, is preﬁxed
by the name of the user for which it is intended. These two parts are separated
by an at-sign (“@”). Given a name, the E-mail system should be able to set up a
connection between the sending and receiving MTA to subsequently transfer a
message, after which it can be stored in the addressed user’s mailbox. In other
words, what is required is that an E-mail name can be resolved to the network
address of the destination mail server.
Resolving an E-mail name requires support from the Internet DNS (Do-
main Name System) [5, 47]. Consider sending an E-mail to an address JohnD-
@cs.vu.nl. In this example, JohnD identiﬁes the user at site cs.vu.nl. To send
a message, it is necessary to identify a mail server that can handle incoming
E-mail traﬃc. For Internet E-mail, DNS allows to store such information in
what are known as MX (Mail Exchange) records.
For example, using a program called dig (Domain Information Groper), a
DNS query requesting an MX record for cs.vu.nl returns the answer shown in
Figure 1.2.
The most important part of the response is the answer section (shown in
boldface in Figure 1.2), which states that there are twomail servers for cs.vu.nl.
The preferred mail server is named tornado.cs.vu.nl, while a secondary server
named zephyr.cs.vu.nl is also available. To initiate an SMTP session, the
sender’s MTA usually sets up a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) con-
nection to the preferred MTA at the destination site, for which it needs the
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server’s IP address. In the example, this would require resolving the name tor-
nado.cs.vu.nl, which is, in principle, done by means of another DNS query.
DNS anticipates such additional queries when asked for an MX record and
includes an additional section containing the IP (Internet Protocol) addresses of
the returned mail servers thus avoiding another query.
Once the message has been transferred to the destination MTA, it is the task
of the latter to resolve the user name that is part of the E-mail address to the
appropriate mailbox. How this user-name resolution is done is not prescribed
by SMTP.
Summary of Properties
The E-mail messaging system oﬀers delivery of a message into the receiver-
speciﬁc storage of any number of pre-known receivers. Once received, messages
do not expire. This cryptic description will be restated more formally after the
introduction of the messaging taxonomy in Section 1.4.
1.2.2 The USENET Messaging System
USENET, also called NetNews, gained its popularity as part of UUCPNET
(UNIX-to-UNIX Copy Protocol NETwork), a logical network mainly consist-
ing of many computers that used POTS and modems for message exchange.
The USENET model is that of an electronic bulletin board: messages are put
up on the board to be read and reacted to by others. In USENET, messages
are referred to as articles that are posted in a speciﬁc newsgroup. A newsgroup is
thus a collection of logically related articles and forms the electronic represen-
tation of a bulletin board. A nontechnical overview of network news is given
by Comer [22].
A user provides the USENET system with the name of a newsgroup in order
to read articles. The header of any new article that has not yet been read by the
user is then transferred to the user. If the user wants to read the entire article,
he will request for the transfer of the article’s body. After reading an article, a
user can respond by posting a reaction in that same newsgroup (which again
appears as just another article). Cross postings by which an article refers to an
article in a diﬀerent newsgroup is also possible.
Note that users do not actively delete articles. However, to prevent postings
from consuming storage indeﬁnitely, system administrators generally remove
articles after some time. Unlike E-mail where messages are permanently stored
until explicitly deleted by a recipient, this policy makes news articles imperma-
nent to the recipient.
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Figure 1.3: The general organization of network news.
Principal Operation
The core of the network news system is formed by a huge collection of news
servers that are spread across thousands of diﬀerent sites. A news server, also
referred to as an NTA (News Transfer Agent), is capable of receiving, sending,
and storing articles. The basic organization is shown in Figure 1.3. A client,
called an NUA (News User Agent), connects to a news server to read and post
articles for one or several newsgroups. Likewise, servers connect to each other to
exchange articles as will be discussed in more detail below. Although the ﬁgure
suggests a principal diﬀerence between clients and servers, no such diﬀerence
actually exists. In fact, the protocol that is used between a client and server and
the one used between two servers is the same. All information exchange follows
NNTP (Network News Transfer Protocol), as speciﬁed in [37]. A news server
must connect to one or more existing news feeds, which are just other NTAs
that are willing to exchange articles. In many cases, a news feed is operated by a
separate organization such as an ISP. When a news server contacts a news feed,
it requests the transfer of new articles. There are several operations available to
establish such a transfer of which some important ones are listed in Table 1.2.
The transfer protocol is relatively simple and has not been changed since its spec-
iﬁcation in 1986. However, practice has shown that extensions and deviations
from the original speciﬁcation were needed. In particular, the communication
between servers, and that between a client and a server are diﬀerent enough to
warrant further reﬁnements, eﬀectively leading to two very similar, yet diﬀerent
protocols. These reﬁnements are described in [11].
Naming
An important diﬀerence between USENET and E-mail is that there is no need
to explicitly name and lookup news servers. Instead, the address of a news feed
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Operation Description
LIST
Returns a list of newsgroups available at the callee with
each entry identifying the ﬁrst and last article in that
group.
GROUP
Makes a speciﬁed group “current,” and returns an estimate
of the number of articles at the callee in that group.
ARTICLE
Transfers (to the caller) a speciﬁed article in the current
group.
POST Tells the callee that an article has been posted at the caller.
IHAVE Tells the callee that a speciﬁc article is available to be sent.
NEWNEWS
Returns a list of articles that have been posted at the callee
in speciﬁc news groups.
NEWGROUPS
Returns a list of newsgroups that have been created at the
callee.
Table 1.2: Commonly used operations to establish the transfer of arti-
cles between two news programs.
is assumed to be known at the time a news client or server is conﬁgured so that
its address can be readily used to setup an NNTP session. Jointly, these sessions
ensure that articles are ﬂooded through the network consisting of USENET
servers. In contrast, for E-mail it is necessary to devise a naming scheme by
which users and mail servers can be looked up at runtime. This naming scheme
is needed to support the point-to-point communication in E-mail systems.
Naming in news therefore restricts itself to newsgroups, and implicitly also
articles. In particular, it is important to have a suitable naming scheme for the
tens of thousands of newsgroups that currently exist. To this end, a hierarchical
naming scheme has been devised that is simple, yet ﬂexible enough to support a
large number of newsgroups. A newsgroup name is a series of strings separated
by a dot, such as comp.os.research. In this example, comp identiﬁes the broad
category of over one thousand newsgroups related to computer science, which
is further divided into over one hundred and ﬁfty newsgroups dealing with
operating systems (os) and, in particular, the one containing articles on research
in this area (research).
Each article has a unique identiﬁer consisting of two parts separated by the
at-sign. An example of such an identiﬁer is 3e1ed38c$1@news.cs.vu.nl (see
also [31]). The second part identiﬁes the host where the article was ﬁrst entered
into the news system, in this example news.cs.vu.nl. The ﬁrst part is a unique
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identiﬁer normally generated by the host named in the second part (and hidden
from the user). In principle, an article’s identiﬁer is globally unique and is never
reused: it is a so-called, true identiﬁer [70].
Summary of Properties
The USENET messaging system oﬀers delivery of a message that does expire,
to a number of class-speciﬁc storage spaces, to any user interested in its class.
These properties diﬀer greatly from the properties of E-mail, as listed at the end
of Section 1.2.1.
1.2.3 Instant Messaging Systems
One of the upcoming means of user-centric communication across the Inter-
net is Instant Messaging. The Radicati Group estimates that in 2012 about
2.7 billion IM accounts will be active with and estimated yearly growth rate
of 6% for the next four years. The model underlying instant messaging is that
of synchronous communication: a message can be successfully transferred only
if the destination is willing to receive it at the time it is sent. In many other
respects, instant messaging strongly resembles E-mail and their user interfaces
are sometimes integrated into a single messaging (web) client. One of the ﬁrst
one-to-one instant messaging systemwas called “term-talk” and ran on the Plato
system as early as 1973 [71]. One of the earliest full-blown instant messaging
systems appeared in MIT’s Athena system [12]. On the Internet IM became
popular due to a program called IRC (Internet Relay Chat), described in [48]
and updated in [35] and [36]), but became really popular with the introduction
of ICQ (I seek you). Currently, there are many instant messaging clients, some
are integrated into other services like social network websites or VoIP appli-
cations. Instant messaging services are mainly provided by large organizations
such as Skype, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. An instant messaging system
is generally paired with a component, called a presence-information service, which
is used to inform users of the presence of a user-speciﬁc list (often referred to
as “buddy list”) of other users (see also [25]). Such a service allows a user to
see whether users on his list are on-line. When a user logs in, his presence is
published and forwarded to subscribers of that information. Likewise, a user
can indicate that he is temporarily not reachable, or has logged oﬀ. Managing
presence information is increasingly becoming an important issue as it strongly
aﬀects the privacy of publishers. Below, I will return to presence information
in more detail.
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Figure 1.4: Setting up an instant messaging connection: (a) directly, (b)
through a central server, (c) centralized, including messag-
ing, and (d) through diﬀerent servers.
Principal Operation
The principal operation of an instant messaging service is quite simple. In all
cases, a channel between the communicating parties has to be set up ﬁrst. Con-
sider the case where Alice wants to communicate with Bob. If Alice has Bob’s IP
address then, in principle, she can set up a channel directly to Bob’s UA (User
Agent) as shown in Figure 1.4(a).
The main drawback of this approach is that Bob’s contact address must be
ﬁxed (i.e., the address where Alice can reach Bob), but also that Alice can set
up unsolicited channels to Bob. To alleviate these problems, many instant mes-
saging services adopt the scheme shown in Figure 1.4(b). In this case, a central
server keeps track of online clients (whose contact address may be diﬀerent
each time they come online). Alice sends a setup request to the server which
subsequently returns Bob’s address, possibly after checking whether Alice is au-
thorized to set up a channel to Bob. Note that the central server may also be
used as an intermediary for all communication between Alice and Bob, that is,
including the instant messages sent between them, as shown in Figure 1.4(c).
The obvious drawback of the central server is that it forms a potential bot-
tleneck. This centralized approach, even when multiple servers are used, is rec-
ognized as one of the main scalability problems in IRC. To circumvent these
scalability problems, several instant messaging servers can be used, as shown in
Figure 1.4(d). In this solution, Alice contacts a local instant messaging server
and requests a communication channel to Bob. Her local server then queries
other servers to ﬁnd the server that controls connections to Bob (or new servers
to query), and requests a communication end point to Bob’s client. After the
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proper security checks have been made and Alice is indeed found to be autho-
rized to contact Bob, Bob’s address is returned to allow the setup of a connec-
tion.
This use of a distributed instant messaging service scales well as only the
servers that are local to Alice and Bob need to assist in setting up a connec-
tion. However, it also introduces a lookup problem, because the server local to
Alice needs to locate Bob’s local instant messaging server. A simple solution,
but one that has not been widely deployed yet, is to follow the same approach
as in E-mail. In principle, every site makes use of a single instant messaging
server and users simply identify themselves by their E-mail address. Assume
Bob’s E-mail address is bob@cs.vu.nl. When Alice wants to contact Bob, her
(well known) local instant messaging server queries the DNS for the instant
messaging server at cs.vu.nl using a SRV (SeRvice) record request, much like
the E-mail system uses the MX record. The XMPP (eXtensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol) is a real life example of a protocol that uses the SRV record
this way. The addresses used by XMPP resemble E-mail addresses with an op-
tional additional resource identiﬁer. For example one of Alice’s XMPP addresses
could look like: alice@cs.vu.nl\slashiphone.
So far, it has been silently assumed that instant messaging takes place only
between pairs of individuals. In general, this need not be the case. Two diﬀer-
ent forms of multiparty instant messaging exist. First, setting up a connection
between two parties can easily be extended by inviting another party, leading
to an ad hoc group, or chat session. In this case, each message is sent to all
members participating in the session. An invited party can join the session, and
any joined party can later leave again. A session dissolves when the last member
leaves.
The second type of multiparty instant messaging is through so-called, chat
rooms, which are eﬀectively permanent sessions. To enter a chat room, a user
needs to set up a connection to a well known server that handles all commu-
nication for that chat room, eﬀectively leading to the communication scheme
shown in Figure 1.4(c). Each message sent to the server is multicast to every
other client that has entered the chat room. Unlike ad hoc groups, chat rooms
continue to exist even after the last member has left. By their nature, a chat room
is useful for online discussions on a very speciﬁc subject, and this is indeed the
way that they are generally organized.
Presence-Information Service
Asmentioned above, an important component of an instant messaging service is
a service that provides presence information. In a minimalistic approach, such a
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Status Alert Description
OFFLINE No No IM client is currently running at the recipient.
ONLINE Yes The recipient’s IM client is currently running.
AWAY Yes The client is running, but cannot accept invitations.
BUSY No The client is running, but ignores invitations.
Table 1.3: Examples of diﬀerent states maintained by a presence-
information service. The column alert indicates whether the
recipient is notiﬁed when a setup request arrives.
service merely reports whether a user is online or oﬄine, allowing an initiator to
see whether it makes sense to even try to set up an instant messaging connection.
However, presence information can, and often is, extended with other possible
states, as shown in Table 1.3.
Many variations on these states exist. For example, some presence services
automatically switch a recipient from online to away when there has been no
interaction with the instant messaging client for some while. Likewise, when
an invitation is sent out to a recipient who is currently busy, the inviting client
may receive a message telling that the other other party does not want to be
disturbed.
It is not diﬃcult to see that where instant messaging by itself is relatively
simple, a presence-information service can easily grow into a sophisticated and
complex part of an instant messaging service. Following the general architecture
as described in [25], a presence-information service may also provide the means
to send notiﬁcations when a client’s status changes. Such a notiﬁcation may be
useful, for example, when Alice wants to contact Bob as soon as he can accept
invitations again.
Despite its attractiveness, the real problemwith this functionality starts when
thinking about security. In eﬀect, Alice subscribes to notiﬁcations concerning
state changes of Bob. Although it may seem obvious that Bob should be in full
control of permissible subscriptions, practice shows that this is not always the
case. However, as also laid down in [24], a client should always be in full con-
trol concerning who is allowed to send instant messages, and who is allowed to
subscribe to presence-state changes. This model has been adopted by the IETF
working group on XMPP.
In essence, before Alice can subscribe to presence information concerning
Bob, XMPP requires that she sends Bob a request for subscription. If this re-
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quest is granted, Bob can pass her the appropriate credentials by which she can
obtain a subscription at the presence-information service. Bob, in turn, can
always request the presence service to unsubscribe Alice.
How simple this model may seem, it has severe implications for the de-
sign and implementation of a presence-information service. The simplest sit-
uation is when the presence service is implemented as a single (trusted) cen-
tralized server. In that case, managing subscriptions boils down to checking
lists of subscribers and sending notiﬁcations as needed. However, dealing with
a distributed presence-information service, essentially, is equivalent to dealing
with a general publish/subscribe system. Having to manage many users who
may be geographically widely dispersed, scalability problems suddenly become
paramount and obvious solutions do not exist (see for example [17]). However,
if a system-wide unique token is shared by all interested parties, a publish/sub-
scribe peer-to-peer system like SCRIBE can be used (see [18]).
Naming
Naming is generally straightforward in instant messaging systems and mainly
concerns identifying users. For this reason, systems are gradually adopting the
E-mail naming scheme. In the case of chat rooms, instant messaging service
providers generally oﬀer a list of topics for which a chat room is hosted. By se-
lecting a topic, a user is then allowed to join a chat session. Naming in such cases
is therefore implicit and of less importance than with core instant messaging.
However, naming inmany popular instant messaging systems is still much of
a nuisance. In particular, several systems such as ICQ simply provide a unique
(long) number that is to be used as ID. The drawback of using these numbers
is similar to using network IP addresses instead of host names: they are diﬃcult
for humans to remember. To circumvent problems, users simply build local
lists of aliases for those people they contact regularly.
Summary of Properties
A typical IM system oﬀers delivery of a transient message, to a class-speciﬁc
storage space, shared by two or more users. These properties diﬀer greatly from
the properties of E-mail and somewhat from the properties of USENET.
1.2.4 The Weblog Messaging System
One of the fastest growing messaging forms today is web logging, or simply
blogging [14]. A weblog, or blog, can be viewed as a unidirectional form of one-
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to-many messaging: a user maintains a log of messages that others can generally
only read, much like an online diary. However, many weblogs allow for readers
to react to messages. Web logging can be considered analogous to columns and
commentaries in newspapers. Also, many organizations have in-house weblogs.
It is hard to pinpoint exactly when the ﬁrst homepage turned into a weblog but
from 1998 till 2002, blogging was largely unknown. From 2002 till 2005,
the number of bloggers, as they are normally called, grew from thousands to
millions, and from 2005 onwards, the total number of weblogs probably has
to be measured in tens to hundreds of millions. Precise numbers are diﬃcult
to obtain, however some nonscientiﬁc sources [51] count (end 2011) 39 mil-
lion Tumblr blogs and 70 million WordPress blogs alone and automated blog
searcher BlogPulse.com claims to have counted a over 147 million blogs up late
2010. Experts seem to agree that blogging is growing more and more popular,
probably due to the existence of tools and sites that allow small personal weblogs
to be set up almost eﬀortlessly. Most weblogs have a small reader group. How-
ever, a few high-volume weblogs serve a huge number of readers. For example,
over the course of 2002, the weblog Drudge (drudgereport.com) served around
a billion pages. The weblog Slashdot (slashdot.org) also serves millions of
pages per day with “news for nerds.” Needless to say that high-volume weblogs
usually have multiple editors, and that sophisticated distributed-message mod-
erating takes place to keep the volume usable. With the increasing popularity of
RSS (Really Simple Syndication), allowing weblogs to syndicate their content
and users to access weblog information in an uniformway, the blogosphere, as the
total of weblogs is also referred to, is becoming more and more homogeneous.
Nowadays creating a dedicated weblog can be simpliﬁed by using a so-called,
blog CMS (Content Management System). To start blogging, one only has to
set up a DNS domain and a blog CMS, as shown Figure 1.5(a). A blog CMS
usually consists of a front end, and a back end. The backend is used by the
author(s) to add new entries and manage the system. The front end is what the
ordinary user sees, and uses to post comments. An example of such a weblog
on a dedicated domain is sinteur.com. It utilizes the WordPress CMS. Using
a weblog resembles using the worldwide web, as shown in Figure 1.5 (a). With
the advent of blog service providers, it is even easier to start a weblog. Now a user
does not even have to set up a CMS and a dedicated DNS domain, as shown in
Figure 1.5(b). One of the bigger sites that allows everybody with a web browser
to easily maintain a weblog, is Google-owned Blogger (blogger.com). Accord-
ing to Blogger, over a million people have used their service to start a weblog,
and subscriptions show an exponential growth. An example of a Blogger hosted
weblog is aap.blogspot.com.
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Figure 1.5: Weblog Messaging System, (a) example dedicated domains,
(b) example service provider.
Principal Operation
The principal operation of web logging is extremely simple: a blogger simply
publishes material on a single site that can be read by anyone accessing that
site. Many tools are available that ease the process of updating and managing
published material, eﬀectively hiding the technical intricacies related to web
servers. An important diﬀerence with all messaging systems discussed so far,
is that there are, in principle, no immediate recipients. All material related to
a blog is conceptually permanently published at a single website that needs to
be visit regularly to keep track of changes (i.e., the arrival of new articles) or
an RSS feed could be used to pull the changes automatically at regular inter-
vals. As of version 2.0 the RSS standard also speciﬁes a push mechanism that
fundamentally changes the blog system to a mailing-list like system.
Summary of Properties
A typical weblog-messaging system oﬀers delivery of a message, that does not
expire, to a sender-speciﬁc storage space, to any WWW user. These properties
diﬀer some what from the properties of E-mail and the other messaging systems
discussed above.
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1.2.5 The SMS Messaging System
Worldwide, a total of 4.5 trillion SMS messages were sent in 2009 or just under
2.7 messages a day for all 4.6 billion active mobile subscriptions. [3] Number
wise, the SMS system is the biggest messaging system in the world, by far. By
comparison, as stated above, in 2009 about 1.4 billion E-mail users sended out
0.25 trillion messages and in 2008, about 0.6 billion IM users send out less
than 0.005 trillion messages. Money wise, the SMS system probably is also
the biggest, worldwide. It is hard to measure since SMS messages are usually
paid piecemeal or in bundles, where most E-mail and IM messages are paid
for indirectly through an Internet connection fee. Worldwide the average con-
sumer price for an SMS message will be around 10 cent (USD), while the cost
of delivery approaches zero. Telecom operators usually charge half of that for
delivery of SMS messages that originate outside their network.
Cellular messaging and Internet messaging are becoming increasingly inter-
twined and there is little doubt that they will integrate further in the future.
One thing cellular messaging solves diﬀerently from POTS and Internet
messaging, is reaching a roaming user. With cellular networks, users take the
messaging device with them; with other messaging systems, the user roams from
messaging device to messaging device. This is exactly as with voice communica-
tion. A cellular device is carried while roaming and with POTS voice communi-
cation, the user roams from phone to phone. With the rising popularity of cell
phones, the popularity of pay phones is going down. No doubt a similar trend
will be seen with messaging. The downside of having a user device roam with
the user, is the single point of failure it introduces. With the loss of a cellular
device comes a substantial diminishing of communication ability. On the other
hand, when a pay phone is out of order, the loss of communication ability is
distributed amongst many users. In Section 1.3 a general unifying model for
messaging is introduced that does not have this trade-oﬀ.
Principal Operation
The SMS system is a store-and-forward, end-point delivery messaging system,
predominantly implemented on top of MAP (Mobile Application Part). There
are two similar standards, the American IS-41 MAP (or ANSI-41 MAP) and
the international GSM MAP. In turn, MAP sits on top of TCAP (Transaction
Capabilities Application Part) on top of the SS7 network layer, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.6. In the past telephony used SS5 (Signaling System 5) in-band signaling
for call setup and teardown. Information was sent by playing special tones into
the telephone lines (also called bearer channels). For security and other reasons,
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Figure 1.6: SS7 protocols stack for SMS message delivery. The approx-
imate equivalent ISO/OSI model layers are listed on the
right.
the SS5 in-band system gave way to SS7. With SS7, data exchange is done out-
of-band, on a separate data channel. The ITU (International Telecommunica-
tion Union) deﬁned SS7 as a packet-switching four-layer stack, resembling the
seven-layer ISO/OSI network stack. For an overview of SS7 see [26]. Note that
using packet switching was a radical break with the traditional CSD (Circuit
Switched Data) technology applied by older telephone systems. Soon the SS7
out-of-band data channel, was used for more than just call setup and teardown.
This data channel proved a perfect infrastructure for a system to exchange the
limited sized messages that are now known as SMS messages or simply text
messages. The packets are 190 bytes long and sport a 50 byte system overhead
leaving 140 bytes for the actual message. With 7-bit ASCII (American Stan-
dard Code for Information Interchange) coding amessage can be 160 characters
long. For languages like Azerbaijani, German and Manx that need glyphs like
’Ü’ and ’Ç’ the maximum is 140 (8-bit) characters. Non-Latin languages like
Arabic, Chinese and Russian are supported using 16-bit encoding, limiting the
message to 70 graphemes. Users have found creative ways to cram more text
into a message. Russian messages can be written using the Latin alphabet and
esoteric phonetic abbreviations can be used like “l8r” for “later.” For example a
Dutch SMS message might read: “Xi dT FF ZZ” to convey that the sender has
found the tea and is about to brew some.
Message delivery is straightforward. A new SMS message entering the sys-
tem is forwarded to the nearest SMSC (Short Message Service Center). This
SMSC tries to locate the roaming device. The device is either inactive, that is,
the device is currently oﬄine, or active. As long as the device is inactive, the
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message is kept waiting. When the device is (or becomes) active, the message is
forwarded from one SMSC to the other SMSC until it reaches its destination.
A reply, whether the delivery was successful or not, is sent back to the original
SMSC. An SMSC keeps trying to send an SMS messages for a limited time. In
the end, it always sends back a report to the original sender of the SMSmessage,
stating success or failure.
Nowadays, SMS centers are connected to many systems and networks like
fax, E-mail, voicemail, and so on. It is feasible to send SMSes from and to a
wired phone, web page, PDAs, satellite phone, and so on. To send an SMS
message over the Internet, an SMSC can use a SIGTRAN (SIGnaling TRANs-
port) protocol extention to SS7 named SCTP (Stream Control Transmission
Protocol).
Even though less restrictive cellular messaging systems have been introduced
later, (i.e., EMS (Enhanced Messaging Service), MMS, and I-mail) SMS still is
hugely popular. As stated above, daily, billions of SMS messages are exchanged,
worldwide. Since the classical E-mail system is also a store-and-forward end-
point delivery messaging system, transport of SMS messages using SS7 is a bit
like transport of E-mail messages using SMTP. However, roaming is handled
totally diﬀerently by the E-mail and SMS messaging systems. Below is a short
comparison between support for roaming E-mail and SMS users.
Handling Roaming
Originally, the E-mail messaging system only featured end-point delivery. All
messages were routed to one dedicated server, usually on a work place com-
puter. Roaming users challenge end-point delivery routing in two ways. First,
a roaming user (or device) might not be reachable at all, at times. Second, a
roaming user, by deﬁnition, does not have a unique static end point. The ﬁrst
challenge is not a big one in a store-and-forward system. If it is impossible to
forward a message, try again later. Though not optimal, this simplistic solution
usually suﬃces. The second part, ﬁnding the current end point, is a bigger chal-
lenge. With E-mail the solution was simple, the end point was made remotely
accessible, ﬁrst through POP back ends, and later on through more powerful
IMAP back ends. With the widespread availability of Internet at home, POP
and IMAP became an integral part of the E-mail messaging system, because
home computers are often disconnected from the Internet. Consequently, the
current E-mail system is not a pure end-point delivery messaging system any
more, from a users perspective. It could be argued, however, that E-mail is now
a store-and-forward, remote-accessible end-point delivery system.
In contrast, the SMS messaging system is predominantly still is a true end-
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point delivery system. This is because the end points are made to roam with the
user. A cellular network, such as the GSM (Global System for Mobile Com-
munications) network, consists of a (usually large) number of radio transmit
and receive units, called base stations. Base stations cover a relatively small area,
ranging from a part of a building to several tens of kilometers using RF (Ra-
dio Frequency) in the SHF (Super High Frequency) band and digital coding
techniques. Currently the main RF channel access methods deployed by cel-
lular networks are CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), SDMA (Space
Division Multiple Access), FDMA (Frequency Division Multiple Access) and
TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access). The area where one base station has
the strongest RF signal is called a cell. By deﬁnition, a cell has exactly one
base station and its base station services only this one cell. Every cellular device
has an identiﬁer, called an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) that
uniquely identiﬁes a cellular device, ormore precisely, it identiﬁes the SIM (Sub-
scriber Identity Module) card within the device. A cellular device constantly
monitors the strength of the RF signals of all the base stations it can hear. The
base station with the strongest RF signal is chosen. The device notiﬁes this base
station of its presence. The base station will now register the presence of the
device in two places. First, the IMSI number is registered in a local database,
called the cell’s VLR (Visitors Location Register), so the base station knows
this device is in its cell. Second, the base station uses the IMSI number to
register its cell as the current cell for this device in a systemwide database called
HLR (Home Location Registers).
Eﬀectively by this registration process, all SS7 network users can now reach
any cellular device, as it roams from cell to cell. If an SMSmessage is sent to the
cellular device, the current, or more accurately, most recent, location is looked
up in the HLR database and the message is forwarded to the corresponding cell,
where the cell’s base station will forward it to the end point, that is, the device
itself.
Naming
For cellular messaging, names take the form of telephone numbers. Tradition-
ally, these numbers have been directly used for routing. Dialing 1234 would get
a phone connected to exit four of exit three of exit two of exit one of the ex-
change oﬃce that the telephone was connected to. Nowadays, most telephone
numbers have three basic parts: a country code, an area code (or network code),
and a subscriber number (or mobile subscriber identity number). For local calls,
the ﬁrst two parts need not be explicitly provided.
Partly due to cellular phones, routing schemes needed to be adjusted and this
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aﬀected the way naming was deployed. To facilitate a ﬁxed number for roaming
cellular devices, the area code in a telephone number was used to also designate
a particular cell-phone operator, eﬀectively diverging from the geographical in-
terpretation initially tied to area codes. This approach has nowadays been taken
another step further, as the original area code is now also used to designate
diﬀerent types of services, such as toll-free calls, premium-rate calls, normal cell
phones, pagers, and so on.
With the advent of digital telephone network technology (i.e., ISDN (In-
tegrated Services Digital Network)), and number portability it became even
harder to directly use a telephone number for routing. To remedy this, the ITU
introduced the E.164 protocol in 1984.
Today global title naming is most commonly used. The structure of a global
tile address is still hierarchical, still of variable length, but also it can contain
nonnumerical values.
A global title actually is an aggregation of formats, most of which are deﬁned
in separate standards. The active format is indicated by the numbering plan
indicator. The most commonly used numbering plan indicator values for global
title routing are: 1: for an ISDN, E.164 address, 6: for an American, IMSI,
E.212 address, and 7: for an international E.214 address. Basically these highly
structured numbers look like ordinary POTS telephone numbers to the user.
Summary of Properties
TheSMS system oﬀers delivery of amessage that does not expire (once received),
to receiver-speciﬁc storage, to one pre-known receiver. Though the parameters
diﬀer greatly, these properties hardly diﬀer from the properties of the E-mail
system.
1.3 Uniﬁed Messaging
The previous section described some current messaging systems and their prop-
erties, Table 1.4 summarizes them. This section introduces the notion of uniﬁed
messaging as a candidate replacement for (almost) all current messaging.
The number of users of any given messaging system determines in a large
part the worth of a messaging system to users. The more people that can be
reached through a messaging system, the more usable it is to the average user.
This must be the reason why new messaging systems often have at least one
gateway connecting it to an older and bigger messaging system. Currently many
messaging systems are connected to E-mail. For example, most cellular network
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operators have some sort of gateway that allows SMSmessages to be delivered to
an E-mail address, and with some restrictions (SMS messages can only contain
160 characters of text) vice versa. Theoretically all messaging systems could
be connected to E-mail to form an integrated set of messaging systems. Note,
however, that a new uniﬁed naming convention would be needed to enable
such a system. Obviously such a uniﬁed messaging system oﬀers optimal con-
nectivity to all its users. This might be the very reason why so many messaging
systems have been connected to E-mail. The current situation is illustrated in
Figure 1.7 which shows two interfaces (a personal computer and a cell phone)
and a small selection of current messaging system protocols. There seems to
be an implicit consent that uniﬁed messaging is feasible and usable. It is this
implicit consent that prompted the research for this dissertation. There are a
number of questions that should be asked and thoroughly researched. These
questions are:
Is (near) uniﬁed messaging feasible?
Would uniﬁed messaging be usable?
What infrastructure would support it?
The short answers are: “yes,” “yes,” and “micro-objects.”
Feasibility of Uniﬁed Messaging
If all messaging systems could be integrated by connecting them to E-mail,
then uniﬁed messaging would clearly be feasible. Although E-mail provides
the proper means to transfer messages, one could argue that there are inherent
System Properties
E-mail Permanent, receiver-speciﬁc, private.
USENET Impermanent, class-speciﬁc, public.
IM Transient, group-speciﬁc, shared.
Weblog Permanent, sender-speciﬁc, public.
SMS Permanent, receiver-speciﬁc, private.
Table 1.4: Summary of the messaging systems and their properties as
discussed in Section 1.2.
30 CHAPTER 1. MASSIVE MESSAGING
web-log
SS7
SMTP
SMTP
NNTP
ICQ
IRC
AIM
AIM
ICQ
IM
POP
IMAP
SMTP
IMAP
E-mail
web-mail
IMAP
IMAP
POP
SMTP
HTTPS
HTTP
NNTP
IRC
HTTP
mail-news
GSM
ahxitffzz
ooo
o
User
net-news
#
3
SMTP
0
987
65
21
SMS
mailing list
*
4
Figure 1.7: A few interfaces and messaging system protocols. Note that
a smartphone can take the role of both a phone and a com-
puter.
problems with integration through E-mail. The properties discussed in Sec-
tion 1.2 of USENET and IM diﬀer considerably from the properties of E-mail.
Besides, IM has synchronous properties, and USENET uses ﬂooding to gain
high accessibility. It is not obvious how E-mail can be used to support these
messaging systems. So E-mail cannot fully play a unifying role. However, in
Chapter 4 a detailed description of a uniﬁed messaging system is given, thus
asserting a positive answer to the feasibility question.
Usability of Uniﬁed Messaging
At ﬁrst the usability question seems a nonissue; Every user can send a message
to any number of other users. Actually since E-mail has so many users and it
has been usable for a long time, it is probable that a system that is only an order
of magnitude larger could be usable too. However, as any long time E-mail
user will probably agree to, E-mail seems very prone to spam or unsolicitated
messages, also referred to as, junk-mail, UCE (Unsolicited Commercial Email),
and UBE (Unsolicited Bulk Email). The vast majority of spam receivers dislike
it as we will return to in Section 4.3. However disliked, low costs combined
with huge audiences make it very cost eﬀective for the spammer, even if the re-
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sponse is ten per million. As stated above, about 90% of all E-mail messages are
spam. Also according to the Radicati Group, a typical 1,000-user organization
can spend upwards of $1.8 million a year to manage spam. Spam for E-mail
and USENET together with spim (spam over IM), could become a threat to
the usefulness of the Internet as a whole. Figures released by Microsoft at the
October 2010 RSA conference indicate that 87% of all spammessages ﬁnd their
origin in some botnet (roBOT NETwork). A botnet is a collection of malware
infected computers on the Internet. The malware secretly takes orders from
one or more controller computers. A botnet controller could order an infected
computer (or “bot”) to generate and send spam.
Microsoft reports that, between March and June of 2010, one single botnet
controlled fromLithuania, was responsible for 56.7% of all botnet-sourced junk
mail. The Rustock and Cutwail botnets were the next two most proliﬁc junk
mail sources in Q2 2010, churning out 16.9% and 15.4% respectively. Ac-
cording to Jeremy Kirk from IDG News Service on August 2010, Symantec’s
MessageLabs’ division came to a similar conclusion. So a uniﬁed messaging
system as large as the E-mail, the USENET and SMS messaging systems united
might collapse under the spam load.
There are at least three ways to combat spam. One, make it expensive; two,
use automated spam ﬁlters; three, put access control in the hands of the receiver.
Since it is very hard to make spam expensive without some form of accounting,
the ﬁrst solution might add complexity and cost for all users. Also the account-
ing might put too much power in the hands of the accounter. Automated spam
ﬁlters make mistakes, and not every user will use them to the fullest. Hence
not all spam can be ﬁltered out and spam might still be cost eﬀective. Worse,
since ﬁltering happens at or near the destination it only battles delivery, not
overhead. Worse still, ﬁltering might lead to more spam being sent in an eﬀort
to get through. The third solution tackles the problem at its root. Spam is a
problem only if the senders can send messages to whomever they want. Spam
would be extremely restricted if receivers can predetermine from whom they
want to receive messages. This solution, however, necessitates a paradigm shift,
because users will have to get used to the concept and management of prede-
termination. A more detailed look at spam is presented in Section 4.3.
Infrastructure for Uniﬁed Messaging
Many messaging systems run directly on top of the Internet. More and more
telecom messaging systems are migrating to the Internet too, relying on tele-
com networks, only for the last mile to the user device. So clearly the Internet
is capable of supporting many conceivable messaging systems, including the
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integration of a number of key messaging systems, and thus by extension, in-
cluding a uniﬁed messaging system. That does not mean that it is simple to
construct a uniﬁed messaging system (as described Section 2.2) on top of the
Internet protocol stack.
As part of our research, a simple proof-of-concept implementation was writ-
ten, in Java, directly on top of the Internet protocol stack. Extending and main-
taining this relatively simple program was increasingly diﬃcult as features were
added. As it turned out, the uniﬁed messaging system, by most deﬁnitions,
could be considered a large-scale, distributed application. As such the uniﬁed
messaging system met the same diﬃculties that have been noticed indepen-
dently by several groups researching distributed systems, as will be shown in
Section 3.1. The distributed aspect of the uniﬁed messaging system was, in
fact, generic enough to be captured in a separate layer, on top of which the
uniﬁed messaging could be constructed. After researching current middleware
for distributed systems, no middleware layer seemed suitable for the uniﬁed
messaging system. Further research led to the design of a novel distributed
programming middleware model, that was better suited for a speciﬁc class of
distributed applications, including uniﬁed messaging. This middleware layer
turned into a separate research topic, as described in Chapter 3.
1.4 Messaging System Taxonomy
The section above is lacking a formal deﬁnition of what properties a uniﬁed
messaging system should have. In order to give a formal description of any
messaging system, a classiﬁcation scheme is needed. This section describes such
a classiﬁcation or taxonomy for messaging systems and the formal deﬁnition of
a uniﬁed messaging system is postponed until the next chapter. The taxonomy
is organized along the four most important aspects of messaging systems from
a user’s perspective, as opposed to a technical or design perspective. With this
taxonomy, any messaging system can be scaled with respect to four independent
dimensions. Figure 1.8 shows the four dimensions and their values.
Dimension 1: Time
A messaging system can have one of three values in the time dimension: im-
mediate, meaning that all messages are transient, short-lived or available only
once during a relatively short period; impermanent, meaning that all messages
are available pending their expiration or revocation by some set of rules; per-
manent, meaning that all messages are available indeﬁnitely unless a message is
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Dimension Values
Time Immediate, impermanent, permanent.
Direction Simplex, duplex.
Audience World, group.
Address Single, list, all.
Figure 1.8: The messaging system taxonomy.
explicitly revoked by an authorized user.
Dimension 2: Direction
Amessaging system can have one of two values in the direction dimension: sim-
plex, meaning that a write-only storage or channel is used for message delivery,
a reply has to be directed towards another storage or channel; duplex, meaning
that one store or channel is used for both reading and writing.
Dimension 3: Audience
The audience of a messaging system is the set of users that can receive a message
through this system. In the audience dimension a messaging system can have
two values: world, standing for every user that has the hardware, software, and
connectivity to use the system or group, standing for a true subset of all users.
In a grouped messaging system, users cannot post messages to a user outside
their audience, even though this outsider is ready for any message and uses the
same system. Restriction of audience (grouping) can be the result of restrictions
related to the infrastructure or implementation. The system can also limit the
audience as a service, security measure, or due to speciﬁc policies.
Dimension 4: Address
In the address dimension a messaging system can have three values: single, if
the system allows only one recipient per message; list, if the system allows for
addressing more than one explicitly addressed recipient; all, if the system allows
for some form of broadcasting.
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Classifying Messaging Systems
The four dimensions are truly independent, although not all of the thirty six
types of possible messaging systems might be equally useful. When classifying
a messaging system, it is easy to confuse audience and address: both are subsets
of recipients. The audience comes with the system and users have no direct
inﬂuence on it. The address is something the user determines (per message)
and the system has no inﬂuence on. The intersection of audience and address
is the set of recipients that is supposed to receive the message.
Figure 1.9 shows the classiﬁcation of the ﬁve messaging systems as described
in the previous section (Section 1.2). Many interesting observations can be
System Time Direction Audience Address
E-mail Permanent Simplex World List
News Impermanent Duplex Group All
IM Immediate Duplex Group All
Weblog Permanent Duplex World All
SMS Permanent Simplex World Single
Figure 1.9: Classiﬁcation of some current messaging systems.
made when using the taxonomy to compare messaging models. For example,
the fax messaging system and the SMS messaging system could both be clas-
siﬁed as (immediate, simplex, world, single) systems, revealing that they share
an underlying model. Due to the diﬀerent output devices and infrastructure,
their systems are, however, very diﬀerent and incompatible. Interestingly but
not surprisingly the SMS system is meeting exactly the same user demands for
service extension that the fax system (invented over 100 years earlier) has met.
Users will want support for sending a single message to multiple recipients,
automatic forwarding to other recipients or locations, nonrepudiation, authen-
tication, and so on. Note that voicemail systems are also (immediate, simplex,
world, single) and were also confronted with similar user demands. Researching
the history of several messaging systems, one might conjecture that messaging
systems with coinciding positions in the taxonomy, usually have coinciding de-
velopment paths. However, this is outside the scope of this thesis. Another
interesting observation is that when a system is built on top of another system,
its classiﬁcation clearly reveals what property (if any) has been downgraded in
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favor of the upgrading of some other property. For example, due to some lim-
itations of E-mail [69], several so-called mailing-list systems were built on top
of it. With a mailing-list, users would be able to send an E-mail to a sym-
bolic E-mail user. This message would then be forwarded automatically (by a
mailing-list server) to a set of users. Sending special E-mail messages, for exam-
ple, a message with the subject “subscribe,” would allow users to be included
in the set of recipients. The mailing-list messaging system can be classiﬁed as
(permanent, duplex, group, all). Comparing this to the classiﬁcation of E-mail
to the mailing-list messaging system, it is clear that audience was downgraded
in favor of upgrading its addressing capabilities.
Armed with this taxonomy, a formal description of a proposed uniﬁed mes-
saging system will be given in Section 2.2.
1.5 Diﬀusion of Uniﬁed Messaging
Next to research questions about uniﬁed messaging, one practical question on
this subject manifests itself. With uniﬁed messaging, feasible, usable, and im-
plementable, will it have practical value? Since a mass-messaging application is
true to its name only if its usage is ubiquitous, this question translates into this;
“Will uniﬁed messaging diﬀuse, and if so, how fast?”
The nonscientiﬁc answer to this nonpragmatic question probably is “No.”
Due to the cesspool of intermixed ﬁnancial and other business interests in mes-
saging, it is highly unlikely that at some point in time all major parties will want
to standardize.
Probably if everybody with a communication device, be it cellular or not,
would pay a ﬁxed amount, of say US $ 5, per month for communication service,
regardless of usage, there would be more than enough money to support the
service. This type of payment is often referred to as ﬂat rate (or sometimes as
linear rate because the rate is linear with time). Flat rate would go well with a
uniﬁed messaging system. It would make it everybody’s interest to bring cost
down, and clearly uniﬁcation of the core systems would be a good ﬁrst step.
However, in the current situation, it is often most proﬁtable to oﬀer yet an
other way of communicating, because the vast majority of communication still
is billed per message.
Hopefully, however, this dissertation, or its research, will play some small
role in the uniﬁcation process.
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1.6 Social Network Messaging
The last ten years, a number of online social networks grew past one million
users. Examples are Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, and Twitter. An argument
could be made to include YouTube, eBay, and dating sites like Zoosk. These
social networks could be qualiﬁed as multi-author weblogs. In general, this
is not how they are perceived by their users. From a technical point of view,
however, Facebook (in its 2012 incarnation) is a multi-author weblog with in-
tegrated instant messaging and E-mail. Twitter is like a micro-blog site with an
SMS interface. Most of these online social networks are a mix and match of
messaging functionality. As such they feature partial uniﬁed messaging. Since
unifying messaging systems is not their goal and since they do not oﬀer unique
messaging functionality they play a minor role in this thesis.
1.7 Summary
This chapter described some mass-messaging systems and introduced a taxon-
omy to classify and compare these and similar systems. It introduced the con-
cept of uniﬁed messaging as a valuable research topic. The next chapter will
introduce the uniﬁed messaging model, as designed by the author and his pro-
moter, and discuss the major diﬀerences between the uniﬁed messaging model
and current messaging practices.
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❧ ”Can a single messaging system cover the whole taxonomy?”
This question seemed rhetorical. There was no doubt in my
mind that I could design and build one. The doubt came
later, after I tried to build a proof of concept. The ﬁrst at-
tempt, in PHP, failed and I told my promoter ”PHP is un-
suitable.” The second attempt, in Java, failed and I concluded
that ”The Enterprise JavaBeans architecture is too complex.” The
third attempt, in C, totally collapsed under the complexity of
distributed computing. ”C is too simple,” I remember lament-
ing. On the positive side, every attempt simpliﬁed my design,
ending up with a minimalistic one that had only three major
concepts: messages, targets, and access control. With those
three I could mimic any type of messaging within the taxon-
omy. It was good to have failed three times in a row, as it
helped shape the solid design for a uniﬁed messaging system.
It was also bad to have failed to implement even the simplest
proof of concept, as it made me worry about the feasibility.
My promoter told me he shared my worries. ”It is probably
impossible, but if it were not….” The rest of the question would
become the next topic of research: ”What would it take to im-
plement a uniﬁed messaging system?”
❦
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Chapter 2
A Uniﬁed Messaging Model
“The long-term goal is to get E-mail available on every Treowith every [BlackBerry, Seven, Visto, and GoodLink] server.”
Joe Fabris, the director Palm wireless marketing.
The taxonomy presented in Section 1.4 allows analysis and classiﬁcation of
messaging models. Moreover, this taxonomy dictates the services that uniﬁed
messaging, as deﬁned in Section 1.3, needs to provide to the user. Throughout
this chapter, the word “user” can be read as “the application program on behalf
of the user.”
A unifying messaging system must, by deﬁnition, allow the user to choose
the properties of a message exchange, on a per message basis. In terms of our
taxonomy, this translates into the user’s ability to freely determine the position
of every message exchange in the messaging space spanned by the four axes of
the taxonomy. In other words, a uniﬁed messaging system has to be adaptable
to the changing messaging needs of the user.
A common deﬁnition of “adaptability” is “the ability to change (or be changed)
to ﬁt changed circumstances,” (see [21]). In the context of a taxonomy, “change”
can be interpreted as a change of position, leading to the following deﬁnition:
A system has “maximum adaptability” within a given taxonomy, if the
system can easily move or be moved to any position within that taxonomy.
If a messaging system with maximum adaptability already existed, it could re-
place most of the other messaging systems; there would be only one big messag-
ing system and some nongeneric systems would be ﬁlling the remaining niches.
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Since there exist many diﬀerent messaging systems each with their own merits
and peculiarities, one might assume none of them has maximum adaptability.
Using our taxonomy to categorize existing messaging systems, it is clear that
this assumption holds: none of the massive-messaging systems has maximum
adaptability; most such messaging systems lack adaptability altogether. This
chapter introduces a uniﬁed messaging model that does have maximum adapt-
ability and could be used as a basis to unify, incorporate and replace all major
existingmessaging systems, includingWhatsApp, E-mail, fax, SMS, IM, I-mail,
USENET, weblogs, MMS, voicemail, and so on.
Thismodel illustrates the feasibility of a large-scale UMS (UniﬁedMessaging
System) that supports maximum adaptability, and which is capable of providing
the same services as existing messaging systems. To the best of my knowledge
such a messaging systems does not yet exist. Section 2.4 contains some exam-
ples how this model could be used to closely mimic existing messaging systems.
Besides existing messaging systems, some examples demonstrate messaging sys-
tems with a hitherto unknown mix of properties.
2.1 The Uniﬁed Messaging System
Before describing the model for the UMS, an informal description of a UMS is
in order. Basically, the UMS is a middleware layer that manages the distribution
of message objects. On top of the UMS middleware layer sits the application
layer, providing a (graphical) user interface or proxy. The UMS does not have,
or even need, a name-space service, but several name-space layers can operate
next to the UMS layer. To oﬀer compatibility with current messaging systems,
the application layer could use a gateway layer to one or more existingmessaging
systems, as shown in Figure 2.1.
2.1.1 Missing Services
Next to the messaging service provided by the UMS, there are some services
missing that are provided by some of the existing messaging systems. At ﬁrst, it
might seem that by deﬁnition, these services should be part of the service pro-
vided by the UMS. However, after some research, these additional services have
been proven to be unrelated to messaging, or to be only cosmetically diﬀerent
from the messaging service provided by the UMS. Some of the seemingly most
blatant omissions are discussed below.
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Figure 2.1: The position of the UMS-layer.
No Presence Service
The UMS does not include presence service because presence basically is a spe-
ciﬁc form of messaging. Presence can be implemented by sending a “I am alive”
message at ﬁxed time intervals. Nongenericmessaging systemsmight necessitate
a separate implementation of presence messaging. A truly generic messaging
system should be able to handle presence as just one of the many messaging
needs of the user.
No Security Service
The UMS does not include secrecy, authentication, nonrepudiation, and in-
tegrity control services, because these should be done end-to-end (i.e., at the
application level) [53]. Although the UMS layer does employ encryption that
might be enough for some uses, it would be impossible to facilitate (and main-
tain) generic security that would suit all users, all the time. Note that there are
ways to provide PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) by adding end-to-end security to
messaging systems like E-mail (see [9]). Chapter 3 introduces a library compo-
nent that will take care of this.
No Name-Space Service
A name-space service maps a user-friendly name to machine-usable addresses.
Mapping has two distinct advantages. The ﬁrst advantage is that the user is al-
lowed to use a human readable name instead of a hard to use machine address,
the second is that the user is shielded from address changes. The ﬁrst advantage
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can be exempliﬁed by considering the diﬀerence in eﬀort it takes the average
human to memorize “cnn.com” and “157.166.226.25” For an example of the
second advantage, consider a server moving to a new machine address, render-
ing its old address useless. With name-to-address mapping, the name could
be made to map to the new address, allowing references-by-name to continue
working.
A well known example of a name-space system is the DNS, as described
in the section on E-mail (Section 1.2.1). DNS maps several name spaces into
the IP address space. Well known name spaces are E-mail host names (MX
records) and DNS server names (NS records). Another well known example is
the name-location to telephone-number mapping in phone books. The phone
book name space features a distinct third advantage for users; it is searchable.
Usually a dedicated name space is integrated into, or closely bound to, the
system using it. There are good reasons for the UMS to not have an integrated
name space. The main reason is that such a name space would need to unify
all the properties of all other name-space systems which in turn would lead
to a generic systemwide searchable name space, which would need a complex
access control mechanism or a pricing mechanism, to combat spam. The UMS
does not need an integrated name-space service. Because the three advantages
stated above, can be achieved if need be, by combining the UMS with one
or more existing name spaces. The advantage of friendly naming can be han-
dled by one or more nonintegrated name spaces. The ﬁrst and third advantage,
user-friendly names and searchability can be served by any number of nonded-
icated name spaces. As will become apparent from the rest of this chapter, the
UMS is a transport service, where messages are kept alive long enough allowing
messages to reach their destination user application layers comfortably. There-
fore information is usually not very long lived within the network, days rather
than weeks, lessening the eﬀects of address changes. So the second advantage,
machine-address independence is usually not (fully) needed. However, if some
information has to be long lived, an existing name-space system could be used.
In the latter case, spam becomes more expensive, because the sender will have
to provide the resources. The subject of spam will be dealt with in detail in
Section 4.3.
No Delete-Message Service
The uniﬁed messaging model does also not provide a “delete” service. This
is in line with most other messaging systems. In fact, messages are immutable.
Releasing a message to a messaging system indicates that the message is ﬁnished.
Once a message is sent, it cannot be un-sent. Note that some messaging systems
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feature a “remove” operator. The actual removal of a copy is, however, left to the
server(s) holding it, there is no guarantee that all copies will be removed by the
servers holding a copy. Also there is no way to revoke a message once a recipient
has read and or copied it. For example, USENET has a highly insecure “cancel”
command to delete messages already posted. Only the NNTP server of origin
is supposed to cancel a message. The cancel command is seldom used by users,
it is, however, (ab)used by cancel bots, that is programs that attempt to delete
spam. Due to the voluntary nature of these delete operators, it can be easily
shoehorned on top of any messaging system by means of a special message.
Such a cancel message basically is a request to remove an earlier message. Since
such a cancel message can be a normal message with a special content, such a
voluntary removal scheme can be implemented at the application level, should
the need for it ever arise.
One consequence of the lack of a delete operator is that messages might live
forever. With massive messaging, this can cause a storage problem. Actually, all
of the better known messaging systems use one form of expiration or the other.
For example, USENET articles expire after several days or weeks and E-mail
messages are (supposed to be) deleted after each successful hop, leaving only
one private copy at the end point, out of reach of the local MTA. The uniﬁed
messaging model also supports message expiration but it is up to the application
layer to choose the expiration date of outgoing messages, as well as to extend a
message’s lifetime, if need be.
2.2 Uniﬁed Messaging Model
After the terse introduction above describing the uniﬁed messaging system, this
section will elaborate on its underlying model.
2.2.1 Goals
One of the prerequisites of a model for a UMS is the maximum adaptability.
Clearly this is not the only property a uniﬁed messaging model should have.
The uniﬁed messaging model is designed with the following goals in mind:
1. Large-scale messaging: handling hundreds of billions of messages per day
between billions of users.
2. Independence of trusted sites: allowing (a combination of ) a client/server
or a peer-to-peer communication model [46].
3. Prevention of spam: preventing unsolicited messages, without restricting
the freedom of speech.
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4. Orthogonality of dimensions: deciding on time, direction, audience, and
address independently.
Note that the goals of an implementation are a superset of these goals. In
Chapter 4 the goals of the UMS implementation will be enumerated. They will
include ease of use, eﬃciency, and maintainability among others. For themodel
such goals are an undesirable burden.
2.2.2 Target and TISM
There are some things that, by my deﬁnition, all messaging systems have in
common. Every messaging system has some digital representation of a message.
Also every messaging system has some kind of storage unit for those messages.
Messaging systems typically have their own nomenclature. A message can be
termed “mail,” “text,” “post,” “tweet,” “message,” etc. The same naming diver-
sion can be found with regard to the place where these messages can be found.
Typical names are “mailbox,” “channel,” “bin,” and “group.”
A UMS needs some new terminology to counter possible assumptions due
to the reuse of known nomenclature. In the UMS each message is “targeted”
because it is directed towards a speciﬁc user or a group of users, a message is
immutable because it cannot be changed after it has been sent and it is usually
short. From this reasoning the acronym TISM (Targeted Immutable Short
Message) has arisen. Also, the word “target” is used to denote the destination of
a TISM. Within the model, “messaging service” is deﬁned as making a TISM
accessible for a group of users, by posting it to one or more targets. It will come
as no surprise that the main objects in the uniﬁed messaging model are: TISM,
containing a subject and a message body; and target, containing a set of TISMs.
2.2.3 Protection and Identiﬁcation
A target protects each TISM with public key encryption and a message di-
gest [55]. In our model each target is associated with a unique post-key/read-key
pair. To post a TISM, the proper post-key is needed. Likewise, to read a TISM,
the proper read-key is needed. Without a read-key, it is suﬃciently hard to re-
construct a TISM, even if a post-key and a copy of the encrypted TISM are
available. Without a post-key, it is very hard to spoof a TISM even if the read-
key is available. The UMS will generate a new post-key/read-key pair for every
new target.
In the UMS a target is identiﬁed by a systemwide unique bit string. We
deﬁne a target-ID as this unique bit string. To access a target, the proper key is
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needed in combination with the target-ID. This combination is called a UMS
tuple. A UMS tuple consists of one or two keys and a target-ID. For conve-
nience a (post-key, read-key, target-ID) tuple is denoted as a post/read-tuple.
Likewise, we use (read-key, target-ID) as a read-tuple and (post-key, target-ID)
as a post-tuple. When the UMS creates a target for a user, the user is returned
a post/read-tuple, from which a separate post-tuple and read-tuple can be cre-
ated. Typically, a user might create a target and distribute its read-tuple to
others, enabling them to get the encoded TISMs from the target (using the
target-ID) and to decode those TISMs (with the read-key). This is similar to a
weblog-messaging system. Had the user distributed the post-tuple, an E-mail
like messaging system would have resulted, as it would allow people to post
messages for that user to read.
TheUMS user has a number of ways to distribute UMS tuples. For example,
a user could pass on a tuple wrapped in a TISM, distribute a tuple through the
World Wide Web, or store a tuple in one of more name-space systems. Other
lookup models are also feasible. Note that not being bound to any particular
lookup mechanism or name-space service is one of the strengths of the UMS.
2.2.4 Taking Control
To utilize the ﬁne-grained control the UMS oﬀers, the user needs a separate
target for each diﬀerent communication partner or group. This may sound
complex, especially to users that manage all their Internet E-mail from one so-
called, in-box. However, most E-mail users already have many sub-mailboxes.
Likewise, most IM systems allow users to create any channel/room they want
to. As another example, every USENET user can create a new alt.* group
at will (like the actually existing alt.swedish.chef.bork.bork.bork). Creating
a new box or channel, in one of these legacy messaging systems, is limited by
the ability to create a new entry in the accompanying name space. For exam-
ple, ﬁnding a meaningful name for a new alt.* USENET group that does not
already exist, is hard, as is the case for IM channels/rooms.
In the UMS system, the target-ID is not bound to any name so users can eas-
ily create thousands of targets if need be. Note that this will necessitate support
from the application layer to hide complexity.
2.3 Resource Allocation
One thing that is radically diﬀerent in the uniﬁed messaging model when com-
pared to legacy approaches is how and when resources are being used. Most
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messaging systems push their messages as far as possible towards the receiver.
Clearly, this makes sense from a performance point of view. However, it also
allows spammers (i.e., users that send out spam), to send out vast numbers of
messages (typically resulting in millions of copies being distributed), in a short
time. Messages are simply pushed into the messaging system, and after that
resources of other participants (i.e., likely receivers) are being used for delivery,
resulting in shorter delays for the receivers. With modern networks, perfor-
mance is not so much of an issue any more. Checking a remote message store
every minute for changes, is no problem for most current network infrastruc-
tures. This makes message-pull systems a viable alternative. The basic distribu-
tion method of the uniﬁed messaging model is message-pull. Every target and
TISM has a home location. This is the place of origin in the form of a server on
the user’s network. It is also the only place that has to hold on to the created
target or TISM.There are two important observations to make about this. First,
unlike most messaging systems, the poster has to supply the (storage, process
and bandwidth) resources. Second, there is at least one known place where the
message is available (until it expires). This illustrates how the UMS puts the
recipient in control, in contrast to most existing messaging systems.
Note that the uniﬁed messaging model does allow consenting parties to
use message-push or other replication policies on top of this basic distribu-
tion. This is facilitated by additional replication at a lower layer as described
in Section 3.5.6
2.4 Mimicking Legacy Messaging System
Since the uniﬁed messaging model should be able to accommodate virtually all
other messaging systems, I will give a coarse description of UMS-based appli-
cations that mimic the functionality of the following legacy messaging systems:
1. Internet E-mail: being large and well known.
2. USENET News: targeting groups of users.
3. Instant messaging: featuring a real-time component.
4. Web logging: featuring subtle rules for posting.
The functionality of these systems is deﬁned in accordance with the taxonomy
as discussed in Section 1.4.
2.4.1 Internet E-mail Imitation
The E-mail system is a (permanent, simplex, world, list) messaging system. A
message-management program (let’s call it u-mail) would distribute a post-tuple
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of a newly created target (let’s call it mailbox target). U-mail would further dis-
play selected TISMs from the mailbox target. U-mail would allow new TISMs
to be posted to any target it holds a post-tuple for.
To be backward compatible with the Internet E-mail system, the u-mail
program could also feature legacy protocols like SMTP, POP3, and IMAP4.
2.4.2 USENET Imitation
The USENET News system is a (impermanent, duplex, group, all) messaging
system. Amessage-management program (let’s call it u-news) would allow users
to create a new target and distribute its post/read-tuple. The u-news program
would list the short text of the TISMs of the subscribed targets. Users can then
select the TISMs they want to read. U-news would further allow users to read
from and post to those subscribed targets. A fair amount of backward compat-
ibility could be realized here too. Section 2.5 will show a way of distributing
UMS tuples to mimic newsgroup moderation.
2.4.3 Instant Messaging Imitation
Most IM systems (like WhatsApp, BBM (BlackBerry Messenger), AIM (AOL
InstantMessenger), ICQ, SkypeChat, and IRC) are (immediate, duplex, group,
all) messaging systems [25]. An IM interface program (let’s call it u-talk) would
allow users to create a target and distribute its post/read-tuple. U-talk would
allow users to select a target. The u-talk program would supply the selected tar-
get with a call-back function, that the target would call upon the arrival of new
TISMs. The u-talk program would display a split screen, showing all the new
TISMs in the top half and allow the user to type in lines of text in the bottom
half. The u-talk program would post each line the user types, preﬁxed with a
user alias, as a new TISM. Again backward compatibility could be introduced.
2.4.4 Web Logging Imitation
A weblog is a combination of simplex and duplex communication. In its purest
form a blogger (i.e., a user who runs the weblog) appends messages to a page on
the WWW.The blogger can append messages and other users can only read the
messages. However, users can react to a weblog message by posting a follow-
up message. Weblogs thus form a (impermanent, simplex/duplex, world, all)
messaging system.
A weblog management program (let’s call it u-blog) would allow a user to
create a new target (let’s call it blog target) and distribute its read-tuple. U-
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blog would further allow selecting a blog target and reading TISMs from the
selected blog target. U-blog would allow a blogger (i.e., a user in possession
of a post/read-tuple) to post a new TISM to a blog target. Appended to this
TISM is a post/read-tuple of a newly created target (let’s call it follow-up tar-
get). U-blog would allow reading from, and posting to, any follow-up target.
Obvious extensions, like having multiple bloggers or moderated follow-ups can
be realized along similar lines, using still more targets and careful management
of the UMS tuples.
2.5 New Messaging Paradigms
As we have shown, the UMS can be used to mimic existing messaging systems,
but the model has much more to oﬀer. Proper distribution of UMS tuples
allows the UMS to implement almost any imaginable messaging system. Some
might ﬁnd it surprising that with only a few tuples, some novel and complex
forms of messaging can be facilitated. The (a) Figures from 2.2 through 2.7
show possiblemessaging system. Tuples are depicted as solid arrows showing the
allowed TISM ﬂow. A thicker solid arrow signiﬁes ownership. The (b) Figures
from 2.2 through 2.7 show a corresponding example usage. The numbered
dotted arrows show the path an example TISM would travel from poster to
reader. In all ﬁgures the application layer program is depicted as a stick-person
and the target is depicted as an amoeba-like blob.
If there would be one target for which all users had a post/read-tuple, it
would be a form of a say-all, hear-all messaging system (see Figure 2.2). It would
be hard to deny access to individual users. Note that in the UMS model, it is
feasible to have a high-volume target like this without a huge central server,
because TISMs are stored at the poster’s home location. By limiting others
reader
poster
1
2 3
(b)
reader
(a)
Figure 2.2: Say-All, Hear-All Messaging. Note how hard it would be to
ban an individual user in possession of a post/read tuple.
to read-only access, the say-all, hear-all messaging turns into publish-subscribe
2.5. NEW MESSAGING PARADIGMS 51
messaging. If one user (called the publisher) created a new target and publicly
announced a read-tuple, a simple form of publish-subscribe messaging could
take place. Figure 2.3 shows just that situation, with one publisher and three
subscribers. This model can be extended even further. If one user (called the
2
(b)
subscribers
publisher
1
4
3
(a)
Figure 2.3: Publish-subscribe Messaging. Note how hard it would be to
ban an individual user in possession of a post/read tuple.
moderator) created a new target (i.e., a moderated target) and distributed a
read-tuple to a number of other users, a form of moderated messaging would
result (as shown in Figure 2.4). The moderator would cross-post a selection
from the unmoderated target into the moderated target. The beauty of this
scheme is that any user can start doing this at any time. By the way, even if the
moderated target would contain many TISMs, the required resources for the
moderator would be modest for there is no need to copy all the TISMs from the
unmoderated target, only the meta information would have to be stored. Some-
moderated
moderator
unmoderated
targettarget
unmoderated
targettarget
moderator
poster
reader
moderated
(a)
1
(b)
4
23
Figure 2.4: Moderated Messaging. Note how the moderator can de-
cide on a per TISM basis to forward a message or not. The
moderator however cannot ban an individual poster.
times a moderator needs the ability to deny access to an individual user (let’s call
him BIFF [56]). A messaging system can be constructed such that input from
BIFF can be made invisible. First, the moderator creates an input-moderated
target and distributes the read-tuple, just as in the previous example. Then, the
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moderator solicits from each user the read-tuple for a new target. From these
so-called, input targets TISMs can be cross-posted into the moderated target.
The result is shown in Figure 2.5. This way a moderator can oust BIFF simply
by ignoring BIFF’s input target. Reverse all the arrows in Figure 2.5 and an
output-moderated messaging system would result, allowing the moderator to
select none, or a number of appropriate TISMs for each individual user. A com-
bination of both would lead to a highly conﬁgurable input-/output-moderated
or total-moderated messaging system. Total moderation is, in fact, a combina-
input
targets
moderated
target
moderator
moderated
target
moderator
reader
poster input
target
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2
1
(b)
3
4
Figure 2.5: Input Moderation. Note how, contrary to Figure 2.4 the
moderator can now also ban an individual poster just by
ignoring their input target.
tion of manual selection and manual forwarding. The forwarding part could be
done automatically by a computer (i.e., a forwarding server), to a given set of
users. Automatic forwarding is best known under the name of “mailing list.”
A mailing list is a form of read-access control. Note that it is easy to confuse
moderating and access control. Moderating is done on a per-message basis, and
access control is per-user based. Besides read-access control, there is, of course,
post-access control. Access controlled posting can be seen in the form of the
registering mechanism, as featured by some weblogs and IM systems. Currently
there are no well known messaging systems that oﬀer full read- and post-access
control. The closest thing to a messaging system with full-blown access control
would be a moderated E-mail mailing list or a moderated BBS (Bulletin Board
System). However, any user in possession of the address of a mailing list can
post messages to the moderator, even if the user is not on the list. These kind
of “holes” in control exist because the control was shoehorned on an existing
system. Holes like these can be plugged by using special mailing list or BBS
server software like Fluxbox, Dada Mail, UseBB, or Mailman.
In the messaging system as shown in Figure 2.6, it is possible to prevent post-
ing by an individual user. In this messaging system the automatic forwarding
A or B could be stopped. For a picture of a classical (i.e., output controlled)
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mailing list messaging system, we need to simply reverse the arrows.
A
B
A
1
reader
poster
(a)
2
3
(b)
Figure 2.6: Input Controlled Mailing List. Note that this messaging
model is the same as the one in Figure 2.5 with the mod-
erator replaced by automatic forwarding processes A and B
allowing per postermoderation, though not of an individual
reader.
A fully controlledmailing-list likemessaging system is depicted in Figure 2.7.
By controlling the automatic forwarding A, B, C, and D, it becomes possible to
control which individual user can post and/or read.
C
D
A
B
T T
B
D
reader
4
3
2
poster
1
(b)(a)
Figure 2.7: Fully Controlled Mailing List. Note how in this messaging
model automatic forwarding A through D can be cut to reg-
ulate posting and reading on a per user basis.
It can be hard to discontinue a subscription to an Internet E-mail mailing
list, but it is always simple to unsubscribe from a UMS mailing list, because in
this system, a user does not depend on another person to stop the forwarding.
The user, in Figure 2.7 who is reading from target T can stop reading from it at
any time, and because target T collects TISMs only from this speciﬁc mailing
list, no other TISMs are lost.
This is a general feature of the UMSmodel. Users can be very selective, since
each communication platform is supported by an ad hoc created messaging
system. Users will have many targets to receive TISMs from: their spouse,
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their boss, their mother, their company’s mailing list, their hobby club, their
government, and so on, each of which can be ignored independently without
further ado. Asmentioned above, the poster is initially responsible for resources,
not the receiver.
We have shown, with these few examples, that careful creation of targets
and distributing their UMS tuples, can lead to the creation of sophisticated
messaging systems.
2.6 Summary
This chapter described a basic model for massive messaging that incorporates
all the current messaging systems, as well as any messaging system that ﬁts the
messaging system taxonomy. I have introduced the concept of target and TISM,
and discussed the major diﬀerences between the uniﬁed messaging model and
current messaging practices. The next chapter will in detail deﬁne, describe,
and discuss a split oﬀ of a generic distributed-object layer from the UMS layer.
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❧ ”Whatwould it take to implement a uniﬁedmessaging system?”
My ﬁrst thought was ”a miracle.” My promotor pointed out
that miracles are often misunderstood normalities, ”just keep
dividing miracles in smaller miracles until they seem normalities.”
I realized he was talking about software abstractions and after
some pondering I found three simplifying abstractions. First,
content-centric addressing for location-agnostic access to data
objects (e.g., s), second, clustering for data-object group-
ing (e.g., targets), third, replication policies for meta informa-
tion (e.g., s added to targets). I remember thinking ”three
miraclettes” because it is like sitting atop a cloud from where
requested objects magically appear, in a whimsical structure
imposed upon the cloud and soft whispers telling all about
that cloud. My promotor, however, was unperturbed: ”Imple-
ment these abstractions ﬁrst, it will simplify the rest.” I realized
that this might be doable if the distributed data objects were
dumb and small. If done well, these ”micro-objects” would
make perfect building blocks for a whole class of distributed
application objects, not just targets and s. It would leave
only an easier question: ”How to implement uniﬁed messaging
atop a cloud of micro-objects?”
❦
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Chapter 3
Micro-Objects
“People should learn how to play Lego with their minds.”
Vitorino Ramos, bio-inspired computation specialist.
Implementing a middleware layer to provide a uniﬁed messaging service can
be quite challenging. A naive approach would be to translate the concepts of
the uniﬁed messaging model, one-on-one, to application objects. The proof-of-
concept implementations that were initially written as part of this research had
a target and a TISM class. Deﬁning the interface for these classes was almost
trivial, however, implementing these classes proved to be challenging. Most
challenges had to do with the large-scale distributed nature of the system. To
facilitate the design and implementation the middleware layer was split into two
layers. The bottom layer of the stack would isolate the distribution part, and
top one would implement the messaging service. The idea was to use an oﬀ-the-
shelf, or slightly adapted, implementation for the distribution part. Selecting
an existing implementation proved hard. All implementations reviewed had
some drawbacks. There were, however, problems that none of the candidates
solved, notably those related to partial failure. An important lesson from these
selection eﬀorts was one of the fundamental truths of distributed systems:
Partial failure cannot be made transparent, rather, it should be made
apparent and conﬁned to a single distribution layer.
Partial failures happen when one information exchange, in a related series of
several, fails. For example, Alice sends some information to Bob. If no timely
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conﬁrmation is received, either it is lost, still forthcoming, or Alice’s initial in-
formation has not been received (yet). As the parties do not know whether
their actions are based on the same information, this poses a coördination prob-
lem. With large-scale distribution, there are many, not just two, parties second
guessing each other, and the problem is aggravated. It turns out that the more
complex the shared data is, the more complex it becomes to deal with partial
failures. In this chapter a novel design is presented for the lower layer of our
implementation and that does minimize the problems with partial failures.
3.1 Distribution Woes
Creating a truly large-scale distributed application has since long been recog-
nized to be a nontrivial exercise despite the existence of various distributed-
application development frameworks. Astley et al. [8] notice that the asyn-
chronous nature of distributed systems signiﬁcantly complicates application de-
velopment. Klintskog et al. [42] notice that transparency is possible, modulo
failure, timings, and resource consumption. Frameworks like CORBA (Com-
mon Object Request Broker Architecture), .NET Remoting, and EJB (Enter-
prise Java Beans) try to map the object-oriented programming paradigm to net-
worked environments. This mapping is accomplished through a remote-object
model in which an object is deﬁned in terms of a set of interfaces declared in
an IDL (Interface Deﬁnition Language). Messages to an object can then be
redirected to a remote address space. Waldo et al. [65] showed that frameworks
that hide the distinction between local and remote objects are inherently unre-
liable. This is because such a model inevitably leads to an RPC (Remote Pro-
cedure Call) type of framework that cannot deal transparently with problems
caused by partial failures and concurrency constraints. To assist the applica-
tion programmer in dealing with these problems, distributed-application de-
velopment frameworks have been augmented to open up the implementation
of remote objects, even though that goes against the principal of abstraction.
Various, partially overlapping programming techniques are being used to make
the object support environment more open, including reﬂection [43, 63], (dy-
namic) composition [59], and AOP (Aspect Oriented Programming) [39, 40].
In essence, both reﬂection and AOP allow for ﬁner grained separation of con-
cerns, in turn allowing the programmer to pinpoint better where partial failures
play a role. Using composition, building larger objects from smaller objects,
resembles micro-object programming. Still, all three programming techniques
aim to support the transparent promotion of local objects to remote objects
by sending interobject messages through a network. Therefor, none solves the
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basic design ﬂaw: applications still have to send messages through a distributed
environment prone to partial failures. Therefore, all the diﬃculties inherent to
distribution addressed in [65] remain. Other extensions to the object model
have been researched. For example, there is the large category of actors. Actors
extend the object model by adding concurrency to the distributed object [2].
Basically, actors are autonomous, distributed, concurrently executing objects
that exchange messages. Interesting as this may be, it does not solve the prob-
lem of partial failures, because actors that are distributed over diﬀerent nodes
in a network will need some form of network communication. Adding concur-
rency does not solve the problems caused by partial failures. Transparency often
is feasible if no errors occur. For example, Parrot is a system that transparently
integrates distributed-ﬁle services by means of an “interposition agent” [62].
However, ignoring or sublimating errors deﬁes transparency. For example, in
the Parrot system, some ﬁles (notably FTP (File Transfer Protocol) ﬁles) are
copied, changed and written back without (transparent) collision resolution.
Also, some errors lead to a premature termination of the application process.
One could argue that premature termination is transparent to the program, but
usually, it is not transparent to the user. Even though total transparency is im-
possible, it still is possible to help the application programmer with the distribu-
tional aspects of programming. A new approach to simplify distributed-systems
development using an explicit nontransparent failure model is described in the
next section.
3.2 A New Approach
The new approach is based on the assumption that it is better to reverse the ﬂow
of information by copying selected remote objects to the local address space for
local processing instead of sending instructions to remote locations for remote
processing. Local processing will prevent the partial failures associated with
remote processing. Using this approach leaves information retrieval to be the
only thing that depends on remote processing. Moreover, an object retrieval
request can either have a positive or negative outcome and false negatives can
safely be interpreted as normal negatives. This indiﬀerence to partial failure will
be referred to as apparent failure because it allows the application programmer
to know both where and how things can fail. An object change request, on
the other hand, does not have apparent failure because it relies on an atomic
execute--and--acknowledge step that can fail partially, often promoting false
negatives into a big problem for the application. No matter the direction of the
information ﬂow, remote objects have to be located. As will be described below,
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assigning a systemwide unique ID to remote objects enables a middelware layer
to oﬀer an homogeneous cloud of remote objects who’s exact locations are of no
concern of the application layer.
This novel approach to distributed programming is thus based on a copy-
before-use scheme, featuring transparent object location and apparent failure.
For some application domains, this approach allows massive information ex-
change by vast numbers of applications without partial failure deteriorating the
system. Distribution aspects are handled through a simple API (Application
Programming Interface), enabling an application to express its needs irrespec-
tively of what peer applications need. This pure localized expression of distribu-
tion needs will result in emergent communication behavior, which turns out to
be suﬃcient to handle many information exchange patterns for which current
approaches require explicit control by a programmer. This approach, however,
is not without its own challenges, most notably in the realms of concurrency,
availability, and performance. A response to these challenges, a replication sys-
tem featuring a very simple, lightweight object, dubbedMO (micro-object), will
be introduced below. The cloud of MOs is provided by a set of distributed
MO cloud servers or cloud servers. The resulting system is called an MO system.
It’s purpose is to provide application programmers with small distributed build-
ing blocks (i.e., micro-objects) that can be used to construct larger distributed
objects (i.e., application objects).
3.3 Micro-Object Internals
At the heart of theMO system lies the notion of a micro-object. A micro-object
is a relatively small container used to ferry copies of distributed data around.
For the creation of larger distributed data structures, micro-objects can be clus-
tered into arbitrary graphs. Before delving into the design choices, ﬁrst a brief,
yet complete description of a micro-object, is in order. Figure 3.1 shows its
organization.
A micro-object is used to distribute an immutable and a mutable data part.
The immutable part comprises a token by which the object can be uniquely
identiﬁed. Every token contains a home location pointing to the home server,
where a copy of the micro-object is guaranteed to be kept (until it expires). The
token is systemwide unique and can be used to locate a copy of themicro-object.
More profound than the immutability of the token, is the fact that it is not the
only immutable part: the immutable section also contains a limited-sized buﬀer
of (encrypted) application data, or payload. It should be stressed that the pay-
load cannot be modiﬁed, a design choice that will be discussed below. Though
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Figure 3.1: The general organization of a micro-object. The distributed
part of a micro-object contains information that is shared by
all local copies. The part that is not distributed contains local
information that can (and usually does) diﬀer per local copy
and can only be shared out of band.
the payload (and the token) are immutable, a micro-object can group related
micro-objects into a mutable cluster. Every micro-object has a cluster of zero
or more other micro-objects. There are no constraints, every micro-object can
be put in the cluster of any other micro-object. Clustering allow for the con-
struction of arbitrary graphs of micro-objects, which are versatile enough for a
whole class of applications. These graphs of micro-objects are limited mutable,
they can only grow because a cluster is like an append-only list: members can
only be added, but never removed. As discussed below, this restriction simpli-
ﬁes distribution and the development of distributed applications. This kind of
limited mutability might seem too limiting, however, in Section 3.5.4, it will be
shown not to be the case. The immutable and mutable section together form
the distributed part of a micro-object. This part is copied and updated across a
network by the MO system. An important issue is that the distributed part is
securely protected against unauthorized access. Equally important is that the
application using a (copy of a) micro-object stays in full control regarding the
replication of the mutable part (i.e., the cluster) of that micro-object. An appli-
cation (programmer) has to express only the policy for replicating the object’s
cluster according to its own local demands. For example, if rapid dissemination
is needed, an application may specify that changes to a cluster (i.e., additions)
should be ﬂooded throughout the network. Whether ﬂooding actually takes
place depends on the (again local) needs of potential recipients.
This protection and control is achieved through the nondistributed part of
a micro-object. The nondistributed part consists of two sections. The closed
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shared section describes how the payload and cluster sections of themicro-object
are protected. Typically, this section contains policy descriptors and encryption
keys: information that may be disclosed only within a closed group through se-
cure channels. The openly shared section describes the rules (i.e., the replication
policy) that should be followed when copying (changes in) cluster information
to and from other address spaces. By its nature, replication data has to be share-
able, however, it does not classify as distributed data, because it does not have
to be the same for every individual copy of a given micro-object. As discussed
in the next section, these local policies provide a high degree of ﬂexibility in
distributing and replicating micro-objects.
3.4 Example Scenario
To illustrate the organization and usage of micro-objects, consider the following
simple scenario. Alice, Bob, andClare regularly publish newsmessages that they
would like to distribute as micro-objects. To this end, Alice takes the initiative
to create a micro-objectM for storing their shared news messages. The payload
ofM will not need to hold any data other than perhaps a description of the type
of news items it is intended to contain, or maybe a password for the messages
associated with M. The cluster of M holds the tokens of micro-objects holding
the actual news messages. Note that this makes Alice’s dedicated cloud server
the home server for M. Alice’s local copy of M is denoted as MA. Alice then
passes the token (a systemwide unique identiﬁer) ofM to Bob and Clare, using
any well known communication method, and Bob and Clare retrieve their copy
of M (referred to as MB and MC, respectively) from the MO system. Note that
the server’s contact information (i.e., Alice’s dedicated cloud server) is stored as
part of the object’s token.
Once Bob and Clare have the token of M (and the proper security creden-
tials) they can add a micro-object with a message payload to M. However, by
default, these additions toM’s cluster will not be forwarded to the other parties.
In order to express that additions should be actively forwarded to other parties,
Alice, Bob, and Clare decide to choose the replication policy of their local copies
ofM such that new news items are instantly forwarded to all other participants.
Now assume that Bob produces a news item that he wants to share with Alice
and Clare. To that end, he creates a micro-object (N1 at his dedicated cloud
server) containing the an actual news message and adds the its token to his local
copy MB of M that will be forwarded to his home server.
Due to the chosen replication policy, the home server will make an attempt
to forward any of the elements contained in the object’s cluster, as shown in
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Figure 3.2(a). The only server it knows about (at this point in time), is the home
server ofM (i.e., Alice’s dedicated cloud server). Bob’s server will then contact all
the servers in the replication data ofMB, in this case only the home server ofM,
to report the additions to the cluster ofM. This reporting is done bymeans of an
 request, which essentially initiates a harmonization of cluster elements
between MA and MB. The word “assent” is used because the harmonization
protocol has only one type of message requesting: “please assert to this cluster
content.” No message, not even an acknowledge message is expected in return.
However, if the receiver ﬁnds the cluster incomplete, it might send out its own
assent request.
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Figure 3.2: Memory snapshot of local copies of M at time (a), (b), and
(c). Shown are the ﬁelds, token, cluster, replication policy,
and replication data.
Only because the replication policy () speciﬁed for MA matches
the one speciﬁed for MB, will Alice’s server react to the  request. Alice’s
server will ﬁrst add Bob’s server to the ﬂooding replication data of MA. Then
Alice’s server will add the new token for N1 to the cluster ofMA. After updating
MA, Alice’s server searches the replication data of MA for servers that are not in
the replication data ofMB. Since it ﬁnds none, the changes need not be ﬂooded
onwards to other servers.
Next, assume Clare inserts a news item N2. At that moment, Clare’s server
sends out the cluster and replication data of MC to all servers in the replication
data ofMC, as shown in Figure 3.2(b). The only server that is known is the home
server ofM, Alice’s server. Alice’s server will then update both the cluster and the
replication data of MA, after which it will search for servers in the replication
data of MA that are not in the recently received replication data of MC. In
this case, there is one candidate: Bob’s server. Bob’s server is sent the cluster
and replication data of MA, so it can update MB. Clare’s server is also sent the
replication data ofMA so it can update the replication data ofMC. The resulting
66 CHAPTER 3. MICRO-OBJECTS
situation is shown in Figure 3.2(c). From a application programmers point of
view, M, N1, and N2 make up an distributed application object that is mutable
and can be represented by a graph, see Figure 3.3. Note that each node of the
M
N1 N2
Figure 3.3: Alice’s distributed news messaging object represented as a
rooted graph. The messaging object contains two messages.
Access to the root (i.e., M) is enough to access all the news.
graph is located on a diﬀerent home server and replicated on all servers and
application computers involved.
There are a number of important observations to make. First, note that
cluster elements are only tokens. As a consequence, after the clusters of MA,
MB, and MC have been merged, the servers of Alice, Bob, and Clare will still
need to explicitly fetch N1 or N2 to get (the payload of ) the new messages.
Also note that news items can be forwarded only to cloud servers that are
known to the forwarder and that have indicated that they are willing to accept
such items by means of a matching replication policy. An important eﬀect of
this need for matching is that, for example, Bob cannot produce a news (or
any other) item that will be stored at Alice’s, Clare’s or any other server without
cooperation of that server.
It should be stressed that there are only local copies of M in the system.
Although M has a home server, this does not mean that there exists a most
up-to-date master copy ofM (e.g., one of which the cluster has incorporated all
changes so far). Instead, it only means that some local copy of M is guaranteed
to be found at its home server.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, in the example, the clusters of the local
copies of M did converge, as distributed data should. However, the replication
data of the local copies of M did not (need to) converge. In eﬀect, only after
some elapse of time did all news items reach all interested parties.
In this example, the steps for enforcing cluster security policy were omitted.
These steps would (for most cluster security policies) entail authentication to
ensure that only those additions to the cluster that are properly authenticated
will be accepted. Security policies will be further discussed below.
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3.5 Design Issues
The main goal of theMO system is to make it easier for programmers to design
and develop distributed applications. Initially, it was conceived as an abstrac-
tion layer to develop a uniﬁed messaging application. The reasons to make the
abstraction layer generic nonetheless, were twofold. First, abstractions work
best if they are isolated from others, lest they become leaky. Second, the more
generic some thing is implemented the simpler the code. Therefore, uniﬁed
messaging initiated but does not play a role in the design. The MO system
makes it easier to identify, locate, delete, update, protect, and replicate distributed
data by providing a clear and singular way of dealing with these issues. Some of
the protection and replication aspects, however, depend on local (temporary)
circumstances, and have to be dynamically directed by the application. To this
end, theMO system oﬀers a limited number of security and replication policies
for the application (programmer) to choose from that can be tuned by changing
local security and replication data. The replication data is shared throughout
theMO system when necessary, the security data, however, is closed shared data,
because it is shared in a closed group only. Furthermore, theMO system has no
data access control, but is able to detect bogus data to some extent. The design
issues concerning all of these points are explained below.
3.5.1 Identifying Data
Tokens are used to manage micro-objects and to describe links between micro-
objects. Each micro-object is associated with a token that is systemwide unique
to simplify its processing in a highly distributed environment. For example,
the token allows tracking an object back to its home location, and also to check
how long servers need to support its distribution by means of an expiration
date. Besides these two attributes, a token also consists of a hash, which is
computed over the home location, expiration date, and the object’s payload.
The implementation is slightly more complex than this: to distinguish micro-
objects with the same home location, expiration date, and (encrypted) payload,
the implementation also features a token counter. Essentially, the hash ensures,
with a suﬃciently high probability, that the token is indeed systemwide unique.
Nonetheless a token can be computed locally: there is no need to communicate
with another party. Addressing data directly frees the application (programmer)
from having to locate objects. All the objects are just in one big cloud and local
copies can be retrieved from just knowing the micro-object’s token.
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3.5.2 Locating Data
After some data has been requested by the application, theMO system does have
to locate it for retrieval. With improperly designed identiﬁers, data location can
become a major issue in any distributed system. The WWW handles massive
data exchange and has a simple scheme for locating data: the URL (Uniform
Resource Locator). The locating part of the URL is the home location of an
object. Basically copying this simple proven concept, each micro-object has a
home location (i.e., a server) that is guaranteed to hold (a copy of ) the micro-
object. Since every micro-object has a home location, the payload of a micro-
object can, pending communication errors, always be found, independently of
replication eﬀorts. Note that replication improves the QoS (Quality of Service):
the micro-object system is fully functional without replication.
Since micro-objects expire, there is little need for the, sometimes relatively
intricate, “binding” steps as featured by many existing middleware solutions.
However, if need be, the micro-object system can, on a per object basis, use in-
direct addressing. For example, one micro-object might have a home location
containing a DNS host name, another micro-object might have a raw IP ad-
dress. There is no native bindingmechanism but there is no fundamental reason
why several indirect addressing, or binding, methods could not be added.
A consequence of this design is that the creator of a micro-object is respon-
sible for keeping it online until its expiration date. One might consider this
a drawback, but it introduces a form of fairness as the creators of data should
now also provide the resources for keeping their data in the system. In this way,
creators hold a bigger share in the cost of resources (CPU time, storage, network
bandwidth) in comparison to other approaches, like systems based on NNTP
or SMTP.
Still, to make this home location scheme work, the system has to provide
the means to retrieve a copy of a given micro-object from its token until it
expires. Therefore a home server needs to be always online, just like the WWW
depends on servers being online. This scheme has been proven to work, but not
to be robust. To enhance the robustness, the MO system contains additional
replication options as described in Section 3.5.6.
3.5.3 Deleting Data
Deleting a distributed object means deleting all its local copies. Every micro-
object has an expiration date: this helps maximize the number of issues that
can be dealt with locally by the MO system. The expiration date speciﬁes until
when the object can be retrieved from its home location. The expiration date
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should be set to allow a micro-object to reach all participants it needs to reach.
The expiration date is determined by the application program(mer). Once the
expiration date has passed, the system is no longer required to store the object
on any server, most notably its home server. There is now no longer a need for a
delete operator. In other words, if a micro-object is ignored long enough, it will
disappear. A distributed delete operator could be fairly complex, especially if it
would need to guarantee that all replicas of an object had indeed been removed.
In order to keep an object longer than its expiration date, an application
will need to explicitly take action, such as requiring its local server to extend
the lifetime of the object. It can do so by specifying a local  replication
policy. This issue is detailed below.
To prevent premature expiration some form of clock synchronization be-
tween all participating parties is needed. The granularity of this synchronization
need not be too ﬁne and can easily be satisﬁed through a time protocol such as
NTP. Assuming that the clock of a server can be kept up-to-date with a preci-
sion of T time units, a simple solution to premature expiration is to keep every
expired micro-object for a grace period T ∗ time units with T ∗ > T . Note that
each server can locally determine its own grace period based on the granularity
and precision of its time synchronization mechanism.
3.5.4 Updating Data
In all but the most trivial applications, application objects change, and if the
object is distributed, local copies of that object might need to be updated. One
of the major challenges of any distributed system is supporting timely propaga-
tion of updates of distributed objects. However, it is diﬃcult, and often even
impossible for a system to predict which data will be updated, where updates
will be needed, and when. This lack of knowledge is unfortunate, as better pre-
dictions will enhance the positive eﬀects of replication, such as responsiveness
and availability. Since even the application programmer often has a hard time
predicting changes, the distributed part consists of a mutable and immutable
part, as shown previously in Figure 3.1.
This separation eﬀectively concentrates changes in the mutable part of an
object, making them better explicit to both the application (programmer) as
well as the MO system. The mutable part (i.e., the cluster) exclusively con-
tains only references to (i.e., tokens of ) micro-objects. Allowing only the set
of references (i.e., clusters) to change simpliﬁes updates considerably. Even the
update operations on the mutable part are limited by design. In particular, there
is only an operator to add tokens, but no operator to remove tokens, further
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simplifying the update process. Moreover, the mutable part has been specially
constructed for eﬃcient replication by sorting its elements on expiration date.
This sorting allows us to construct eﬃcient representations of clusters so that
two parties can quickly detect diﬀerences in their respective clusters [66]. Note
that since the expiration date is part of the token, a list of tokens can be sorted
locally, in line with the design philosophy to maximize the number of issues
that can be decided on locally.
Thismodel forces the application to express distributed application objects as
(a growing number of ) immutable parts glued together in a way that is eﬃcient
for distribution. It can be argued that the combination of an immutable payload
and a limited mutable cluster is not enough to allow for distribution of arbitrary
mutable application data. However, a broad range of fully mutable distributed
application objects can be eﬃciently supported. A demonstration of this is given
in Section 3.7.
3.5.5 Protecting Data
The MO system supports ﬁne-grained security of distributed data, due to the
strict separation of security management and object management. Distribut-
ing data raises fundamental security challenges. The potential number of people
who could access distributed data could be huge and integrity and conﬁdential-
ity of data are not protected by personal hardware as is possible for nondis-
tributed data. Therefore, additional protection is needed. The MO system uses
a combination of end-to-end message encryption and message authentication
because it signiﬁcantly reduces the security demands for remote parties. Both
encryption and authentication are needed. Encryption prevents an attacker
from knowing the content of a micro-object but does not protect it against ma-
nipulation. Authentication can protect against manipulation of data but does
not protect against reading data. Authentication is also useful to protect the net-
work against attacks involving data spooﬁng. It is important to understand that
this encryption and authentication scheme is needed to protect theMO system,
not the data that is transported through it. The combination of end-to-end
encryption and authentication happens to provide some level of protection for
application data, but it does not satisfy all security needs of all applications. To
name but one example, attacks based on traﬃc analysis would not be foiled this
way. To counter traﬃc analysis, one might implement a replication policy based
on sophisticated cryptographic protocols like mix-networks. This, however, is
a whole separate ﬁeld of research [19] and beyond the scope of this thesis.
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3.5.6 Replicating Data
As stated before, theMO system always utilizes a local copy of a data object, where
the traditional approach is to utilize a remote copy of a data object through RPC
or RMI. This diﬀerence has important implications for data replication. In a
traditional system, replication is deployed to enhance performance or availabil-
ity. As a result, separate mechanisms are needed to support replica placement,
consistency enforcement, and redirecting clients to the best replica [58]. More-
over, replication may require the collaboration of third-party servers, leading to
the incentives and fairness problems hampering many of today’s decentralized
peer-to-peer systems [44, 54].
Basic Replication
In a local-copy system such as the MO system, purposefully replicating objects
for availability and performance can come at virtually no extra costs. First,
in order to access an object, an application will have to make a local copy of
that object. This mandatory object pulling on-demand is the basic replication
method of the MO system. As a result of basic replication, micro-objects are
already massively replicated on-demand, by client applications.
Additional Replication
In addition, if an application strives for higher performance, robustness, or
availability, it can specify this by means of an additional object-push or object-
prefetch replication policy, to be executed by the dedicated cloud server. The
eﬀect of such additional replication, is that objects end up quicker at those cloud
servers where they are wanted most. Eﬀectively, additional replication allows
cloud servers to preemptively fetch or push objects anticipating their use by
local applications. Note that additional replication is established as an ad hoc
agreement within a group of collaborating local applications using matching
replication policies, whereas basic replication is supported by all cloud servers,
independently of applications. One could view the MO system as a generic
structure that facilitates the creation of ad hoc overlay networks.
Because of the multitude of additional replication policies, there is no need
for a strong one-size-ﬁts-most basic replication. So having additional replication
allows relaxation of demands put on the basic replication. Also, basic replication
relaxes the demands on additional replication. For example, assume a group of
applications jointly follow a gossip-based dissemination and replication of their
objects by applying an anti-entropy protocol [27]. These protocols are known
to disseminate data in a robust way, but may easily introduce inconsistencies as
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diﬀerent nodes will see diﬀerent values. Since the MO system can always rely
on basic replication, these problems are alleviated when gossiping is used as an
additional way to replicate objects. If the payload of a micro-object is needed
immediately, it can always be fetched from its home server, because of the basic
replication support of the MO system.
At ﬁrst it might seem odd to allow a subset of cloud servers to engage in
an additional replication policy. In fact, it is one of the strongest points of
the MO system. For example, imagine a distributed ﬁle system based on the
MO system and assume several applications need to access the same ﬁle at the
same time. In this case, it would make perfect sense to let those applications
use an additional high-cost, high-performance replication policy on the micro-
object tree that makes up that ﬁle. The home servers of these applications would
eﬀectively form an additional overlay network.
Eventual Consistency
Micro-objects themselves are immutable. Any changes in an MO’s state stems
from additions to its cluster. Given that all tokens in the cluster have a sys-
temwide unique token, it follows that it is possible to consistently sort any given
set of tokens the same way. By sorting the tokens of a cluster upon insertion,
the order of token insertion becomes irrelevant. From a consistency point of
view, this is a very nice feature, because it greatly simpliﬁes keeping diﬀerent
local copies of a cluster consistent. Any replication strategy that delivers all the
cluster tokens to all the local copies at least once will eventually cause all local
copies to be consistent, even if several clusters are delivered out of order and
multiple times. Analogously to the deﬁnition given by Tajibnapis [60], clusters
in the MO system can be said to enjoy eventual consistency.
Heterogeneous Replication
It is worth noting that the basic replication takes place all the time. Therefore,
it takes place in parallel with any additional replication. In most systems using
replication, having two replication strategies run in parallel could cause sophis-
ticated challenges. At the very least the replication policies have to be aware of
the fact that other replication could be taking place. A lot of replication policies
are based on the silent assumption that there are no out-of-band or “sudden”
changes. TheMO system is designed to allow such parallel heterogeneous repli-
cation. This is relatively simple, because payloads are immutable and clusters
have no delete functionality. Not only can an additional replication policy be
combined with the basic replication, but a micro-object can have several het-
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erogeneous replications going on in parallel. Note that it makes sense to allow
this heterogeneous replication because without it, applications would have to
be aware of what other applications are doing if the data they use overlap. This
would complicate application development enormously while the whole point
of developing an MO system is simpliﬁcation of application development. By
design choice, one local copy can have only one additional replication policy.
This makes the API more intuitive. However, by making multiple local copies
of a micro-object, a micro-object can have heterogeneous replication policies
running at the same time.
3.6 Systems Design
Now that the micro-object has been introduced, it is time to discuss the design
of the MO system. All the components of the current version of the micro-
object system are available for download from micro-objects.org. The infras-
tructure of the MO system is not unlike the E-mail system in the sense that a
distributed application does not directly contact other applications. Instead, a
network of (dedicated) servers is used for distributing micro-objects.
cloud−server B
cloud−server C
lib−server
LAN
lib−server
WAN
LAN
cloud−server A
address space A
application A
address space B
application B
Figure 3.4: Overall design of MO system.
An application contacts a local server, much like an E-mail client application
would up- and download newmessages to and from a server provided by a com-
pany or ISP.These servers will communicate as peers to distribute micro-objects.
Just like the E-mail system, an application can be oﬄine without disrupting any
ongoing replication scheme.
Unlike the E-mail system, however, the MO system does not do end-point
delivery. In delivering information, it is more like the traditionalWWWmodel:
information is stored in a single known place and can be cached closer to the
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destination. Like WWW proxy caching, multiple applications will generally be
using the same server cache for a better cache hit ratio.
On top of this basic “pull on demand” replication, the MO system features
additional dynamic replication policies. The application (programmer) can
specify when a server needs to spend additional resources on replicating a spe-
ciﬁc micro-object.
To handle basic and additional replication, theMO system follows the classi-
cal three-tier approach. The three tiers consist of the application, the lib-server,
and the cloud server (as shown in Figure 3.4). The ﬁrst tier, the application,
shares its address space with the second tier, the library server, also referred
to as the lib-server. The second tier, the lib-server, provides library functions
and spawns process threads acting like a server, hence the name. The lib-server
communicates with the third tier, its dedicated cloud server, through a relatively
secure and fast connection, for example, a LAN. The cloud server has to be al-
ways online whereas the lib-server can be regularly oﬄine. The next section
contains a closer look at the cloud server and the lib-server.
3.6.1 The cloud server
The cloud server, sketched in Figure 3.5, fulﬁlls three major roles. First, the
cloud server has to store every micro-object that a trusted MO application has
created. The server will store such an object until it expires, thus acting as the
object’s home server. Second, it has to cache incoming micro-objects. Third,
it has to run threads to execute replication policies. The store and cache diﬀer
cache store
cloud server
application application
cloud server
cloud server
Figure 3.5: Close-up of the cloud server.
mainly only in how they clean up their contents. Micro-objects can be removed
from the store only if they have expired, while they can be removed from the
cache at any time. Just as with additional replication, cache management has
no external dependencies as a discarded micro-object can always be retrieved
3.6. SYSTEMS DESIGN 75
from its home server. A cloud server has a remote and a local communication
channel. The local channel diﬀers from the remote channel in the sense that
it can be made as trustworthy as needed, for example, by means of SSL/TLS.
In practice though, the local channel will simply be a LAN or ISP network
oﬀering low latency and possibly also high bandwidth. The cloud server is a
basic request/response system.
A remote request/response sequence is used by the cloud servers to communi-
cate with their remote peers. There are several types of such communications.
For example, if one cloud server needs a micro-object, it can ask any other cloud
server for it by sending the latter a  request containing a valid token. If
the receiving cloud server has the requested micro-object (in its cache or store),
it can send the micro-object back in response. Since encryption is used on
a higher level, there is no need for security checks, most notably there is no
distributed infrastructure for security. It will also be diﬃcult to forge a valid
token, because the token space is very sparsely ﬁlled.
To facilitate load balancing and additional replication policies, a remote re-
sponse can contain further information by means of a ditto-list. A ditto-list
contains a number of cloud servers that are likely to have the requested infor-
mation. In general, a cloud server is put on a ditto-list because it has previously
made a similar request. So, it is very likely that any server on the ditto-list will
be able to respond to the request. Not only is the original request sent to the
cloud server in the ditto-list, but also the related, subsequent requests. This will
save the original home server a whole set of requests.
Any remote request can trigger a  response with a ditto-list. This reply
indicates that the cloud server is swamped with requests. It is then up to the
requesting cloud server to re-route the remote request to another cloud server
from the ditto-list. Note that this solution is not new, sometimes it is applied
to alleviate hot-spot problems in the Web (see, e.g., [50]).
The  request is sent whenever two cloud servers want to make their
respective copies of a micro-object consistent, that is to make sure that the two
clusters are the same. To this end, a cloud server A can send a  request to
cloud server B containing micro-objectM. This request will allow B to possibly
merge the elements contained in A’s copy ofM’s cluster with its own copy ofM’s
cluster. B can now also detect which elements are missing from A’s copy of M’s
cluster and pass this information back to A. If both A and B decide to add the
missing elements to their respective copies, the two will be the same after the
 exchange. After merging, A or B might decide to forward information
to other servers, as seen in the example in Section 3.4. Note, however, that each
party is completely free to decide which elements to include in its local copy of
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M.
A local request/response sequence is used by the cloud server to communicate
with a (trusted) lib-server. An obvious local request is the  request, which
is issued by the lib-server. It forces the cloud server to ﬁnd a requested micro-
object, either in its cache or store or by means of a remote  request. If the
cloud server is the home for the requested micro-object (and it has not expired),
it will ﬁnd the micro-object in its store. If not, the cloud server can use a remote
 request to a peer cloud server, most notably the home cloud server of the
requested micro-object. It will forward the response to the lib-server, but also
extract the micro-object from the response and put it in its cache. Note that in
this case the cloud server acts like a proxy server. As with the  request,
there is no need to check for access permissions.
Only a trusted application can ask a cloud server to become the home of a
micro-object. It does so by sending a local  request. If local policies allow
it, the cloud server will put the micro-object in its store.
Also, only a trusted application can ask a cloud server to start (or stop) ex-
ecuting a replication policy for a given micro-object. It does so by sending a
local  request to the server. If local policies allow it, the cloud server
will start the requested replication policy for the given micro-object, pushing its
payload and cluster to other cloud servers, the same goes for new additions to
the micro-object’s cluster while the replication policy is active. Micro-objects
in a cluster inherit the replication strategies of the micro-object holding the
cluster, so their payloads and clusters are replicated as well. This recursion stops
at an application speciﬁed level. Replication example code will be given in
Section 3.6.4. Note that, as stated in Section 3.5.6, several replication policies
can be active at the same time for a given micro-object. Therefore the cloud
server has to be able to handle replication data of multiple replication policies
per micro-object.
Trusted applications are also allowed to send a local  request. Such
a request contains one or more tokens that are to be added to a given object’s
cluster. If the micro-object in question is in the cache or store, its cluster is
updated immediately. Also if there are replication policies active for this micro-
object, they are run, because the arrival of new cluster members may necessitate
some action.
The store of a cloud server holds all the micro-objects that are at home at that
server. However, the store can be populated with “foreign” micro-objects too.
To understand why, note that every replication thread has full (i.e., both read
and write) access to the store. Consequently, a replication policy like ,
by which an object is stored beyond its expiration date could put such a foreign
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micro-object in the store. The result would be that this foreign micro-object
will not be removed from the MO system until its extended expiration date.
Future replication strategies might have other reasons to put micro-objects in
the store, for example, to save them from cache cleanups. Note that every cloud
server can have its own policies for storage, most notably it could feature a quota
system, disallowing or charging excessive usage.
Since every cloud server has to act like a proxy server because all micro-
objects are retrieved indirectly through a cloud server, all cloud servers feature a
micro-object cache. Appropriate caching algorithms for cloud servers still need
to be investigated in detail. For now, an LRU (Least Recently Used) algorithm
is assumed. Note that the cache algorithm is a local aﬀair, every cloud server can
make its own local decisions. For example, it could decide to cache requested
micro-objects depending on which application issued the request.
As mentioned the  replication policy is special because it postpones
the expiration of amicro-object past its expiration date. Basically, an application
(programmer) can ask a cloud server to sustain a local copy of a micro-object
for a limited time (but not forever). Note that an application needs to sustain
the micro-object at regular intervals. If a micro-object is sustained on its home
cloud server, it will still be available to all other cloud servers. If, however,
a micro-object is sustained on a set of cloud servers not including the home
cloud server, servers outside that set will not be able to fetch it anymore. A
prime candidate for prolonged sustaining, for example, would be the root of a
distributed ﬁle system. Note that this does not imply that an application has to
be always online, but only frequently enough to prolong an object’s lifetime.
3.6.2 The lib-server
The lib-server is linked into the application’s address space as a library. It pro-
vides the API of the MO system. Besides a library with functions, however, it
also runs separate threads (in the background) in the application’s address space,
acting like a server. By putting the lib-server in the same address space as the
application, it has the same trust level. This makes it simpler for the lib-server
to safely access security information like encryption keys.
The API of theMO system (as implemented by the lib-server) consists of one
ADT (Abstract Data Type) per concept, each with their own preﬁx, oﬀering
functions like alloc(), free(), copy(), cmp(), put(), and get(). Figure 3.6
lists the ADTs (with their preﬁx). Rather than object classes, ADTs are used to
deﬁne the API. This is simply because the implementation is done in standard
C for maximum compatibility and platform independence. There is no reason
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memory buﬀer ( bfer_ )
home location ( hloc_ )
expiration date ( xpir_ )
token ( tken_ )
payload ( plod_ )
cluster ( cter_ )
payload security ( psec_ )
cluster security ( csec_ )
replication ( repl_ )
micro-object ( mo_ )
(a)
Figure 3.6: Lib-server ADT list.
why micro-objects could not be implemented as computer language objects in
an object oriented programming language. The lib-server is based primarily
on the micro-object ADT (with preﬁx mo_). A number of pivotal functions,
as shown in Figure 3.7, will be described below in more detail. Throughout
mo_create_new(mo_t*, xpir_t, plod_t, psec_t, csec_t);
mo_get_tken(tken_t*, mo_t);
mo_create_copy(mo_t*, tken_t, psec_t, csec_t);
mo_put_repl(mo_t*, repl_t);
mo_get_cter(cter_t*, mo_t);
mo_put_cter_clbk(mo_t*, cter_t*, clbk_t, void*);
mo_cter_add_tken(mo_t*, tken_t);
Figure 3.7: List micro-object API functions (partial).
the rest of this chapter, several C-code examples are given. Note that this code
blatantly ignores the return value of API calls. For example, the code:
plod_put_string(&plod, "Hello World!");
does not take into account that this API call could fail. A better, but maybe too
draconian way to check the return value would be:
assert(plod_put_string(&plod, "Hello World!"));
For clarity, these assertions or other forms of return value checks, have been
omitted in the example code given in the rest of this chapter.
Mo_create_new ( )
The mo_create_new() API function creates a new micro-object. For example:
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/* Set expiration date, payload contents, and security policies.
*/
xpir_put_secs_to_live(&xpir, 120);
plod_put_string(&plod, "Hello World!");
psec_put(&psec, psec_poln_asym, NULL);
psec_put(&csec, psec_poln_sym, NULL);
/* Make some room for the new micro-object.
*/
mo_alloc(&mymo);
/* Create a new object.
*/
mo_create_new(&mymo, xpir, plod, psec, csec);
When mo_create_new() is called, the lib-server ﬁlls the freshly allocated local
micro-object with copies of the given payload and security policies. It generates
a systemwide unique ID, that is a token, using only locally available information
like: the address of the home server, the given expiration date and a hash of the
immutable ﬁelds of the micro-object. The lib-server will also put the ﬁnished
local copy of the new micro-object on the outbound queue for the home server.
After mo_alloc() and mo_create_new() have returned successfully, a new local
copy has been created from the pool of available memory within the application
and lib-server’s address space. Also a copy of the new micro-object has been put
on the queue to the cloud server, for persistent storage on the home server. This
happens independently of any replication policy, since the new micro-object
cannot belong, yet, to any cluster, nor does it have a replication policy of its
own. This is the only time a payload or security policy can be set. After calling
mo_create_new(), the given payload and security policies, as well as the calcu-
lated token, are bound to this one micro-object, they have become immutable,
because by deﬁnition, they are part of the immutable part of a micro-object, as
shown in Figure 3.1.
Mo_get_tken ( )
With the function mo_get_tken() the token can be retrieved from a givenmicro-
object. Tokens can be exchanged out-of-band, but they have to be marshalled
ﬁrst. For example, consider this code:
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/* Allocate and fill new token.
*/
tken_alloc(&tken);
mo_get_tken(&tken, mymo);
/* Convert the token to a Radix64 encoded buffer for exchange.
*/
tken_to_bfer(&bfer, tken);
bfer_encode_radix64(&bfer, bfer);
After the above call to mo_get_tken(), the newly allocated token is copied from
the token from the micro-object mymo. After getting the (machine dependent)
token, it has to be marshalled and coded so it can be shared out-of-band. After
the tken_alloc() and mo_get_tken() calls return successfully, a new token has
been created from the pool of free memory in the address space of the applica-
tion and the lib-server. This new token is an exact copy of the token from the
micro-object mymo. The cloud server does not need to be notiﬁed, so no com-
munication takes place between the lib-server and the cloud server as a result of
these calls. Once the encoded token is received by another application, it can
be used to build the entire micro-object. To rebuild the entire micro-object, or
more correctly put, to create a complete local copy of the same micro-object,
the token has to be decoded and combined with the correct security policies.
The next API function (mo_create_copy()) is used for the actual construction.
Mo_create_copy ( )
The function mo_create_copy() is used to construct a new local copy of an
existing micro-object from its token and security policies. For example, if a
token has been received, and the security policies are known, a local copy of a
micro-object can be retrieved using the following code:
/* Convert the Radix64 encoded buffer to a new token.
*/
tken_alloc(&tken);
bfer_decode_radix64(&bfer, bfer);
tken_from_bfer(&tken, bfer);
/* Create a new local copy using the common security policies.
*/
mo_create_copy(&mymo, tken, psec, csec);
First, memory is allocated for a new token. Then the buﬀer is decoded and
demarshalled into the new token. Note that these steps are the reverse from the
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steps taken in the example for mo_get_tken(), above. With the new token, and
some (apparently) known security policies (e.g., a decryption key), a new local
copy of the micro-object is created. This object can be subsequently used to get
the payload, or add tokens to. After the successful return of mo_create_copy(),
the application has a local copy of the complete micro-object. The micro-object
could have been known to the lib-server before, in that case, no communication
has to take place before the call can return. If the lib-server does not have the
requestedmicro-object, it asks a nearby cloud server to provide one, and it holds
the application process (or more precisely the requesting application thread),
until the cloud server returns an answer. In some cases the cloud server might
have a copy of the requested micro-object in its cache. If not, the cloud server
will contact other cloud servers, for example the requested micro-object’s home
server. The micro-object might be stored in the micro-object cache of the cloud
server for quicker retrieval in the future.
Note that the security policies used to create a new local copy do not need
to be exactly the same as the policies that were used to create the micro-object.
In fact, the security will often be a “cut down” version allowing only reading.
For example, the psec_t argument needs to contain only the decode key in case
an asymmetric encryption policy was used. To illustrate, here is some code that
“cuts down” the capabilities of a policy:
/* Create a new policy for a number of related micro-objects.
*/
psec_alloc(&psec_full);
psec_put(&psec_full, psec_poln_asym, NULL);
/* Alloc and fill a read-only payload security.
*/
psec_alloc(&psec_ro);
psec_copy(&psec_ro, psec_full);
psec_command_("del post key", &psec_ro, NULL);
First, the code above generates a new payload security policy named psec_full.
It is asymmetrical, hence it has a read- and a post-key. Note that the appli-
cation does not need to generate a key pair ﬁrst. All initialization is done by
the one call to psec_put(). This is in line with the simplicity goal. Calling the
function psec_put() will generate a new encryption key pair, along with any
necessary meta data. After creating a new payload security, the above example
code generates a payload security policy called psec_ro, that would allow an-
other application to read the payload of a micro-object that uses the psec_full.
However, the MO system would not allow the usage of psec_ro to be used to
create a new micro-object. In fact, it would be nearly impossible to do, even
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if the MO system would want to do that, due to the underlying asymmetric
encryption.
Mo_put_repl ( )
The mo_put_repl() function will change the replication policy of the cluster of
a local micro-object. Changing the replication policy of a local micro-object is
relatively simple with code like this:
/* Allocate and set a replication policy.
*/
repl_alloc(&repl);
repl_put(&repl, cter_poln_cyclon, 3);
/* Change replication of the micro-object.
*/
mo_put_repl(&S, repl);
The above example code, allocates and sets a replication policy repl, to cluster
policy number (cter_poln_cyclon). The policy number is used by the lib-server
to select a block of replication code for this local copy of S. This will make the
local micro-object S start participating in replicating its cluster members with
an epidemic protocol named C, which basically is an enhanced gossiping
protocol [64]. After the call mo_put_repl() has returned successfully, the given
replication policy will have been put on the output queue to the cloud server.
The cloud server does the lion’s share of the actual replication. This also implies
that the replication is not dependent on the application and the lib-server. In
other words, if the application quits, the replication can continue. Note, how-
ever, that it is thinkable that some stringent cluster security policy might conﬁne
(part of ) the replication process to the (trusted) lib-server. In that case, stopping
the lib-server will cause the replication to be ceased or hampered. Such a strict
cluster security policy has not been deﬁned or implemented yet, but there is no
reason why it could not be.
Replication Level
Besides the type of replication (in the above example: cter_poln_cyclon), the
API call repl_put() also contains a replication level. In the code above, it is set
to 3. This replication level plays a crucial role in the eﬃciency of the replica-
tion. As noted before, each micro-object has a cluster of tokens of other micro-
objects. From an application point of view, these clusters are used to form
arbitrary graphs of micro-objects to represent distributed application objects.
Given the hierarchical nature of most application structures, the tree depicted
3.6. SYSTEMS DESIGN 83
in Figure 3.8 could be a typical example of some distributed application object.
Some micro-object S has one child A, that in its turn has B and C as children,
level
C
A
B
D E F G
S
3
5
6
4
2
1
7
Figure 3.8: Example hierarchy of some micro-objects that form an ap-
plication object.
etc. Had the replication-level argument in the repl_put() call been zero in
the example above, only the cluster of S would have been replicated using the
replication policy. Had it been 1 then the cloud server would also start retrieving
and caching the actual micro-objects corresponding to the tokens in the cluster
of S. In the example of Figure 3.8 that would be A. Had it been 2 then the
cluster of micro-object A would also be replicated by the cloud server. In casu
the tokens for micro-objects B and C. With the given replication level of 3, the
cloud server will retrieve the full micro-objects S, A, B, and C, plus any other
micro-object that is added to the cluster of S and A, but not B or C. In eﬀect, the
whole tree underneath S is replicated up to three levels deep. Replication here
means that data is pushed and/or pulled to the likings of the selected replica-
tion code. With a tree-shaped graph, this replication level provides an intuitive
and generic relation description that allows for more eﬃcient replication. The
increase in eﬃciency of the replication is possible because the cloud server has
more (meta) information on what micro-objects the application presumes, are
prone to be used in conjunction. If the graph is not a tree but some arbitrary
graph containing cycles, the cloud server will not loop indeﬁnitely because any
loop can be detected and cut applying one simple rule: any micro-object to be
replicated according to a given policy and level, can be ignored if it is already
being replicated with that same policy and any level equal or higher to the given
level. Changing the replication policy of one local copy of a micro-object, could
force the lib-server and the cloud server to start prefetching cluster additions.
This is, of course, the very point of added replication. Changing the replica-
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tion policy of several local copies, spread around theMO system, would force a
subset of cloud servers to start communicating amongst each other. This subset
of servers doing extra communication could be said to form an overlay repli-
cation network. The emergent behavior of such an overlay replication network
is dependent on the details of the replication policy and its implementation.
In general it will lead to a higher diﬀusion of the payloads and clusters of the
micro-objects involved.
Mo_get_cter ( )
With the mo_get_cter() API function, an application can get a snapshot of the
current cluster of a micro-object. The usage is straightforward as can be seen in
the ﬁrst two API calls in the next example:
/* Allocate room for a new cluster and get a copy.
*/
cter_alloc(&my_cter);
mo_get_cter(&my_cter, the_mo);
/* Do something with all the tokens in the cluster.
*/
tken_alloc(&tken);
cter_enum_create(&enumb, my_cter);
while(cter_enum_get_next_tken(&enumb, &tken, NULL))
do_some_thing(tken);
The example code above allocates room for a new cluster called my_cter and
calls mo_get_cter() to get a snapshot copy of the current cluster of the_mo.
Note that a snapshot could already be outdated upon successful return of mo_-
get_cter(). If the cluster of the_mo gets updated after the snapshot my_cter
has been returned, there will be a diﬀerence in the cluster of the_mo and the
snapshot my_cter.
The subsequent four lines of code demonstrate a usage of the cluster’s snap-
shot. Using a new enumerator named enumb the API call cter_enum_get_next_-
tken() is repeatedly called to iterate through all the cluster members of my_cter.
Presumably the function call do_some_thing() does something with a token.
For example, it could get a local copy of the corresponding micro-object’s pay-
load using mo_create_copy() followed by mo_get_plod(). The lib-server will
allocate and ﬁll the cluster with a copy of the current micro-object’s cluster.
No communication with the cloud server is needed. Since the lib-server just
gives out (a snapshot of ) what it has at the moment of calling, there can be no
unexpected delays or other problems caused by partial failures.
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Additions to the cluster of the micro-object will not be “magically” added to
the cluster my_cter. This makes using clusters of micro-objects simple. There
will be cases where the application would want to do more than take a snapshot
and iterate the cluster members. For example, it might want to do something
with newly arrived cluster members as soon as possible. For this, a somewhat
more complex API function exists: mo_cter_clbk().
Mo_put_cter_clbk ( )
The API call mo_put_cter_clbk() is used to ask the lib-server to call a given
function every time the lib-server becomes aware of new additions to the cluster
of a given micro-object. A simple callback function could look like this:
/* This a very simple callback function.
*/
void my_clbk(mo_t mo, tken_t tken, void *user)
{
printf("%s.\n", (char*)user);
}
A callback function my_clbk() is deﬁned. It returns no value (i.e., its type is
void) and accepts a micro-object, a token, and a void pointer as arguments.
The callback function is used as an argument to the setup function mo_put_-
cter_clbk(). For example, like this:
/* Start calling my_clbk() for every addition to the cluster of my_mo.
*/
user_data = "Seen new token";
mo_put_cter_clbk(&my_mo, &cter_track, my_clbk, user_data);
do_other_stuff();
sleep(10);
/* Stop calling the callback function for this micro-object.
*/
mo_put_cter_clbk(&my_mo, NULL, NULL, NULL);
Once the setup is completed, every new token that is added to the cluster of my_-
mo will trigger execution of the callback function my_clbk(). The lib-server, or
more precisely one of the server threads of the lib-server, will execute the callback
function supplying it with the micro-object my_mo, the new token whose arrival
triggered the callback, and the user_data argument copied verbatim from the
setup routine mo_put_cter_clbk(). Callback functions will be executed by lib-
server threads while the main thread of the application does other stuﬀ or sleeps.
The tracking of the cluster of the micro-object my_mo is stopped, by changing
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its callback function to NULL. Like any local copy of a micro-object, my_mo can
have only one callback function active at the same time. However, every local
copy of my_mo can, simultaneously, activate its own separate callback function.
Modifying the above code to simultaneously activate two callback functions on
my_mo, using mo_create_copy(), is left as an exercise to the reader. The callback
function will be called by the lib-server, and no additional communication with
the cloud server will be necessary. Note that the lib-server has to run at least one
thread for this to work. In fact, the lib-server runs several threads and can start
and stop additional threads if circumstances dictate it. The code below shows a
slightly more complex callback function.
/* Print a dot every tenth new token.
*/
void my_clbk(mo_t mo, tken_t tken, void *user)
{
int *p_cnt = (int *)user;
if (0 == p_cnt[0]++ % 10)
printf(".");
}
It increments the user data, interpreted as (a pointer to) a number. If this
counter reaches a tenfold a ’.’ is printed. This callback function clearly is not
thread safe. Since this might be the case for most nontrivial callback functions,
every callback is protected by a lock. There is one caveat, the lock is bound
to a single local copy of a micro-object. So, if one callback function were to
be shared by several local micro-objects, additional locking of shared resources
might be necessary.
The API call mo_put_cter_clbk() takes, besides the micro-object pointer
(&my_mo), callback function (my_clbk), and user data pointer (user_data), a
fourth argument, a cluster called cter_track. If non NULL, this cluster keeps
track of the tokens that should not trigger a callback. Typically, these tokens
have triggered a callback already. The lib-server will update the tracker as it
makes callbacks. Upon calling the mo_put_cter_clbk() function to start the
callback process, the tracker cluster contains all the tokens that are not to be
considered new. Upon stopping the callback process, it contains the same to-
kens, plus the tokens that have triggered a callback. This way an application has
more control over the callback process. The code below demonstrates the usage
of such a tracker cluster.
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int cnt = 0;
/* Allocate room for a new cluster and get a copy.
*/
cter_alloc(&tracker);
mo_get_cter(&tracker, the_mo);
/* Do something with all the tokens in the cluster.
*/
tken_alloc(&tken); /* Redundant. */
cter_enum_create(&enum, tracker); /* Redundant. */
while(cter_enum_get_next_tken(&enum, &tken, NULL)) /* Redundant. */
do_some_thing(the_mo, tken, &cnt); /* Redundant. */
/* Start calling my_clbk() for every addition to the cluster of the_mo.
*/
mo_put_cter_clbk(&the_mo, &tracker, do_some_thing, &cnt);
A tracker cluster is allocated and ﬁlled with a snapshot of the current cluster
of the_mo. For each token in the tracker cluster, the function do_some_thing()
is called. After that a callback is requested on the cluster of the_mo. Without
explicitly tracking which tokens have been processed and which not, all kind of
race conditions could arise, leading to repetitive callbacks on a single new token
or callbacks that should be preformed but are not. The solution is straightfor-
ward, there will be no callback for the tokens that are in the tracker cluster.
Only tokens that have arrived (and will arrive) after the tracker was ﬁlled, will
cause the callback function do_some_thing() to be called. Note that had to-
kens arrived in the time slot between the call to mo_get_cter() and the call to
mo_put_cter_clbk() they will be stored in the cluster of the micro-object, but
not in the tracker cluster. Hence, the callback function will be called on each
of those newly arrived tokens as soon as mo_put_cter_clbk() is called. In fact,
using an empty tracker will cause execution of do_some_thing() on all (cur-
rent) cluster members of the_mo. In the example code above, the block of code
marked with /* Redundant. */ could simply be removed, without eﬀecting any
change in behavior of the code. This is because if mo_put_cter_clbk() is called
with an empty tracker, the callback function do_some_thing() will be called on
all the current members not in the tracker.
In an extreme case a single application might even have many local copies
of one and the same micro-object, each with a diﬀerent callback function. A
single addition to the cluster of such a micro-object would then trigger several
callback functions. The current implementation does not guarantee the order in
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which the callbacks are executed, nor does it limit the number of simultaneous
callback executions. The code below could be added to the example code above:
/* Add a callback function doing other stuff with the cluster members.
*/
cter_alloc(&trck2);
mo_alloc(&copy_mo);
mo_copy(&copy_mo, the_mo);
mo_put_cter_clbk(&copy_mo, &trck2, do_other_stuff, &cnt);
This would cause the callback function do_other_stuff() to be called for each
token in the cluster of copy_mo and thus also of the_mo. Upon arrival of a new
cluster member, both do_some_thing() and do_other_stuff() would be called.
Note the usage of the “standard” mo_copy() to create a new local copy of the_mo,
without the replication and callback state.
Mo_cter_add_tken ( )
The examples so far showed only how the MO system reacts to newly added
tokens. Actually adding tokens is done using the mo_cter_add_tken()API func-
tion. The example code below shows a way to add Nmicro-objects to the cluster
of a micro-object.
/* Add the tokens of N new micro-objects to the cluster of the_mo.
*/
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
mo_create_new(&tmp_mo, xpir, plod, psec, csec);
mo_get_tken(&tmp_tken, tmp_mo);
mo_cter_add_tken(&the_mo, tmp_tken);
}
The snippet of example code above repeats three steps N times. Presumably an
expiration date (xpir), payload (plod), and two security policies (psec and csec)
have been allocated and set so they can be used to create a new micro-object
tmp_mo. From this new micro-object its token is extracted using mo_get_tken()
and subsequently added to the cluster of the_mo using the API call mo_cter_-
add_tken(). The last two calls in the loop extract a token and add that to a
cluster.
Extracting a token to add it to a cluster is such a common combination that
there exists an API call mo_cter_add_mo() that does the same thing in one go.
Note that adding this API call sins against the goal of keeping the API interface
small. However, because it hardly adds any complexity, it was incorporated.
This example does not do something really useful, because all the micro-objects
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added carry the same payload and expiration date. Note, however, that they
will be distinguishable because they each have a systemwide unique token.
One would usually expect the payload to diﬀer for the individual cluster
members. In practice one would also expect that the order of the cluster mem-
bers could be important. Since the expiration date is the most signiﬁcant part
in the sorting order, incrementing it before each call to mo_create_new() will
guarantee the sorting order. For this a special API function called xpir_uinc()
exists. This function will increment the expiration date by one microsecond.
The code below demonstrates the usage of xpir_uinc() and mo_cter_add_mo():
/* Add tokens to the cluster of the_mo in a given order.
*/
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
xpir_uinc(&xpir);
mo_create_new(&tmp_mo, xpir, plod, psec, csec);
mo_cter_add_mo(&mo, tmp_mo);
}
Adding a token to the cluster of a micro-object causes the lib-server to not only
update its own data structure, but also to send an update request to the cloud
server. The cloud server will also update its internal state and, dependent on
active replication policies, will forward the update to other cloud servers and
lib-servers.
Actually, as discussed in the above section on mo_put_repl(), whether or
when a local cluster update triggers a remote cluster update is dictated by the
active replication policies on the cloud servers involved.
3.6.3 “Hello World!” With Micro-Objects
To illustrate programmingwithmicro-objects, let us consider the standard “Hello
World!” example. Note that the code given in Figure 3.9 up to and including
Figure 3.12, are excerpts from a demonstration program as given in appendix A.
The function set_msg(), shown in Figure 3.9, creates a systemwide visible
micro-object, that expires in 24 hours. Note how an application ﬁrst prepares
the content of the object: it creates an application-level micro-object and passes
payload and security data to the lib-server. The actual creation of the system-
level micro-object takes place by a call to mo_create_new(), eﬀectively placing
the object in the store of its home server. After this creation, it becomes possi-
ble to refer to the object by means of its token, which is generated by the home
server. Note that at this point that application-level object can be destroyed: the
intended micro-object is now successfully being taken care of by the underlying
MO system.
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void set_msg(bfer_t *p_bfer)
{
mo_t mo;
:
: /* Code omitted for clarity. */
: /* Full code in Appendix A. */
:
/* Allocate ADTs. */
mo_alloc(&mo);
:
:
/* Fill the components for the micro-object. */
plod_put_string(&plod, "Hello world!");
xpir_put_days_to_live(&xpir, 1);
:
:
/* Create the micro-object. */
mo_create_new(&mo, xpir, plod, psec, csec);
/* Fill the output buffer with the radix64 of the token. */
mo_get_tken(&tken, mo);
tken_to_radix64_bfer(p_bfer, tken);
/* Deallocate ADTs. */
xpir_free(&xpir);
}
Figure 3.9: Creating a “Hello World!” micro-object.
Let us now consider how another (or the same) application can obtain this
object and retrieve its “Hello World!” message.
The function get_msg(), shown in Figure 3.10, retrieves a local copy of the
“Hello World!” micro-object and copies its payload. Micro-objects are dis-
tributed, so that set_msg() can be run in one address space, while get_msg()
can be executed in another (or the same) address space. For this to work, the
payload security of both processes needs to match. When using asymmetrical
encryption, for example, the function set_msg() needs to provide at least the
encryption key (also referred to as post-key in [67]) in psec, while the function
get_msg() needs to provide at least the decryption key (also called read-key) in
its psec. These keys have to be exchanged out-of-band, for example, through a
secure channel.
Figure 3.10 again illustrates locality when using micro-objects. An applica-
tion starts with constructing an application-level object, providing the required
token and necessary security information. The actual object retrieval takes place
by means of the call mo_create_copy(), which instructs the receiver’s dedicated
cloud server to fetch the object. If fetching succeeds, then the cloud server will
copy the relevant ﬁelds to the application-level micro-object, after which its
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void get_msg(bfer_t *p_bfer_message, bfer_t bfer_radix_token)
{
mo_t mo;
:
: /* Code omitted for clarity. */
: /* Full code in Appendix A. */
:
/* Allocate ADTs. */
mo_alloc(&mo);
:
:
tken_from_radix64_bfer(&tken, bfer_radix_token);
:
:
/* Get a copy, get the payload, copy its buffer.
*/
mo_create_copy(&mo, tken, psec, csec);
mo_getref_plod(&r_plod, mo);
plod_get_bfer(p_bfer_message, *r_plod);
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
mo_free(&mo);
}
Figure 3.10: Fetching and reading a “Hello World!” object.
payload can be retrieved.
Again, note the diﬀerence with other distributed frameworks. No messages
are sent to remote data objects. No remote procedure calls take place: the system
only copies requested data from a (possible) remote location.
3.6.4 Example Extension
The following extensions to the example above change the micro-object into a
chat channel for IM. Calling the function do_chat(), shown in Figure 3.11, will
start the exchange of lines of text, using the previously created “Hello World!”
object. This function reads lines from the user’s terminal, transforms each line
to a new mo_line micro-object and adds this new micro-object to (the clus-
ter of ) the mo_channel micro-object. Before entering the read--add loop, the
replication policy of mo_channel is set to , to stress the importance
of fast delivery of newly added members, and mo_get_cluster() is called with
the callback function fprintmo(). This latter function prints the payload of the
given (token of a) micro-object. Once it has been set as a callback function,
using mo_cter_clbk() every time a new member is added to the cluster, it will
be printed. From the application programmer’s perspective, calling mo_cter_-
clbk() is similar to starting a new thread that receives all the tokens as they are
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void do_chat(bfer_t bfer_radix_mo_channel)
{
/* Declare local variables.
*/
mo_t mo_line, ... ;
:
: /* Code omitted for clarity. */
: /* Full code in Appendix A. */
:
/* Allocate ADTs.
*/
mo_alloc(&mo_line);
:
:
/* Set replication of the channel (object) to flooding.
*/
mo_put_replication(&mo_channel, FLOODING);
:
:
/* Start forwarding the incoming tokens.
*/
mo_put_cter_clbk(&mo_channel, &cter_tracker, fprintmo, stdout);
/* Start the line with a prompt.
*/
strcpy(line, "1>> ");
/* Direct all input lines to channel.
*/
while(fgets(line + 4, sizeof(line) - 4, stdin)) { /* Read line. */
plod_put_string(&plod, line); /* In payload. */
xpir_uinc(&xpir); /* Up count. */
mo_create_new(&mo_line, xpir, plod, psec, csec); /* New line-MO. */
mo_cter_add_mo(&mo_channel, mo_line); /* Append. */
}
/* User typed ^D: Stop forwarding the incoming tokens.
*/
mo_put_cter_clbk(&mo_channel, NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* Deallocate ADTs.
*/
mo_free(&mo_line;
:
:
}
Figure 3.11: Using micro-objects for instant messaging.
added to the cluster of the micro-object. To make the lib-server thread stop
calling fprintmo(), the NULL argument is used for mo_cter_clbk().
As an alternative, Figure 3.12 shows a single-threaded, busy-loop version,
using nonblocking calls only. This version is almost identical, but now, the
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void busy_chat(bfer_t bfer_radix_mo_channel)
{
/* Declare local variables.
*/
mo_t mo_line, ...;
:
: /* Code omitted for clarity. */
: /* Full code in Appendix A. */
:
/* Allocate ADTs.
*/
mo_alloc(&mo_line);
:
:
/* Start a line with a prompt.
*/
strcpy(line, "3>> ");
:
:
/* Loop until there is no more input.
*/
for(;;) {
/* Print cluster so far.
*/
mo_getref_cter(&r_cter, mo_channel);
pr_cluster(mo_channel, *r_cter);
/* Get user input, but don't wait to long.
*/
if (!read_noblock(line + 4, sizeof(line) - 4)) break;
/* If there is new data, put it on the channel.
*/
if ('\0' != line[4]) { /* Read line */
plod_put_string(&plod, line); /* 2 payload. */
xpir_uinc(&xpir); /* Up count. */
mo_create_new(&mo_line, xpir, plod, psec, csec); /* Create MO. */
mo_cter_add_mo(&mo_channel, mo_line); /* Append. */
}
}
:
:
/* Deallocate ADTs.
*/
mo_free(&mo_line);
:
:
}
Figure 3.12: Single threaded version of code shown in Figure 3.11.
cluster is retrieved and printed inside the loop replacing the two mo_cltr_clbk()
calls bracketing the loop. Note that these two examples are compatible: they
can be run by diﬀerent applications on diﬀerent machines and actually provide
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the exchange of chat lines. This compatibility is due to both programs (1) using
the MO system and (2) agreeing on how micro-objects are clustered.
Also note that the “Hello World!” micro-object that is used as a channel-
DAO (Distributed Application Object), would normally contain a symmetric
key to be used like a session key for the channel.
3.7 The Micro-Object Clusters
This section demonstrates how micro-object clusters can be used to construct a
complex fully mutable DAO. In the MO system, an application (programmer)
deﬁnes every DAO as a single micro-object with a (application-speciﬁc) graph
structure. Sharing only a representative micro-object will nevertheless enable
distributed applications to share a multitude of objects as these other objects
can be organized in a graph of any shape. Usually the graph structure is a tree,
and the micro-object representing the DAO is the root of the tree. This allows
convenient access to the entire tree from just one token. Also, a tree shape
explicitly allows a DAO to consist of other sub DAOs. More speciﬁcally, if
every DAO is represented by one micro-object, complex DAOs can be crafted
by creating a micro-object and adding (sub) DAOs to its cluster.
As an example, consider the realization of a ﬁle DAO shared by a number of
distributed ﬁle-system applications, shown in Figure 3.13. The cluster of the ﬁle
DAO, F, contains two (tokens of ) block DAOs. The cluster of the ﬁrst block
DAO, B1, contains three content DAOs. The second block DAO, B2, holds
two content DAOs. The content of a ﬁle DAO is deﬁned as the concatenation
of the content of its clustered block DAOs, ordered by expiration date (B1, B2
in this case). The content of a block DAO is deﬁned as (the payload of ) the last
content DAO from its cluster, ordered by expiration date. Thus the content of
ﬁle F is the payload of C3 followed by the payload of C5.
DAOlevel
F
B1
C2 C3 C4 C5
−
B2
C1
− − −
file (F)
content (C)
block (B)
−
3
4
2
1
5
Figure 3.13: The realization of a distributed ﬁle of two blocks.
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From the MO system point of view, every DAO is a regular micro-object
and the structure of the graph originating from its cluster has no meaning to
the MO system. One of the unique features of the MO system, is that it still
utilizes these graphs for grouping micro-objects. Grouping can be used to im-
prove the eﬀectiveness of replication, especially if the objects are small. This
phenomenon is also known from other ﬁelds, such as data clustering for eﬃ-
cient replication and distribution of databases [49]. By using a replication level
indicator in combination with a DAO, an application can generically inform
the MO system that a replication policy should be applied to all micro-objects
in a subgraph originating from a given cluster. Replication level 1, for example,
indicates that only the ﬁle cluster itself should be replicated.
To continue this example, assume that the sharing applications have set the
replication policy of their copy of F to  at level 4. Consider what
happens after one of the applications changes (the second block of ) its local
copy of the ﬁle. To update the ﬁle, a new block, C6, is constructed to replace C5.
Next C6 is added to (the cluster of ) the local copy of B2. Due to the ﬂooding
level of F, B2 (level 2 and 3) and the payload of C6 (level 4) will be ﬂooded,
too. Had the level been set to 3, only the change would have been ﬂooded (i.e.,
the cluster of B2), but not the payload of C6. Obviously, setting the level to
5 or higher, would not have made a diﬀerence. Note that the ﬁle DAO is fully
mutable, even though micro-objects are not. Note that the above example is
oversimpliﬁed, a more realistic and slightly complexer example would be based
on journaling.
The replication level is thus seen to provide the application (programmer)
a simple yet powerful means to express replication of larger groups of micro-
objects.
3.7.1 Managing Clusters
The concept of one cluster per micro-object is a simple one. The cluster of a
micro-object contains only tokens and tokens can only be added to a cluster,
not deleted or changed. However desirable the simplicity of this scheme might
be, it should also be possible to create an eﬃcient implementation. An in-
depth description of the implementation is not part of this thesis. There are
many details, and for the interested reader, the source code of the micro-object
system will be a satisfying read. However, due to the central role clusters play
in the design of the MO system, the disclosure of some implementation details
is warranted at this point. Probably the most pressing questions are, ﬁrst, “Can
the implementation handle large clusters eﬃciently?” and second, “Can the
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implementation handle frequent cluster additions eﬃciently?”
Cluster Growth
The design of theMO system does not allow the application to actively remove
tokens from a cluster at the MO system level. At the application level a DAO
can be arbitrarily changed by adding micro-objects that carry instructions for
any change. In fact, adding any type of “delete” operator for clusters at the
MO system level would not only lead to a more complex interface, but it would
also introduce novel types of failure. For example, imagine one application
process that ﬁrst adds a token to a cluster and then subsequently removes it
again. Without additional and hard-to-keep guarantees, a change in the order of
these instructions could lead to all kinds of subtle application failures. Without
a delete operation, it might seem that all clusters are doomed to keep growing
indeﬁnitely. However, since each cluster is part of one unique micro-object, a
cluster will not live forever, since it expires when its micro-object expires.
Still, if a cluster gets really big, it could consume a signiﬁcant amount of
resources. As with any burden on system resources, it is up to the application
programmer to make the trade-oﬀs involved. That said, there is a mechanism
that allows any cloud server and lib-server to locally decide when a token can
be removed from a cluster. Since micro-objects expire, it is no use hanging on
to a token in a cluster if its corresponding micro-object has expired. Since the
expiration date is part of the token, any cloud server can locally decide when a
token can be deleted from a cluster.
For clusters containing thousands of tokens, the programmer has two ways
of easing the burden on the system. A well-constructed set of application pro-
grams canmake sure large clusters either belong to a short-livedmicro-object, or
is mainly populated by tokens of short-lived micro-objects. Still, a misbehaving
or ill-designed application can easily eat away a lot of system resources, but that
is not a problem that the MO system tries to solve. A similar problem exists
with disk space. However, every individual cloud server is free to implement
local limits on resource usage, just like a ﬁle system can feature a quota system.
In short, theMO system does support, but does not enforce, resource-friendly
applications, but local quota systems could be added.
Cluster Synchronization
If a micro-object’s cluster gets updated frequently, it would be very uneconomi-
cal to bluntly send the whole cluster to other servers upon every token addition.
Clearly this is not a resource-friendly way to synchronize an ordered list of to-
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kens, that is a cluster. Most desirable would be if every cloud server would send
only those updates to other cloud servers that they need. This, however, implies
that all cloud servers would need to keep track of the state of all other cloud
servers (and know what they need). Not only does this put a huge dent in stor-
age resources, it also introduces massive opportunity for partial failures to wreak
havoc. In fact, such a method would introduce into the MO system almost all
the problems other distributed-programming frameworks have. For this very
reason the MO system is designed to maximize local decision making, that is
it is designed to minimize knowledge of remote state. The method described
below does data synchronization without the need for state synchronization.
One particularly hard problem to overcome is state changes during data syn-
chronization. In a multiparty system, a data synchronization mechanism should
be indiﬀerent to state changes during updates. Given the limited capabilities of
micro-object clusters, there exists a relatively simple and eﬃcient way of state-
less synchronization. This synchronization is based on the exchange of update
messages. All the necessary state information is carried inside each individual
update message. No state of remote hosts needs to be kept and no state in be-
tween update messages needs to be locked. Hence, interpretation of incoming
update messages as well as the construction of response update messages is based
upon the local state and the incoming message only.
The basic principal of cluster updates is the notion that total synchronization
does not need to be achieved with the exchange of only one update message or
one pair of messages or any predetermined number of messages. As long as every
update message can only contribute towards synchronization but not hinder it,
total synchronization becomes a matter of exchanging enough messages. The
MO system features eventually consistent clusters. Eventual consistency is not
cure for everything but it is important to a whole class of distributed systems
including uniﬁed messaging. To do this, an update message needs to contain a
description of the content of a cluster. From now on, “theMO system’s descrip-
tion of the content of a cluster for update messages” as described below, will be
abbreviated to content list. A remote content list can be compared to the local
cluster content, yielding several of three conclusions. One, the remote cluster
contains a token that needs to be added to the local cluster. Two, the local
cluster contains a token that needs to be sent to the remote site. Three, a mis-
match exists, but there is not enough information to ﬁx it. A typical outcome
of comparing a remote content list with a local cluster might be that three new
tokens are added to the local cluster, one token in the local cluster needs to be
sent to the remote site, and one mismatch that needs further synchronization
to solve. Based on this outcome, the three new tokens are added to the local
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cluster and a new content list is constructed and sent out, containing the one
token that the remote site was missing, and more speciﬁc information on the
unsolvable mismatch. To the remote site, this is not an answer to the previous
content list, but an independent message to further synchronization.
Example of Content List Driven Synchronization
As a simple example, let’s consider two servers (A and B) that need to syn-
chronize the cluster of their respective local micro-object copies, as shown in
Figure 3.14. Let us further assume they each have four tokens, as shown in
Figure 3.14(a). In Figures 3.14 and 3.15, for simplicity, the expiration date will
be represented by a single-digit number. Analogously to the ordering of tokens
on expiration date, the tokens in the examples below are ordered by this ﬁctional
number. At some point in time, some local application adds a token (token 4)
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Figure 3.14: Syncing two clusters after insert of token, using a
content list.
to the cluster at server B, as shown in Figure 3.14(b). Let us assume server B
has to enforce a replication policy that forces it to try to synchronize with A. So
it sends out an update message containing two items, ﬁrst, a checksum of the
older tokens, second, (a copy of ) the new token. Note that server B does not
anticipate an answer nor does it need to keep track of update messages that are
sent out. That is, B does not keep a communication history. Upon reception,
server A examines the update message item by item. First, it ﬁnds the checksum
for the ﬁrst four tokens, it veriﬁes the checksum, and since it matches the known
tokens, it does nothing. Next it ﬁnds the new token (token 4), and since it does
not have this token in the local copy of the content list, it adds the new token
to its list. Now A arrives at the end of the update message. Since there are no
tokens known to server A that were not in the update message there is no need
to send back anything, and synchronization has been accomplished, as shown
in Figure 3.14(c).
Please note the low overhead. Even if the initial situation had contained
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one thousand nodes instead of just four, there was only one update message
sent that is only marginally larger than the raw size of the new token. On the
Internet, one UDP (User Datagram Protocol) packet could suﬃce. Note that a
replication policymight ormight not force serverA to acknowledge the synchro-
nization has ﬁnished, or it might force server A to use the less error-prone TCP
protocol. However, as with any acknowledgment in communication, there has
to be a last acknowledgment, and therefore there is not ever going to be a way
for both parties to know for sure if synchronization succeeded. Tanenbaum et
al. calls this the “two army problem” [61]. There is but one guarantee, if server
A and server B keep communicating, synchronization will become ever more
probable. This also holds if more than two servers try to synchronize
If server A initially had been missing a token (e.g., token 2) in Figure 3.14,
the synchronization after adding token4would have proceeded diﬀerently. Ini-
tially server B would send the same update message as it did in the previous ex-
ample, as shown in Figure 3.15(a). Upon reception, A would start comparing
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Figure 3.15: Syncing two clusters with more than one token missing.
the items in the message. The ﬁrst item would be a mismatch, and A would
know something was out of sync between number 0 and 3. What exactly is
missing cannot be inferred from the update message. So after processing the
other items from the update message (adding token 4 in the process), A would
split the sum for tokens 0, 1, 3, and 4, and it would send that back to B, as
shown in Figure 3.15(b). How A splits the sum is discussed below. From that
server B could determine what A was missing. A new update message would
be constructed, containing the missing token (token 2) and two checksums.
Upon reception, A would process it and add the missing token to its cluster.
Again, note ﬁrst, how eﬃcient this algorithm is in this case and second, that
each packet contains all the information needed to process it properly (i.e., ev-
ery update can be processed individually) independently of remote state or even
local communication history.
There are two obvious parameters that inﬂuence the performance of this
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algorithm. First, the number of consecutive tokens that will not be replaced
by their checksum. Let’s call this replacement value “R.” Second, the number
of parts a mismatching checksum is broken into. Let’s call this fragmentation
value “F.” Both R and F can have a huge impact on the total number of bytes
exchanged (#B) and the total number of update messages exchanged (#M).
The Replacement Value R
R holds the number of consecutive tokens that will not be replaced by their
checksum. For example, with a replacement value, R of 1, any number of con-
secutive tokens will be replaced with their checksum. With R equals 10, any
number of consecutive tokens over 10 will be replaced with their checksum and
any group of tokens less than or equal to 10 will be inserted in the update mes-
sage verbatim. Parameter R could easily be set to 100 or above, the eﬀect would
be that most update messages would grow in size (i.e. #B would grow) but #M,
the number of update messages needed for a full synchronization, might go
down.
Now the question rises how well this implementation does on arbitrary syn-
chronization needs. The answer is, in general, not too well, especially if added
tokens have random expiration dates. However, if added tokens in clusters
group around one date, the algorithm is highly eﬃcient. To demonstrate this,
the results of two simple tests (test A and B) can be compared. In both tests a
cluster of 990 tokens is updated by adding 10 new tokens. The number of mes-
sages and the number of bytes needed to propagate these changes are recorded
for both tests A and B. The only diﬀerence between the tests is the position of
the new tokens. For test A, tokens are inserted at the end of the cluster. For
test B, tokens are inserted at random positions. These tests simulate a situation
where one local copy of a micro-object is missing 1% of its clustered tokens. The
clusters of these local objects are then synchronized. The cloud server holding
the smaller cluster sends its cluster to the cloud server holding the complete
cluster. Due to base replication, the receiving cloud server replies. The two
cloud servers keep exchanging messages until both clusters contain the same
1000 tokens. The results are displayed in Figure 3.16. The starred area (A)
represents the number of update messages exchanged (#M) when the added to-
kens group at one extreme of the cluster. The minimum number of messages is
two because the ﬁrst message will show what the smallest content list is missing
and the second message will contain all the missing tokens. The striped area (B)
represents the total number of update messages exchanged if the 1% new tokens
do not group at the end of the token list, but are randomly dispersed between
the other 990. As shown, #M is ranging from 12 to the minimum number of
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messages with increased values of R.
↑#M
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
A B
→R
Figure 3.16: The number of messages (#M) needed to synchronize a clus-
ter of size 1000 against parameter R. Note that only twomes-
sages are needed when the changes group (area A).
Figure 3.17 shows a similar graph for #B, the total number of bytes ex-
changed. Note that the maximum for #B is the sum raw size of the smallest and
biggest clusters, plus some bytes for overhead. The starred area (A) represents
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Figure 3.17: The number of bytes exchanged (#B) to synchronize a clus-
ter of size 1000 against parameter R. Note the characteristic
block wave pattern for R over 63. Also note that if R >= 900
the number of bytes exchanged maxes out.
the number of bytes exchanged if the new tokens group at one extreme of the
cluster. In fact, the starred area is not very visible on the left hand side, due to
the scale of the y-axis. The number of bytes is rather constant at (merely) 600
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bytes, until R reaches 990. The striped area (B) represents the total number of
bytes exchanged if the 1% new tokens do not group at the end of the list. These
graphs clearly show the inﬂuence of R on #M and #B if updates to the cluster do
not group. Smaller values of R cause an increase of #M, bigger values of R inﬂate
#B. Past a certain value of R (63 for size 1000) the number of bytes exchanged
starts oscillating roughly, between the raw size of the large cluster and twice
that. Because at some values for R every update message but the last contains
checksums only, leaving #B at about the raw size of the cluster. Yet for other
values or R, the last two messages both contain all the tokens in full, leaving #B
at about twice the raw size of the cluster. Note that two parties synchronizing
do not need to have the same value for R or even know the other party’s value,
each party can locally take decisions on what value for R to use, or even change
it for every new message. This should not come as a surprise given the near
statelessness of the whole synchronization process.
Themost important observations are these. First, if cluster updates do group,
R does not have much of an inﬂuence at all, as long as R stays well below the
cluster size. Second, exchanging content-lists is really eﬃcient compared to a
brute-force approach.
All these observations still hold if the clusters are increased by several or-
ders of magnitude. For example, if the experiment is repeated with a cluster
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Figure 3.18: The number of messages (#M) against parameter R with a
cluster size of 100.000.
size of 100.000, the graphs show a similar trend, as shown in Figure 3.18 and
Figure 3.19.
Since it is plausible that most applications can assure that added tokens can
have increasing expiration dates, further research in the eﬀects of parameter R
falls outside the context of this thesis.
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Figure 3.19: The number of bytes #B against parameter R for a cluster of
size 100.000. When newly added tokens group (area A), #B
is constant around 44kB.
The Fragmentation Value F
F holds the number of parts a mismatching checksum is broken into. The frag-
mentation value, F, plays a role when a group of tokens is represented by a
checksum in an update message. If the checksum does not match the check-
sum over the same group of tokens in the local copy of the cluster, there is a
mismatch. An example of this was given in Figure 3.15, where server B sends a
sum of the tokens 0 through 3 to server A. Since server A does not have token2,
there is a mismatch. With F set to 2, the group of tokens 0 through 3 is split in
two. Had F been 4, the group would have been split in four, eﬀectively sending
tokens 0 through 3 individually. Note that as with the replacement value above,
F can be dynamically changed and does not have to be communicated to remote
parties.
The value of F can be researched for its eﬀect on the number of messages #M
and total number of bytes #B in a similar fashion as the replacement value above.
A similar set of graphs can be drawn up. The graphs plotting F against the
number of messages #M (Figure 3.20(a) and 3.21(a)) resemble the correspond-
ing graphs for R (Figure 3.16 and 3.18). The graphs plotting F against the total
number of bytes #B (Figure 3.20(b) and 3.21(b)) resemble a clipped sine wave
for larger values of F, just as the the corresponding graphs for R (Figure 3.17
and 3.19) show a block wave. Note that a fragmentation value of 1 is invalid,
because it would signify that a mismatching checksum would be “split” into
one new checksum. Hence there is no value for 1 in the graphs of Figure 3.20
and 3.21. The main observation, however, is similar to the conclusion for the
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Figure 3.20: Plots for cluster size 1000: (a) number of messages (#M)
against parameter F, (b) number of bytes (#B) against pa-
rameter F.
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Figure 3.21: Plots for cluster size 100.000: (a) number of messages (#M)
against parameter F, (b) number of bytes (#B) against param-
eter F.
replacement value above, the fragmentation value F has shown to have hardly
any eﬀect if added tokens group.
Note that F was ﬁxed at 2 for the graphs plotting #M and #B against R. Even
so, R was ﬁxed at 1 for the graphs of the fragmentation value. If newly added
tokens cluster, increasing both R and F at the same time has shown to have a
similar minimal eﬀect, on #M and #B. Using dynamic values for R and F is also
possible, but given that the eﬀect is almost exclusively signiﬁcant when added
tokens do not cluster, no further research on the eﬀect of diﬀerent values is
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warranted at this point.
3.8 Security and Emergence
This chapter introduced a very diﬀerent approach to distributed computing.
Instead of sending messages to (possibly replicated) remote objects, the micro-
object system forces operations to take place on local copies only, keeps data
in objects immutable, and supports only local graph-like data structures from
which objects can never be removed. There are several ramiﬁcations of this
approach that have been barely touched upon. Below a brief discussion of two
important ones: security and emergence.
3.8.1 Security
Building a secure large-scale distributed system requires that the security in-
frastructure is integrated into the design from the start. Therefore, the security
infrastructure is natively incorporated into theMO system, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.1. TheMO system needs data security and system security. Data security is
there to protect micro-objects from unauthorized access, but also to protect ap-
plications against bogus micro-objects. System security concentrates on serving
benign applications, while denying service to malicious applications.
Data security
For data security, theMO system provides separated security policies that utilize
(but are not limited to) end-to-end encryption and authentication. All sensitive
security data appears in plain text only in the application address space.
Bogus micro-objects can be detected by end-to-end authentication. How-
ever, a bogus micro-object will be detected only at the highest (i.e., application)
level. Therefore, bogus micro-objects still threaten the functionality of the lower
level (i.e., the MO system itself ). To deal with DoS (Denial of Service) attacks,
the MO system has been designed such that most bogus data can be detected
early. Note that it is quite easy to generate a bogus micro-object and then cal-
culate the correct hash value for its token. However, it is unlikely that some
application would ever request such a micro-object. Generating a bogus micro-
object in response to a speciﬁc request is computationally much harder, because
the hash of the requested micro-object is given as part of the request.
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System security
The system security of theMO system is still largely unexplored. TheMO system
has rudimentary protection against abuse of storage and transport. In principle,
cloud servers can be tricked in to storing bogus data, but it will end up in the
cache so that the harm is limited. A set of cloud servers can sometimes be
tricked into transporting bogus data. However, newly developed policies and
security for replication might remedy this. The MO system does not yet have
protection (other than its hot-spot handling), against denial of service. For
example, a ﬂooding attack will put parts of theMO system out of function. Also,
theMO system suﬀers from the security bootstrapping problem: in order to set
up secure communication between two given parties, some pre-existing shared
secret is needed. Flooding and bootstrapping are common security problems,
and they are not speciﬁc to the MO system nor is it clear that these problems
can be solved by changing the design.
As mentioned in Section 3.5.5, the MO system does not (yet) possess any
data-ﬂow shielding, and may thus leak sensitive data. However, special replica-
tion schemes could be devised to make traﬃc analysis more diﬃcult.
3.8.2 Emergent Behavior
The emphasis on local decision making has important ramiﬁcations for overall
system behavior. For example, as explained above, objects can be replicated
across the system only if local policies of initiating and intended peers match.
In contrast, replication in virtually all traditional distributed systems is based on
explicit and centralized control. The eﬀect of having only local policies leads to
emergent behavior, observed as the ﬂow of (copies of ) micro-objects between
servers.
It remains to be seen to what extent this emergent behavior can actually
be controlled. One avenue that will have to be further explored is developing
various replication policies and to see how combinations aﬀect the replication
and distribution of micro-objects. Although the loss of centralized control can
be seen as a disadvantage, local decision making simpliﬁes development and
will certainly lead to much better scalable solutions for some problem domains.
In this light, this approach is to be compared to the recent increase in gossip-
based solutions, which all evolve around local decision making [27]. These so-
lutions have in common that only by ﬁne tuning local decision rules can one
observe desirable global behavior. Unfortunately, the relation between this lo-
cal tuning and global behavior is often not well understood, and only recently
have studies been published in which diﬀerent approaches are systematically
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compared [33]. However, it is also clear that local decision making has excel-
lent scalability properties, allowing systems to easily grow to millions of nodes.
This point has already been demonstrated by traditional decentralized systems
such as those for exchanging news and E-mail.
3.9 Related Work
Themain argument in this chapter is not new: distribution transparency is a bad
idea. This research oﬀers an alternative to transparency, making distribution
visible to the programmer in a manageable way. The crux to this approach is
to introduce distribution at a lower level, utilizing the lower complexity that
comes with it. In some way DSM (Distributed Shared Memory) takes a similar
approach; Tackling the distribution problems at a low level. However, I argue
that DSMdoes not concentrate the eﬀects of partial failures in a fewmanageable
places, but spreads the problem evenly throughout the whole program. Any
DSM usage becomes a possible point of failure.
This especially goes for totally transparent DSM, where the operating system
integrates shared memory with the virtual memory management. With totally
transparent DSM every memory access can fail, turning even a basic instruction
like “add one to variable X” into a liability. But even with function-call driven
DSM, where the application has to request blocks of memory explicitly, every
request turns into a potential problem. One could argue that micro-objects
are handles to blocks of shared memory. In eﬀect, this is true, but micro-
objects have additional properties. First, they are immutable and second they
feature a generic way of relating to each other: clustering. The ﬁrst property,
immutability, severely simpliﬁes distribution. The second property, clustering,
allows the support system to better predict the needs of an application, allowing
dynamic, application-speciﬁc replication. In other words where the distributed-
application-object approach is too high level, the DSM approach is too low
level.
In Section 6.2 a detailed comparison is made between existing distributed
frameworks and the micro-objects framework.
3.10 Summary
Current message-to-object based distributed frameworks ignore or fail to ade-
quately address partial failures. For distributed systems based on small, highly
reliable networks, and error ignorance, as for centralized solutions, this might
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lead to acceptable behavior. However, for most large-scale distributed appli-
cations, this leads to unacceptable emergent behavior. As an alternative, the
micro-object system is simple and clean. It makes local decision based solely on
information received, not on the suspected state of a remote party. Therefore,
remote sites never have to acknowledge reception of information, so the micro-
object system does not suﬀer from partial failures. If an application needs some
remote information, it can only request it using an API call. These API requests
are clearly recognizable as blocking calls to the application (programmer) to pre-
vent any surprises. The design and implementation indicate that this model is
relatively simple to realize. However, it is yet too soon to draw hard conclusions
on the viability of the micro-object system, although it is clear that it contains
the essential elements to tackle the hard problems that have been hampering
large-scale distributed systems. Some of these hard problems, notably handling
partial failures, are strongly alleviated by the choice of combining local comput-
ing and immutability. The drawback is loss of distribution transparency but also
loss of the partial failure that comes with it. It is clear this is only the beginning
of exploring this new paradigm.
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❧ ”How to implement uniﬁed messaging atop a cloud of micro-
objects?” To answer that question, I sketched out a design in
micro-object graphs. I showed it to Jeroen Snoeij, a computer-
science master student after I explained both uniﬁed messag-
ing andmicro-objects. ”Would you like to implement uniﬁedmes-
saging using micro-objects?” I asked him. The discussion that
followed ended half a year later when he ﬁnished his master
thesis: Uniﬁed Messaging with Micro Objects. Though more
a proof of concept than an industrial-strength application, it
proved that the two-layered approach was viable. When I
asked him if micro-objects had made it easier to implement
uniﬁed messaging. His response was: ”Micro-objects not just
made it easier, it would have been impossible without.” After
hearing his answer I made my promotor smile by claiming
”Cut, print, it’s a wrap.” Little did I know. His smile meant I
still had to spend quite some time on the important question
that followed it. ”How about performance and performance/re-
source trade-oﬀs?”
❦
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Chapter 4
A Uniﬁed Messaging System
“Most people who have worked on this sort of thing say thesame; it looks deceptively easy till you actually get in to try
and do it.”
Eric Allman, the original author of sendmail.
By using themicro-objectmiddleware layer described inChapter 3, it should
be somewhatmore straightforward to implement large-scale distributedmessag-
ing systems. Primarily, because the MOmiddleware allows direct addressing of
data instead of indirect addressing of data at network end points. This frees
the UMS from handling the actual locating and transporting of messages. This
chapter will focus on a large-scale, MO based, uniﬁed messaging system. In
this system, as with any large-scale distributed system based on micro-objects:
A distributed-application object (DAO) is a rooted weakly connected
graph of micro-objects, represented by one root micro-object from that
graph.
From this, it follows that integrating several basic DAOs into one new more
complex or more powerful DAO is a simple matter of creating a new micro-
object and putting the basic DAOs in its cluster, as shown in Figure 4.1. Rep-
resenting a DAO by one (root) micro-object allows for a hierarchical build up
of DAOs. Though a DAO is built up from micro-objects, it can be seen at
another level of abstraction as being built up from (simpler) DAOs. This is
one reason why a huge tree of micro-objects can feature enough (layered) ab-
straction to remain usable, even when distributed over many computers. As
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Figure 4.1: Distributed application object composition. (a) A rooted
weakly connected graph of micro-objects forming one DAO
with root B representing it (b) Two micro-objects named A
and B each representing a DAO. (c) One new DAO, C, is
created by adding A and B to the cluster of a new micro-
object.
will become apparent below, a large messaging system could feature billions of
connected micro-objects, distributed over millions of computers, yet every level
of abstraction can be understood in terms of underlying abstractions. Needless
to say that this comes in handy when designing and implementing such systems.
To gain practical experience and as a testing ground for micro-objects, two
messaging related messaging systems were implemented. First, a plugin for an
existing IM client was adapted to use micro-objects, second a UMS proof-of-
concept implementation was written.
The IM client
Theworld of instant messaging is partitioned into several incompatible systems.
Leaving aside the proprietary instant messaging systems provided by network
operators and focusing on popular instant messaging systems on top of the In-
ternet, we ﬁnd (in alphabetical order) AIM, Bonjour, Gadu-Gadu, Google Talk,
Groupwise, ICQ, IRC, MSN, MySpaceIM, QQ, SILC, SIMPLE, Sametime,
Skype, XMPP, Yahoo!, and Zephyr. This list is by no means complete. Clients
of one IM system can usually not communicate with clients of another. There
is, however, one very popular IM client that can communicate with all these IM
systems: Pidgin. Pidgin supports what is known as a plugin. A plugin allows a
generic IM client to interface with a speciﬁc IM protocol. By providing a plugin
based on the MO system, a full-blown instant messaging system using micro-
objects can be implemented. This plugin has two parts. One part implements
sockets on top of micro-objects, the other part implements the administrative
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management of the plugin. At ﬁrst it might seem strange that a socket interface
would be put atop of micro-objects which in turn are put atop sockets. How-
ever, there are two main reasons why this might be considered an interesting
experiment. First, the socket interface supports generic communication, not
just traditional end-to-end IP communication. Supporting it could make port-
ing IP-based applications to MO based ones much easier. Second, this setup
allows a traditionally designed Internet messaging client to talk to other clients
that sit directly on top of micro-objects. For an example of the latter, with the
plugin, Pidgin is perfectly capable of communicating with both IM example
implementations as given in the Section 3 in Figures 3.12 and 3.11.
So, the MO-based socket implementation allows applications that tradi-
tionally run on an IP socket to run on the MO layer. Given the security and
replication policies of the MO system, this allows the MO-based socket imple-
mentation to oﬀer additional services like history, low latency, and security, to
existing distributed applications almost for free.
The UMS implementation
A much bigger messaging system has also been implemented. For practical
reasons we took two measures. First, readily available code was used as much as
possible for the GUI (Graphical User Interface) and the data storage. Second,
not all types of messaging were supported, only rudimentary E-mail, USENET
News, and IM style messaging. Below is a description of the code that was avail-
able beforehand. The design allowed for any standard browser client to function
as the GUI of the UMS. Since a browser client necessitates a client/server imple-
mentation, aUMS server was created as a stack, with a simple web server on top
and some message-handling software below that, as shown Figure 4.2. Message
storage is handled by a lightweight SQL (Structured Query Language) library,
called SQLite. Message exchange is handled, of course, by the MO system. So
the lion’s share part of the UMS system consists of “prefab” code. All that re-
mained was designing and implementing a UMS library to glue the upper layers
(browser and web server) and the lower layers (data management and message
exchange) together. This chapter will focus on the new code written for the
UMS.
4.1 Implementation Description
Clearly the proof-of-concept implementation was never meant to be a replace-
ment for all current messaging systems. As stated above, it aims only at mim-
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Figure 4.2: A simpliﬁed, client-server based, UMS system. The UMS
client (a standard web browser) provides the GUI.The UMS
server consists of a web server, a UMS library that uses a
SQLite library to store and aMO lib-server to exchangemes-
sages.
icking the basic behavior of E-mail, USENET News, and IM. Though this is
not truly uniﬁed messaging, it does cover the major classes of popular current
messaging systems. The description below is based on the proof-of-concept im-
plementation. Hence it is not a description of a complete and uniﬁedmessaging
system, yet it tries to demonstrate an easier to understand messaging system
hinting at uniﬁcation. The last section of this chapter describes what additions
would be needed in order to create a system that would be more capable of true
uniﬁed messaging.
The next sections describe the build up of the UMS target as a DAO, as
discussed in Section 2.2.2. The section after that does the same for the TISM
distributed-application object.
4.1.1 Target Design
In uniﬁed messaging the target is used as a replacement for message destinations
mimicking the E-mail inbox, the IM session or channel, and the USENET news-
group, all in one. Note that these three message stores have a lot in common
and the naming diﬀerences signify mainly conceptual diﬀerences. The design of
the target is a rather straightforward message store, with a user-selectable name
and a set of messages. However, to accommodate the IM “presence” feature,
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a presence DAO is added. The resulting design is shown in Figure 4.3. Note
presence
target
name
TISM
...
TISM
content
Figure 4.3: The target-DAO inmicro-objects. Each targetDAO consists
of a name DAO, content DAO, and presence DAO. Micro-
objects are depicted as rounded rectangles and DAO’s are
rooted graphs with their root micro-objects labeled. For ex-
ample the content DAO is the whole graph below the micro-
object labeled “content.”
that the name of the target is in a separate DAO.This allows for easy renaming.
However, renaming was not implemented.
The content of a target is a set of plain TISMs (see below). No subtargets are
allowed in this implementation, neither in the content DAO nor in some other
part. Though apparently straightforward, an important yet slightly less obvious
implication of this design is worth mentioning. This design allows a TISM to
be part of zero, one or many targets. In the E-mail and USENET system this
is called forwarding and cross-posting respectively. There is no equivalent of
cross-posting in most IM systems. The presence DAO will be explained below.
With an existing approach to the development of such a distributed system,
diﬀerent replication policies of the content DAO and the presence DAO could
lead to separate, and very diﬀerent implementations. With micro-objects, con-
tent and presence are implemented in a similar fashion. Setting the right policy
would simply be a matter of choosing the right replication policy for eachDAO,
matching performance to desired behaviour. This is one of the stronger features
of theMO system: multiple, dynamic, per (sub) object, replication policies that
share the same implementation within a single application framework.
For example, imagine a user interested in the presence of a target only. Let
us assume the user’s messaging application would be holding a local copy of a
target-DAO like the one in Figure 4.3. The application could set the replication
policy for the presence-DAO such that it would be updated regularly while not
setting the replication policy on the content-DAO, forgoing even the notiﬁca-
tion of any chance to the content. At some point the user might indicate to
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be interested in the content too. Immediately the user’s messaging application
could switch on a (diﬀerent) replication policy on the content-DAO.
For another example, imagine a user’s messaging application setting two
replication policies on the content sub-DAO. One replication policy is resource
hogging but tracks changes closely. The other replication policy is light on the
resources but slow. The ﬁrst replication has a level of one, the second a level
of ten. This way, users could be notiﬁed of the arrival of a new TISM almost
instantly, but the actual TISM itself would trickle in. Note that theMO system
will instantly retrieve any TISM the application requests explicitly, independent
of any active replication policy.
To summarize the above examples: It is useful for a single target-DAO to
have independent replication of its presence and content sub-DAOs to better
serve the user’s needs. Likewise, it is possible to replicate one DAO using two
policies at diﬀerent levels to create a useful mix of low and high latency.
The presence DAO
The presence DAO contains short-lived status DAOs. If some user wanted his
or her presence in this particular target to be known, his or her application
should insert status DAOs in the clusters of the corresponding presence DAO,
at regular intervals. This is actually more than most IM systems oﬀer. The
latter generally oﬀer a systemwide presence, whereas this implementation oﬀers
a per-target presence. A user could opt to announce his or her online presence
in a target shared with his or her friends and be oﬄine (i.e., not present) in all
others. Note this is by design, not by necessity, for any target could be appointed
(or constructed) to manage “systemwide” presence information. Though not
utilized in this implementation, one status DAO could be shared amongst many
presence DAOs.
4.1.2 TISM Design
In uniﬁed messaging the TISM is used as a replacement for information ex-
change mimicking the E-mail message, IM line, and USENET article. As with
the target, these three datagrams have a lot in common and the naming diﬀer-
ences are chieﬂy cosmetic. Like the design of the target, the TISM is designed as
a straightforward tree of micro-objects, with a body, zero or more attachments
and a message TISM tree, as shown in Figure 4.4. Given that micro-objects are
relatively small and a message can have an arbitrary size, a TISM body can be
split into several parts. Since a TISM can have any number of attachments, a
similar construct is used for them, just one layer deeper. Since in some mes-
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Figure 4.4: The TISM-DAO in micro-objects. Each TISM DAO con-
sists of a body DAO, attachment DAO and tree DAO.
saging systems, i.e., E-mail and USENET, the messages can be related (one
message is said to follow up another), the TISM contains a DAO that can be
used to express these relations. It turns out that a tree structure is well suited
for this purpose. First, the body and attachments will be detailed, then the tree
DAO will be dealt with.
The design of the TISM DAO is straightforward. However, this layered
structure has a distinct advantage with respect to replication. This will be illus-
trated better with an expansion of the TISM DAO of Figure 4.4, shown again
in more depth, in Figure 4.5. As stated in Section 3.7, each micro-object (and
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TISM TISM
TISM
attachments TISM tree
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attachment
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partpart
attachment
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partpart
level 1
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Figure 4.5: A closer look at the TISM-DAO, with replication levels.
hence each DAO) can have its own replication policy and replication depth.
Imagine a TISM in a target that is shared between friends. Every TISM in this
friend target could get a fast-forwarding replication policy at level 6. There is
no need to actually set every TISM policy individually. Setting the replication
of the friend target holding all the TISMs to fast-forwarding at level 8 would
suﬃce. This way the content of each part (at level 6) would be rushed to the
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recipients the instant they were clustered to any of the micro-objects at level
4/5. Now let’s imagine a TISM in some other target that is like an uninterest-
ing news group. The local UMS server could decide to replicate every TISM
in this group at level 4. This way, only the main TISM would be rushed to
the other side, and if the user ever wanted the attachment, it would have to be
retrieved on demand. Even so, replicating at level 4, will make sure all the parts
of the body of a message will be rushed to the recipient, but not the parts of
the attachments because they were deliberately put in at a lower level. This is a
clear example of how the level of replication can inﬂuence the design of a DAO.
In general, if less important things are put in lower layers they can be excluded
from replication by picking a lower replication level.
One way of looking at replication levels is that every micro-object “inherits”
the replication policy of (all) its parents, be it at a decreased level. This does not
lead to problems if a micro-object happens to simultaneously inherit diﬀerent
replication policies. As discussed in Section 3.5.6, replication is robust with
regard to intermediate state change, so one replication policy will never obstruct
another.
Clearly the options are endless. For example, it is also possible to com-
bine deep, cheap, but slow replication with shallow, fast and more resource-
consuming replication.
The proof-of-concept design of the TISM as shown in Figure 4.5, was de-
signed to allow combining diﬀerent replication policies with diﬀerent levels for
the root node. However, this is only one, particularly convenient way repli-
cation can be done. Finer-grained replication schemes are also possible. For
example, looking at a TISMDAO as a combination of three sub-DAOs, (body,
attachment, TISM tree, as shown in Figure 4.5) each sub-DAO could have its
own independent replication policy, or set of replication policies. For example,
a body DAO can be replicated at higher speed and cost, an attachment DAO
can be replicated on demand and a TISM tree DAO can be replicated cheaply
at a slow pace. Indeed, the replication options seem endless, too.
The TISM tree DAO
Since both E-mail and USENET allow the user to follow up one message with
several others, a tree-like structure is needed. Followups are usually reactions
of one user to a message of another user. Since a followup is a regular message,
it can have zero to many followups, too. This leads to tree-like structures, like
the one shown in Figure 4.6. The proof-of-concept design was some what more
elaborate. The TISM tree did not only allow each TISM to have zero to many
followup TISMs, thus providing a TISM tree, but also, for eﬃciency reasons,
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TISM tree TISM tree
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TISM tree
Alice - Re: Re: Hello World!
Eve - Re: Hello World!
Dave - Re: Hello World!
Alice - Re: Re: Hello World!
Alice - Hello World!
Eve - Re: Re: Hello World!
Bob - Re: Hello World!
Alice
Alice
Figure 4.6: Typical followup tree. Alice has posted a message and Bob
posted a followup, Alice posted a followup to that and so
did Eve. (a) Followup tree as depicted in a typical end-user
application. (b) Followup tree as implemented using a TISM
tree DAO.
each TISM would hold a link to the root of the tree it belonged to. Note
that this would introduce cycles, but also note that the replication strategy can
handle cycles, see Section 3.6.2. One of the problems with this design is that
a TISM can only be part of one single tree. A truly uniﬁed messaging system
would also allow for a USENET feature called cross posting, by allowing a TISM
to be posted in more than one target. To fully combine the followup and cross-
post feature, a TISM should be able to be part of more than one TISM tree. One
TISM tree is enough for a proof-of-concept implementation, a more complete
UMS would need a slightly diﬀerent approach. An alternative will be given in
the last section of this chapter.
4.2 Security
The most popular versions of E-mail, USENET and IM do not feature much
security. Clearly for USENET it would make little sense to encrypt messages.
However, given the private nature of E-mail and IM, some protection would
be in order. Surely there are many IM and E-mail clients that feature client-to-
server or end-to-end encryption. However, popular protocols like Jabber (IM)
and SMTP (E-mail), use add-on protocols like, SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
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(client-to-server) and GnuPG (GNU Privacy Guard) (end-to-end) to achieve
security. Though this will protect against most eavesdropping, it will not solve
other problems, most notably unwanted messages, or spam. The next two sec-
tions describe the security as it was designed for the proof-of-concept UMS
system. The section after that details about how a messaging system can be
protected against spam.
4.2.1 Protecting the Target
As described in Section 2.2.3, every target has a post-key and a read-key. In
Section 2.2 key sharing was introduced as a means to enhance security but also
as a means to mimic properties of individual messaging systems. For example,
by making a post-key public and keeping the read-key private, an E-mail like
functionality was mimicked. However, only the extreme forms of key sharing
were mentioned; a key could be either known only by the creator of a target or a
key could be public knowledge. In practice, however, a key, like any secret, can
be shared by two people or a relatively small group or it can be made publicly
known. Figure 4.7 shows a graphical representation of what key distribution
belongs to what type of messaging. Clearly for E-mail like functionality, the
public
public privateshared
IM
e−mail
news
post key
re
a
d 
ke
y
diary
blog
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shared
Figure 4.7: The eﬀects of key distribution on the type of messaging ser-
vice performed.
read-key needs to be private. The post-key should be public or at least shared
amongst two people. If both the read-key and the post-key are private, one
would have a system that would allow one to write messages only to one self.
This area in Figure 4.7 is marked diary. Given the “if you can read it, you can
post to it” character of USENET the read-key and post-key are distributed as a
pair. As with E-mail, if both keys are kept private it is not really an inter-user
messaging system any more. Other than that, any level of distribution for the
read-key, post-key pair leads to a news-like messaging system. The IM system
largely overlaps with the USENET system. However, if the read-key, post-key
pair is shared by too many people, it would be very hard to keep track of who
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is saying what, so much so, that it would render the system unusable. As an
illustration, Figure 4.7 also holds an area marked blog. It occupies basically the
area where the post-key is not known by everybody, and the read-key is not kept
private. In short, it occupies the area signifying a messaging system where one
or a few users post messages that can be read by many to all other users. Hence
the blog label. There might be a good reason to setup a messaging system that
allows everybody to post messages (i.e., the post-key is public) but only a few
to read them. Hence the open area for a public post-key and a shared read-
key. An example would be customer service: anyone can ﬁle a complaint, and a
team of employees (sharing the read-key) can read and handle the complaints.
An other example would be a system where a company target allows (many)
whistleblowers to complain about employees doing illegal things, but only the
CEO can read it. A true UMS system should be able to provide this service,
not only to allow customer-service messaging, but also usages not yet thought
oﬀ. Not being able to anticipate future usage is one of the reasons to create a
generic system. Since the proof-of-concept implementation only tries to mimic
E-mail, USENET, and IM, this functionality was not implemented.
Note that using asymmetric encryption to mimic messaging paradigms usu-
ally leads to a more secure system. For example, with E-mail (without using
GnuPG) every MTA passes the message in plain text.
Since the key is not bound to the initiator or their hardware, initiatives (like
a newsgroup or a chat channel) can live on even if the original “target creator”
stops being involved, simply by transferring the right keys to other users.
4.2.2 Protecting the TISM
Like the target, each individual TISM is protected too. TISMs, however, are
protected with symmetric keys, aptly named TISM-keys. At ﬁrst the proof-of-
concept implementation did not have encryption of the TISM DAO. It took
some eﬀort to come up with a simple and intuitive way of distributing this
TISM-key yet still allow for easy cross posting. To this end, a connector DAO
was introduced, as shown in Figure 4.8. With this improved design, it is feasible
to have an encrypted TISM (body), without having to re-encrypt a TISM for
each cross-post. The connector DAO is inserted in front of the TISM pushing
it down. The payload of the connector DAO holds the (symmetric) encryption
key of the body of the TISM. This key, in turn, encrypted with the post-key of
the target. By cascading the encryption, still only the read-key (of either target)
is needed to decrypt the TISM. To cross post a TISM to some other target, a
new connector DAO is created containing the TISM-key encrypted with the
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presencename content
target 2target
{TISM-key} post-key 2connector
{body}
content
TISM-key
post-key
TISM
connector {TISM-key}
Figure 4.8: A Connector DAO is inserted in between a target’s content
DAO and a TISMDAO.The connector holds an encrypted
version of the symmetric TISM-key. When a TISM is cross
posted to target 2 a new connector DAO is created contain-
ing the TISM-key encrypted with the post-key of target 2.
post-key of the new target and the same TISM DAO is put in the cluster of
this new connector DAO, see target 2 in Figure 4.8. Using a connector DAO
means that only one key has to be encrypted and distributed. Without such a
connector, a potentially large number of TISM parts would have to be retrieved,
decrypted, re-encrypted, and distributed.
4.3 Spam
In their “Email Statistics Report, 2012-2016” the Radicati Group reports that in
2012 about 144.8 billion E-mail messages are sent daily. Around 90% of these
message are spam or unsolicited E-mail, also referred to as, abusive email, junk-
mail, UCE, or UBE. There is a simple reason why there is so much spam; spam
is eﬀective. The Radicati Group reports that despite adept antispam technology,
still about 15% of all E-mail received is spam. Most of the cost of spam lies
on the receiving side because that is where E-mail is stored and managed. The
vast majority of spam recipients dislike it, as shown in Figure 4.9. However,
low sending costs and a huge audience make spam cost eﬀective, even if the
response is a few per million.
Unsolicited messaging was ﬁrst identiﬁed on USENET, and got its name
from a Monty Python sketch. The ﬁrst infamous professional spammer was
Laurence Canter, co-author of the book How To Make A Fortune On The Infor-
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Attitude about spam Response
Like it a lot 1%
Like it somewhat 2%
Neutral 14%
Dislike it somewhat 20%
Dislike it a lot 63%
from: ISPs and Spam: The Impact of Spam
on Customer Retention and Acquisition.
Gartner Group. http://www.gartner.com/
Figure 4.9: What E-mail users think of spam.
mation Superhighway. Unsolicited messaging is a real problem, if not an out-
right threat to the sustainability of the Internet. The total worldwide cost asso-
ciated with E-mail spam for 2009 is estimated at (than) e 90 billion (US $ 130
billion) [34].
4.3.1 Conventional Measures Against Spam
In several countries, antispam laws are in place or under consideration. It is
doubtful whether any legislation will help. First of all, it will not help against
acquaintance spam; spam following a solicited message. Second, the E-mail
system is easily fooled, making it hard to track down the perpetrator. Also the
international character of the Internet make it hard to enforce laws. There is a
growing number of antispam products, which are oﬀered by organizations like:
Brightmail, MAPS, Postini, Trend Micro, Tumbleweed, ActiveState, Cloud-
mark and MailFrontier.
There are many antispam web sites (e.g., http://spamcop.net/). There are
also a multitude of web sites (e.g., http://www.byshenk.net/) describing how
to ﬁght back against spam, how to complain to the spammer’s ISP, how to create
dummy web pages to poison harvesters; programs that collect E-mail addresses
from web pages, how to prevent your machine from being used as an open mail
relay; allowing spammers to use your computer to hide their identity, and so on.
At the moment of writing, spam is largely vectored through E-mail, but spam
has long since been a problem for the USENET system and it is also becoming
an issue for wireless services and IM (such as AOL Instant Messenger, MSN
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Messenger, YahooMessenger and ICQ). The latter type of spam is sometimes
referred to as spim. Some computer-science professors even report to have got-
ten SMS spam in the U.S.
Message Filtering
Getting rid of unwanted messages, like viruses and spam, is hard to do. In
principle, unwanted messages can be ﬁltered out at any hop a message makes.
For E-mail there are three logical moments to delete unwanted messages: at
sendoﬀ, in transit, and at reception. At each of these moments, messages can be
ﬁltered and automatically deleted. The ﬁltering itself is simple: messages are run
through an automated function that checks for known semi-unique patterns. If
a message (including its header and attachments) pass some statistical threshold,
it is deleted. For example, if a message contains the pattern v1agra chances are it
is spam and the message can be deleted. The crux here is “chances are” for there
is no certainty. However, it could, for example, be an important message from
a manufacturer, warning about side eﬀects. If so, it would be a false positive:
a message falsely recognized as unwanted. Eﬀective ﬁltering will delete most
spam messages (and almost all viruses) while occasionally mistaking a normal
message for spam. Most people will not accept a ﬁlter that catches 92% of the
unwanted messages at the cost of 2% false positives, however, 99.9% versus
0.01% would be accepted. There are many forms of ﬁltering each with their
own merits and demerits. Besides false positives there is one other demerit that
all forms of ﬁltering share: Filtering costs resources.
Adaptive-ﬁltering or self-learning-ﬁltering, has been proven to be very suc-
cessful against spam. This type of statistical ﬁltering takes place at the receiver’s
side taking corrections from the recipient. Besides statistic ﬁltering, blacklist ﬁl-
tering is also popular. With this form ﬁltering, amessage is deleted if a from-ﬁeld
entry is known to be a spammer. Blacklisting has been eﬀective against spam in
the past, but spam has evolved to evade this ﬁltering. Other ﬁltering techniques
against spam are whitelisting and graylisting. The whitelist ﬁlter allows only
E-mail messages from known sources. If an E-mail message arrives from an un-
known source, the sender is sent a challenge, and only if the other side sends the
proper response, is the message accepted. Responding correctly, makes sending
spammore costly but will usually be tolerable to the regular senders. The graylist
ﬁlter rejects any E-mail message that has not been accepted recently, based on
the triplet, (sender, receiver, sending-server). If the same E-mail is oﬀered again
after some time, typically 30 to 60 minutes, it is assumed that this message is
sent by a full-blown SMTP server and it is accepted. Graylisting is (currently)
eﬀective because spammers use special programs to send their messages, and
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these special programs try only once. One disadvantage of graylisting is the
delay recipients experience when they get a message from a new sender. Usually
a message passes several ﬁlters before it arrives at its end point.
Many users are unaware that their ISP has SMTP, POP, IMAP andWebmail
servers that ﬁlter on spam and viruses. Of late, spammers, the people that send
spam, have found new ways to fool ﬁltering by means of inserting extra random
words, by inserting images, etc. Basically ﬁltering is part of an arms race between
the spammers and the spam victims.
There are diﬀerent, nonﬁltering, attack vectors against spammers. First,
sending messages should be made less cost eﬀective, and second spammers
should be traceable. The ﬁrst vector is directed against the economics of spam,
the second vector enhances the enforcing of antispam laws and a host of tech-
nical measures. These two attack vectors can be exercised when using a UMS
as described in this section.
Attacking the Cost Eﬀectiveness
There are several ways to make spamming less cost eﬀective. If sending E-mail
were to cost e 0.10 per message, sending out billions of messages would in-
stantly cease to be cost eﬀective. However, even if the overhead cost of such
a pay-per-message system turns out to be below e 0.10 a message, people will
never agree on what to do with the money. Some have suggested donating it
to charity, some have suggested the recipient should receive it. However, all of
these methods need strong protocols to make sure everybody complies. There
are other ways besides pay-per-message, to increase the cost per spam message.
Using many and temporary targets is one of them. One of the reasons E-mail
spam is hard to eradicate is because it is expensive to invalidate an E-mail ad-
dress. Once a spammer gets a hold of an E-mail address, he or she will be able to
use it over and over again and he or she might also sell it to other spammers. So
the cost of getting an E-mail address can be spread over many spam messages.
When this happens, the user is faced with a diﬃcult choice, abandoning his or
her E-mail address, making it invalid for spammers and legitimate users alike,
or dealing with the spam. This is the ﬁrst place where the UMS system oﬀers
a better choice. It is very easy to create many targets, and when a target is
dropped, the other targets will remain fully operational. Imagine a user setting
up a target to communicate with his/her brother and one to communicate with
his/her sister. Imagine a spammer somehow got hold of the post-key of the
“brother-target.” The user could simply drop this tainted target, create a new
brother-target, and notify the brother that he should use this new target. The
user will not even have to bother any other users about dropping the original
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“brother-target.” Since it is very cheap to make a target, it will even be feasible
for any user to create a temporary target for any purpose. In short, a target is
much cheaper than an E-mail box, or USENET group, hence the cost of getting
a target has to be spread over only a few spam messages, increasing the cost per
spam message.
The UMS has another feature that can be used to increase the cost overhead.
In contrast to existing messaging systems, the UMS features a per-target repli-
cation. By selecting a lazy replication policy for public targets, the spammer has
to provide for a cloud server that stays online, ready to deliver the spam every
time the receiver requests it. A replication policy is said to be lazy if the data
has to be kept at the origin. As discussed in Section 3.5.6 theMO system’s basic
replication is lazy. Lazy replication makes sending spam more expensive than the
store-and-forward type of replication that is featured with most existing messag-
ing systems, because the spammer will have to provide considerable long lived
resources instead of being able to ﬁre and forget.
Tracing spammers
With lazy replication, the cloud server functionality that a spammer has to pro-
vide will be very traceable. This opens an array of options of both technical
and legal nature. Owners of cloud servers can be ﬁned, for example, or a spam-
hosting cloud server can be put on a blacklist. This option is not available with
E-mail and USENET because of the store-and-forward replication and weak
security model. Basically a spammer is hard to trace once the message has made
the ﬁrst hop. An ISP can easily see that someone sent a million emails (i.e., the
ﬁrst hop). But in many cases, the spammer owns the ISP.
Antispam Measures
The above mentioned eﬀects on cost eﬀectiveness of spam and possibility to
trace spam back to the spammer, stem from the design of the UMS on top of
the basicMO system. There are, however, speciﬁc measures that can be taken to
make it even harder for spammers to operate. For example, an expensive posting
replication policy could be implemented. Such a policy would necessitate a lot
of computation before a message could be posted. One way of doing that would
be to distribute only part of the post-key, forcing the posting party to calculate
the missing parts by brute force. However, like with using a CAPTCHA (Com-
pletely Automated Public Turingtest to tell Computers and Humans Apart),
some spammers will ﬁnd a way to force the computer of innocent users to do
the calculation. The proof-of-concept implementation does not feature any
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such antispam measures.
4.4 Unique New Features
The proof-of-concept UMS shows some unique new features that one gets for
free by integrating several messaging paradigms. For example, a user could
receive an E-mail like message in a target, and they might follow up in an IM-
like fashion if the sender is notably present in the receiving target. Another
example would be that a message could originally been sent like an E-mail, and
the receiving user might cross post it to a USENET-like group.
The UMS is also able to set up a replacement target for a target that has been
compromised, for example, when a spammer has gotten a hold of the post and
read-key of a target used for communication between two users, named, say,
Alice and Bob. Alice would create a new temporary target, and this target plus
its post-key are put in a TISM that is subsequently posted in the compromised
target. Bob generates a new target and creates a TISM with a small message,
the new target and both keys. This TISM is posted in the temporary target that
Alice created. Alice will judge the small message to verify it is really Bob talking
and both Alice and Bob drop the compromised target in favor for the new target
that Bob made. With some additions, the UMS could even assist in identifying
of Bob, for example, by deploying some signing algorithms. However, that was
neither researched nor implemented. It is worth stressing that at no point in
time did Alice and Bob lose contact, the “tainted” target was, merely, used to
setup the replacement.
4.5 Storage versus Transport
Implementing the proof-of-concept UMS using theMO system, indicated that
a full-blown UMS would be feasible. Since this proof-of-concept was also the
ﬁrst larger nontrivial program using theMO system, it also indicated that using
the MOmiddleware layer did indeed simplify the design and implementation.
Since the programmer-friendliness of the MO system is worthy of separate re-
search, a quick qualitative observation follows below. From the experiment,
it appeared that most aspects of using the MO system to build a distributed
application, were either easy or easy explainable. However, one aspect appeared
to be so subtle, that it was only encountered much later. TheMO system can be
viewed as a storage and transport system or as a transport only system, depending
on the usage of expiration date and replication policy. If micro-objects are set to
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expire after a reasonable delivery period, the micro-objects are used as a trans-
port vehicle. If micro-objects are given a longer time to live and the application
asks the cloud server to keep them alive even after that (by means of repeated
setting of replication policy to extend the time to live), the micro-objects turn
into storage objects. For a programmer unaware of this, it is easy to mix up
these two ways of using micro-objects in the design phase. In this example, the
TISM objects were designed as transport objects. The target objects (by nature)
should have been implemented as longer lived objects. However, the design
did not include the necessary prolongation of the time to live of the targets.
The way the TISM tree was designed was contrary to the transport-only nature
of the TISM objects them selves. These simple to ﬁx design ﬂaws were not
detected during the testing phase, simply because there were no long-term tests
performed. For mimicking the IM system, no changes are needed, however, for
the E-mail and even more so for the USENET like functionality of the UMS
some additions should have been made to the design from the beginning. In
short, application programmers should bemade aware of this matter before they
attempt any serious development based on the MOmiddleware layer.
4.6 Application Programming Interface Design
The UMS API was modeled after the MO API. It uses the C language with
a classical ADT design with rather verbose, underscore-based identiﬁer nam-
ing. OOP (Object Oriented Programming) was considered but rejected be-
cause it would limit the number of systems the software could be easily ported
to. The C language simply has the largest installed base, especially under rela-
tively small systems. Name-space pollution is prevented by consequently pre-
ﬁxing identiﬁers with the proper ADT preﬁx. Classical pre and post ﬁxing
is used for user deﬁned types (postﬁx: _t), structs (preﬁx: s_), unions (pre-
ﬁx: u_), etc. Every ADT is implemented as a pointer to struct. For example,
target_get_tism_list() would operate on the target ADT named target_t, it
would return a TISM ADT. In Figure 4.10 the main API of the UMS system is
shown.
4.7 Future Improvements
A large part of the UMS layer has been implemented as part of a master thesis,
the resulting system is reasonably functional and stable, however, more testing
and more features would have been desirable. Below is a list of improvements
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target (target_)
TISM (tism_)
body (body_)
subject (str_)
radix64 (str_)
text (str_)
(a)
target_get_tism_list(tism_t **, target_t);
target_free_tism_list(tism_t **);
target_create(target_t *);
target_post_item(target_t *, tism_t);
target_get_radix64(str_t *, target_t, int flags);
target_radix64_to_target(target_t *, str_t);
tism_create(tism_t *, str_t, body_t);
tism_get_subject(str_t *, tism_t);
tism_get_body(body_t *, tism_t);
tism_get_radix64(str_t *, tism_t);
tism_radix64_to_tism(tism_t *, str_t);
body_put_string(body_t *, str_t);
body_get_string(str_t *, body_t);
(b)
Figure 4.10: (a) The main ADTs and their preﬁxes. (b) The
main API functions.
that can be added to make the UMS more complete.
• As stated above, the design should be altered to issue keep alive messages
for targets and TISM-trees.
• Currently the implementation is single threaded. The currentMO system
is thread safe. A real life messaging system probably needs a multithreaded
implementation.
• Currently the UMS has a ﬂat organization structure. By allowing targets
to contain targets as well as TISMs, organizing large volumes of messages
would become more intuitive to the user.
• Some additional tweaking of what data would go where could result in
a gain of availability. For example, the body micro-object could contain
the ﬁrst body-part. Hence short messages and the start of long messages
would be available two replication levels up.
• A full-featured presence system should be implemented featuring a range
of possible states of presence like: away, busy, out for lunch, etc.
• Variable intervals could be used to lower the bandwidth needs for the
presence messages.
• The current implementation allows a TISM to be part of one target only.
Cross-posting should be added, for example, by using a connector DAO
as shown in Figure 4.8.
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• Currently the USENET newsgroup hierarchy is not mimicked, besides
allowing targets to hold other targets, a special tree could be used to mimic
it.
• The current implementation has been designed with protection in mind:
a TISM should be protected with a unique symmetric key and this key
should be protected by post-keys of the targets the TISM belongs to.
• The currentMO system features dummy encryption, which should be re-
placed with industrial strength encryption.
4.8 Summary
Designing and implementing a proof-of-concept implementation has lead to
some preliminary observations. First and foremost, diﬀerent messaging function-
ality can be uniﬁed into one generic messaging system. Second, theMOmiddle-
ware is relatively easy to understand and work with, it does seem to facilitate
writing large-scale distributed applications. Third, one subtle concept needs
explicit explanation: The diﬀerences between micro-objects as transport media
and as storage media is not evident.
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❧ ”Howabout performance and performance/resource trade-oﬀs?”
That was the question. The answer was found in adding pro-
ﬁling hooks, designing a test application, adding replication
strategies and repeated test runs. My promotor asked me the
shortest question yet: ”So?” Apparently (my) computer-science
ideas are such that they need numbers and graphs to be con-
vincing. ”What to measure how?” I wondered. Performance
overhead of the micro-object layer was one, a comparison for
diﬀerent replication policies was another. Running request/
response tests in diﬀerent address spaces but on the same com-
puter would come close to testing the overhead of just the
micro-object layer. Performance could be expressed as request/
response times in milliseconds or application runtime in sec-
onds. An interesting resource usage would be the total number
of server requests. Running the same tests with diﬀerent repli-
cation policies would show the eﬀect replication has on the
performance and the performance/resource trade-oﬀs. Run-
ning the same tests using mixed replication policies would give
still more graphs and numbers. Only after those tests would
it be time to wonder: ”What are my conclusions?”
❦
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Chapter 5
Micro-Object Experiments
“A theory is something nobody believes, except the personwho made it. An experiment is something everybody be-
lieves, except the person who made it.”
Albert Einstein, a man who thought time relative.
The micro-object middleware layer was designed to support large-scale mes-
saging structures. However, the design has been kept generic and supports a
broader range of large-scale distributed applications. The design oﬀers a generic
method to build arbitrary data graphs and a generic method to balance the
trade-oﬀ between performance and resources. Chapter 3 describes how to con-
struct those data graphs and how to set replication policies to balance the trade-
oﬀ. In this chapter experimental data is presented to demonstrate some actual
eﬀects of the interaction between replication policies on the one hand and pro-
gram data and logic design on the other. In particular it will be shown that:
Given a ﬁxed data and logic design of an application based on micro-
objects, changing replication policies can have a profound eﬀect on the
trade-oﬀs of performance and resources.
Besides a basic micro-object middleware layer, several straightforward appli-
cations were implemented. Most of these simulated some form of user-to-
user messaging, but not all. For example, the UNIX (Uniplexed Information
and Computing Service) domain sockets re-implementation allows some TCP-
based applications to run atop the micro-object layer. This was not just an exer-
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cise in stacking protocols, it allowed transparent traﬃc shaping and transparent
end-to-end encryption, a bit like SSL does.
5.1 Implemented Replication Policies
The micro-object layer can accommodate many replication policies, three of
which will be introduced in this section: , , and . Also
a performance-measurement tool, called moping, will be introduced and sev-
eral graphs of its output will be presented. In particular it will be shown that
a change of replication policy has a profound eﬀect on the trade-oﬀ of perfor-
mance and resources. For all measurements, dummy encryption and dummy
network communication were used to prevent delays caused by encryption or
network latency from showing up in the output graphs. The cloud server and
the lib-server have their own independent implementation for multilevel repli-
cation to lower the network load between cloud server and lib-server. The
performance-measurement tool measures the resulting end-to-end latency.
5.1.1 Base Replication
Within the cloud server the  replication policy takes care of three things.
First, it will store (encrypted) payloads. Second, it will share (encrypted) pay-
loads upon request. Third, it will try to assent on cluster contents with peers
and applications. The ﬁrst two amount to basic pull replication, the third has
been discussed at length in Section 3.7.1. Note, again, that this type of cluster
synchronization is truly stateless and communication errors might interrupt a
ﬂow of  request exchanges, but eventually all clusters will synchronize.
On the application side, all newly created micro-objects will be rapidly for-
warded by the lib-server to the cloud server that acts as the home server. In
contrast, cluster additions are not instantly forwarded by the lib-server. This
might seem counterintuitive. However, not forwarding allows other replica-
tion policies maximum freedom to do as they see ﬁt. Currently all (i.e., both)
non- replication policies instantly forward cluster additions. The sole rea-
son fresh micro-objects are always instantly forwarded, is that tokens of micro-
objects sometimes need to be forwarded out-of-band, not so with clusters. The
 replication is implemented and tested in full, exactly as described.
5.1. IMPLEMENTED REPLICATION POLICIES 139
5.1.2 Flooding Replication
Within the cloud server the  replication policy honors its name by
forwarding any addition to a micro-object’s cluster, to all remote parties that
have requested or inherited this policy for that micro-object. The current im-
plementation keeps a ledger of token/remote-address pairs. For each pair a
(minimal) content list is kept that is assumed to represent the remote copy of
the cluster. When a cluster change needs to be forwarded, an  request is
faked using that minimal content list. This means that the system is confronted
with a (seemingly remote)  replication  request. Put in another way,
the  replication acts as a proxy to request an update of a cluster when
it has been changed.
Note that no actual state information is kept in sync between the parties. The
cloud server simply assumes perfect communication in keeping track of what
the remote site “knows.” This is a reasonable assumption, since most messages
make it across. However, thanks to the  replication, an incidental miss will
be corrected. If the cloud server assumes wrongly that some tokens are known
at the remote side, the result is a few extra  requests being sent back
and forth. If the cloud server wrongfully assumes some tokens are not known
remotely, the  replication will be forced to send too much information,
which will be discarded by the remote side. To sum up, the  repli-
cation policy fakes a reasonable number of   requests on behalf of
remote applications as soon as a token is added to a relevant cluster. On the
application side, the lib-server forwards any cluster additions instantly to the
cloud server. This allows the cloud server to further cascade the addition. Since
there is currently no encryption of cluster additions, the lib-server does not need
to instruct the cloud server what to do. When this encryption is implemented,
the application side replication will have to be extended.
5.1.3 Interval Replication
Within the cloud server the  replication policy is like the 
policy, with one major diﬀerence. Changes are not ﬂooded immediately but
at ﬁxed intervals. If several changes happen in one interval, the changes are
sent out together, trading WAN (Wide Area Network) bandwidth for latency.
The current implementation uses one dirty ﬂag per token/remote-address pair.
When a cluster addition is detected, the relevant dirty ﬂags are raised but no
 requests are injected into the system, yet. At ﬁxed intervals the ﬂags are
checked. For every raised dirty ﬂag the corresponding remote address is sent
an  request and the dirty ﬂag is cleared. In short, the cloud server side
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 replication policy records all cluster additions and sends out groups
of cluster additions at ﬁxed intervals. The purpose of  replication is
to save WAN bandwidth and application to server communication predomi-
nately uses LAN (Local Area Network)s. Therefore, on the application side, the
 replication acts exactly like the  replication policy, forward-
ing cluster additions instantly.
5.2 Implemented Security Policies
As with replication, payload security is provided through policies. The cur-
rent implementation does not contain proper security policies. However, weak
forms of symmetric and asymmetric encryption for payloads were implemented.
This was necessary to test the API and to get more realistic time measurements.
Strong encryption policies should be added.
Also the current implementation uses MD5 (Message Digest algorithm 5)
as an one-way hash function (see [52]). Wang and Yu have shown that MD5 is
not collision resistant [68], a better hash algorithm may need to be used. The
current implementation allows for the usage of multiple hash functions and
adding or replacing MD5 will not aﬀect the rest of the system.
The cluster security infrastructure has been implemented, but currently no
cluster security policies have been implemented. Those should be added both
at the cloud server level as well as at the lib-server level. At the cloud server
level, authentication policies should be added to guard the addition to the clus-
ters. Even if payload security policies would make it impossible to add a valid
micro-object to a cluster, authentication allows cloud servers to weed out in-
valid additions early on. At the lib-server level, policies for nonrepudiation and
end-to-end encryption should be added for applications needing these types of
policies. Encrypting cluster additions end-to-end will hamper the replication at
the cloud server level, necessitating application participation in the replication
process.
The current implementation also does not hinder traﬃc analysis or resist
DoS attacks. Traﬃc analysis can be hampered by the application independently
from the micro-object layer. Also traﬃc analysis can be made more diﬃcult by
replication policies. A DoS attack can be more eﬀectively countered by the
lower-level network layers. However, a ﬂash crowd might have a similar eﬀect
as a DoS attack. Therefore a complete implementation would have some mech-
anism to redirect (a set of ) requests to another cloud server. Typically, a cloud
server should keep track of how often data are requested and who requested
them. If some information becomes too popular, a cloud server could redirect
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a request and all its related requests to an cloud server that recently requested
the same information. This, however, is not currently implemented.
In short, security is a big part of the design but the current implementation
is lacking most of it. Doing security well is not a trivial matter, best left to a
seasoned expert. The implementation, however, is fully prepared to host the
necessary security code. One could argue that security not done is better than
security not done well.
5.3 Moping
One of the simplest tools that was implemented is moping (pronounce as two
words: mo-ping). It provides a similar service as the ping tool for measuring
Internet routing latency (see [38]). Moping measures the time it takes to “send”
information from a client application to a server application and back, even
though the micro-object middleware does not provide a “send” functionality.
More precisely, two moping programs, one running as a client and one as server,
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ping aliveserver
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time
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Figure 5.1: The moping server creates a server micro-object 1©, the
moping client creates 2© and clusters 3© a pingmicro-object
to that, to which the moping server creates 4© and clusters
5© an alive micro-object.
together construct a data graph in a fashion that can be interpreted as sending
and receiving message objects. Stated another way, the moping application can
measure how long it takes for graph changes to propagate between applications.
The exact graph is shown in Figure 5.1.
The moping application is started in server mode. It creates a servermicro-
object with mo_create_new(). Then, it hooks a callback function onto the
server micro-object using mo_put_cter_clbk(). It continues with creating a
string, encoded in radix-64 [15], containing the token and necessary security
details, utilizing bfer_encode_radix64(). After that, the main thread goes to
sleep, leaving it to the callback function to respond to the ping micro-objects
with alivemicro-objects. Another moping application is started in client mode,
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possibly on the other side of the Internet. When the moping client is given the
string that was generated by the moping server earlier, it creates a local copy of
the server micro-object, by calling mo_create_copy(). It then creates a brand
new ping micro-object, starts a timer and puts the ping micro-object in the
cluster of the server micro-object, by means of mo_cter_add_mo(). The mop-
ing client application then blocks on a mo_cter_wait() call, until an addition to
the cluster of its ping token has been received. It stops the timer and displays
the number of milliseconds it took. Then it repeats these steps from creating a
new ping micro-object till displaying the time, over and over again. Figure 5.2
shows the resulting application object, as a graph of micro-objects, after several
rounds of adding ping and alive micro-objects.
...
alive
ping ping
alive
server
alive
ping ping
alive
...
Figure 5.2: The moping application object after several rounds of prop-
agating ping and alive micro-objects.
5.3.1 Moping Testing Platform
The micro-object middleware layer was developed (and runs) on many plat-
forms, including a vanilla PC running Microsoft Windows XP, a G4 iMac
running Apple OS X, a vanilla PC running FreeBSD, a big AMD-64 multi-
processor running Linux, a Sun Sparc running SunOS, and several Intel-based
Apple Mac’s. The timing experiments were all performed on a  Inspiron
Mini 9 running Mac OS X 10.6.3 on an Intel Atom at 1.6GHz, because that
was by far the slowest machine available at the time. Doing timing on any
other machine resulted in ﬂat results, over ninety percent of the outcomes were
either 1ms, 2ms or way above 1000ms. With the one order of magnitude
slower , timing showed more variation. This is much more suitable to do a
relative comparison of the outcomes of the experiments. All the processes were
run on the same computer. This was done to neutralize the substantial overhead
that would be caused by the underlying physical network. The properties of the
physical network lie outside the focus of this chapter. As a by-product, some
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outcomes can be used to estimate an upper limit of the overhead induced by
the middleware layer as a whole. Since the current implementation is in no way
optimized for speed such an upper limit should not be taken too seriously. On
the other hand it is encouraging to note that the fastest moping results, even on
this slow platform, lay well below the 10ms.
5.3.2 Moping with Base Replication
Clearly the moping client is in for a long wait if the  replication policy is
used exclusively. One might wonder why  replication does not implement
some form of forwarding cluster additions. The reason is simple: No informa-
tion should be pushed at an application unless the application explicitly asked
for it by setting a replication policy with mo_put_repl(). Stated more precisely,
no diﬀusion of information should consume resources other than those pro-
vided by the source and all willing recipients: the source and willing recipients,
in order to receive the information, will have to participate in a replication-
speciﬁc overlay network.
5.3.3 Moping with Flooding Replication
Adding the  replication policy to all the micro-objects will enable
forwarding of cluster additions, as shown in Figure 5.3. Setting the replication
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Figure 5.3: Output of moping with  replication. The ﬁrst 100
iterations on the x-axis are plotted against response time in
milliseconds on the y-axis. Note the upward trend.
policy of just the root node (i.e., the server micro-object) will suﬃce, if the
appropriate replication level is used. So both the moping server and the moping
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client use mo_put_repl() on the server micro-object: the moping server right
after creating it with mo_create_new(), the moping client right after creating
a local copy with mo_create_copy(). Both will use a replication level of 4 (or
more) to assure that (1) the server cluster’s changes, (2) the ping payload, (3)
the ping cluster’s changes, and (4) the alive payload are ﬂooded. Note that
from the description above, a level of 3 would suﬃce, because there was no
mention of payloads. However, the current implementation of moping puts
an auto-incremented number in the payload of every ping micro-object and
this number (with 1000 added) is put in the payload of the alivemicro-object.
The current implementation prints out two intervals, one after receiving the
token of the alive micro-object and one after receiving the payload. For this
chapter, all the interval durations include the retrieval of the payload of the alive
micro-object. The numbers were very close, in almost all cases the diﬀerence
was 1ms. Plotting both would not make for a very interesting graph.
5.3.4 Moping with Interval Replication
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the output of the moping exchange with 
replication. The graph looks quite dull. Other than the ﬁrst iteration, all round
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Figure 5.4: Output of moping with  replication. The ﬁrst 100
iterations on the x-axis are plotted against response time in
whole seconds on the y-axis. Note that the ﬁrst iteration is about
two seconds shorter.
trip times take about 10000ms or 10 seconds. This dullness is intriguing: Why
are the values so similar? The current implementation of the  replica-
tion policy uses an interval of ﬁve seconds between starting to check the dirty
ﬂags. Since two additions have to be forwarded, a maximum of just over 10
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seconds is to be expected. Why does this implementation behave so poorly
and maximizes the delay? And why does only the ﬁrst iteration take 2 seconds
less than the rest? The latter question is easy: the testing script puts 2 seconds
between starting the cloud server and starting the moping client. Clearly some
synchronization takes place during the ﬁrst iteration. The synchronization is
caused by the fact that 5 seconds is a very long time compared to the time other
actions take. This means that as soon as a change is forwarded, a response is
returned nearly instantly. This response will always have to wait just under the
full interval time before it is forwarded. Figure 5.5 sketches what is going on.
Actually, 10 seconds is an abnormally short time, normally there are two cloud
mo−serverserver client
5s
5s
5s
(n)s
(n+5)s
10s
Figure 5.5: After half a round trip, forwarding is locked in ﬁve second
intervals. With two delayed steps, the round trip time is 10
seconds. Note that n ≤ 5.
servers involved. So normally a round trip would take 15 seconds, as shown in
Figure 5.6. To improve the  replication policy, one might consider to
alternate a short and a long interval. This would cause instant responses to be
mostly forwarded after the short interval.
5.3.5 Moping with Mixed Replication
Note that some replication policies can be eﬀectively combined. Figure 5.7
shows the results of just such a combination. The moping server was using the
 replication and themoping client was using the  replication.
This means that everything will be ﬂooded to the moping client where every-
thing for the moping server is sent oﬀ at an interval. The rationale behind this
choice is that it would make sense to group changes to the servermicro-object,
for its cluster is ever growing. For the individual pingmicro-objects, there is no
reason to wait for other additions that can be lumped into one  request,
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Figure 5.6: With two cloud servers involved and forwarding
locked in ﬁve second intervals will cause a delay of
5+(n)+5+(5-n) = 15 seconds. Note that n ≤ 5.
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Figure 5.7: Output of moping with a mix of  and 
replciation. The ﬁrst 100 iterations one the x-axis are plotted
against the response time in seconds on the y-axis. Note the
similarity of this graph and the one in Figure 5.4.
for there will be at most one cluster member, as shown in Figure 5.2. As can
be clearly seen in Figure 5.7 not waiting for 5 seconds when forwarding the
additions to the ping clusters, shaves oﬀ 5 seconds of every iteration. The ra-
tionale behind this choice, however, is false. The moping client is synchronous,
i.e., the moping client waits for the outstanding alive micro-object before a
new iteration is started. And as long as the moping client is synchronous, ad-
ditions of ping micro-objects to the cluster of the server micro-object cannot
be transferred in groups. To see the full eﬀect of the  replication, an
asynchronous version of moping is needed.
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5.4 Asynchronous Moping
An asynchronous version of moping diﬀers only a little from the synchronous
one, in the current implementation, at least. Since callback functions in the
current implementation are re-entered, the moping server operates fully asyn-
chronously. In the code of the moping client, the mo_cter_wait() call and
subsequent handling of the timer has to be replaced by a callback function that
handles the timer and a call to mo_put_cter_clbk(). In order to control the
load on the system, the moping client process does wait for a number of mil-
liseconds in between sending a pingmicro-object. In practice a value of 100ms
seems reasonable. This duration makes sense, since it is much longer than the
minimum time a round trip takes. There should be hardly any diﬀerence for
the ﬂooding example, for the moping client will actually be waiting longer than
when it would wait for the alive response.
5.4.1 Asynchronous Moping with Flooding Replication
Figure 5.8 shows the asynchronous version of moping in action. It looks a lot
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Figure 5.8: Output of the asynchronous version of moping with
 replication. The ﬁrst 100 iterations on the x-axis
are plotted against the response time in milliseconds on the
y-axis. Note the similitude of this graph and the one in Fig-
ure 5.3
like Figure 5.3. The total running time is well over 10s (12.048ms) as is to be
expected of a program that waits 100 times for 100ms. The total running time
of the synchronous version was just over 3 seconds (3.179ms). Switching from
the synchronous to the asynchronous version did not do much for the average
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round trip time when the  replication policy is used.
5.4.2 Asynchronous Moping with Interval Replication
Switching to the asynchronous version drastically impacts the outcome when
the  replication policy is selected. The asynchronous output in Fig-
ure 5.9 looks rather diﬀerent from the synchronous output of Figure 5.4. The
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
s9
s10
Figure 5.9: Output of the asynchronous version of moping with
 replication. The ﬁrst 100 iterations on the x-axis
are plotted against the response time in seconds on the y-
axis. Note the drastic change in shape compared to the syn-
chronous version as shown in Figure 5.4
 replication policy saves up the ﬁrst three seconds of cluster additions
before they are sent in bulk from the cloud server to the moping server process.
With a 100ms wait in between pings that amounts to about 30 packets. The
ﬁrst packet has to wait for about 3 seconds the last makes its way instantly
to the moping server process. Then the next 50 pings are lumped together in
one  request and then the remaining 20 pings are sent over (after wait-
ing between 5 to 3 seconds). Up till this point, there has been no reason to
write about the trade-oﬀ between latency and resource usage. No matter what
combination of  and  replication was used, if the communi-
cation was synchronous, 100  requests were sent from the cloud server to
the moping server process: one for every addition to the server micro-object’s
cluster, hence 100  requests. The asynchronous version of ﬂooding will
likewise use 100  requests. With asynchronous moping and 
replication, however, that number is reduced from 100 to 3. So here is the
trade-oﬀ: asynchronous moping with  replication costs 100 
5.4. ASYNCHRONOUS MOPING 149
requests and delivers an average ping time of 9ms. Asynchronous moping with
 replication costs 3  requests and delivers an average ping time
of 7.583ms. So in this particular case  replication is over 800 times
slower, but at 3% of the communication costs. Note that there are other consid-
erations when selecting a replication strategy. For example, the huge diﬀerence
in variance might be important, or the total running time.
While running tests, it was interesting to note that there was actually one
test where  replication outperformed . When the time be-
tween pings was lowered to 1ms, and a slow computer was used, the 
replication started trashing the system around the 200th packet. Soon, round
trip times of over 20 seconds were no exception. The system also did not recover
from this state and gradually grinded to a halt. Running the same test using the
 replication had no noticeable negative eﬀect. The replication policy
had no problem at all to cope with the torrent.
5.4.3 Asynchronous Moping with Mixed Replication
As noted in Section 5.3.5, there is a rational for using a mix of replication poli-
cies with moping. Since the moping server process waits for 100 updates to 1
cluster and the moping client process waits for 1 update to 100 clusters, there is
no use for the moping client process to try and bundle updates. A ﬁve seconds
shave is to be expected for a run with mixed replications. Sure enough, as shown
in Figure 5.10, the output resembles the previous output with 5 seconds oﬀ the
duration of every iteration. Asynchronous moping with  replication
is thus seen to cost 100  requests and delivers an average ping time of
9ms. Asynchronous moping with a mix of  and  replication
costs 3  requests and delivers an average ping time of 2.560ms. So in
this particular case using this replication mix is over 280 times slower, but at
3% of the communication costs.
5.4.4 Summary
The current implementation of the micro-object middleware layer replication
policies has shown the ﬁrst signs of life. The ﬁrst tests are encouraging, show-
ing that even these relatively primitive policies make it easy to inﬂuence the
(emerging) behavior in terms of trade oﬀ between latency and resource usage.
An overview of the relevant numbers mentioned in the previous sections are
given in Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.10: Output of the asynchronous version of moping with a mix of
 and  replication. The ﬁrst 100 iterations
on the x-axis are plotted against the response time in seconds
on the y-axis. Note the similitude of this graph and the one
in Figure 5.9
100 Ping Server Client Assents Response Client
requests policy policy to server time runtime
  100 9ms 1.05 s
Synchronous   100 9.982ms 998.84 s
  100 4.980ms 498.82 s
Asynchronous   100 9ms 10.81 s
@ 100ms   3 7.583ms 18.85 s
intervals   3 2.560ms 13.82 s
Figure 5.11: Trade-oﬀ between the number of assent requests a ping
server receives and the average response time when clustering
100 ping objects to a server object.
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❧ ”What are my conclusions?” The ﬁnal question at last. Get-
ting abstractions right helps me understand stuﬀ better. Truly
understanding a nontrivial matter makes me euphoric. If only
I understoodwhy people keep using fundamentally ﬂawedmod-
els… ”Any scientiﬁc conclusions?” my promotor interrupted my
self-psychoanalysis. ”Ah, those,” I responded. Clearly there
was work related to uniﬁed messaging and also related to dis-
tributed-programming frameworks. As to further research
into both uniﬁed messaging and micro-objects, we have only
just begun our journy. I wonder: ”Who will join us on this
journy?”
❦
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
“We are not certain, we are never certain. If we were we couldreach some conclusions, and we could, at last, make others
take us seriously.”
Albert Camus, French-Algerian writer and goalkeeper.
As it turned out, this thesis has two main topics: uniﬁed messaging and
micro-objects. Both subjects are about communication. The micro-object layer
is about machine-to-machine communication and uniﬁed messaging is about
user-to-user communication, the distinctionwarrants separate concluding state-
ments.
6.1 Work Related to Uniﬁed Messaging
The term “uniﬁed messaging” is used in a number of commercial and research
areas with varying connotations. There is no single, broadly agreed upon, for-
mal deﬁnition of “uniﬁed messaging” it can refer to simple forwarding of faxes
and voicemail messages via E-mail, or to sophisticated, format changing, mul-
ticopy delivery. Maybe because of this, “uniﬁed messaging” held the number
one position on the 1998 Wired Magazine Hype List.
Currently Google can ﬁnd over ten million related pages for the term “uni-
ﬁed messaging.” Google (scholar.google.com) currently lists over six thousand
related papers and patents. The top ten of these are all patents registered by the
USPTO. Without exception, the description of these patents are about how to
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connect current systems to integrate a heterogeneous set of messaging systems
by connecting them through gateways. There are only a few nonpatent papers
in the top twenty, the ﬁrst [7] is about solving personalization on top of inte-
grated messaging services, the second [57] is about getting voicemail from the
telephone system in to the E-mail system, and the third [20] is a description
of more generic way, using gateways, to forward messages over several existing
systems.
This is in line with the observation that a lot of interest in “uniﬁed mes-
saging” is commercially motivated and usually provides a centralized storage
connected to diﬀerent systems through gateways, services to deal with diﬀer-
ences in data representation, and multiple ways to access stored messages. An
example would be Nortel’s CallPilot Uniﬁed Messaging. It collects voicemail,
fax and E-mail on a single location that can be accessed both via the Internet
and by telephone. Most of these commercial “uniﬁed messaging” product fall
in the category of CTI (Computer-Telephony Integration).
The ACM Digital Library holds forty papers related to uniﬁed messaging.
Some publications are about unrelated things like interprocess messaging [1]
and there are several that only mention the term once. One paper [29] states
“uniﬁed messaging, which has been ’almost here’ for too many years to count,”
without further elaboration. The ones that are elaborating on uniﬁed messag-
ing, all are about message routing, through existing systems, to mobile users
or handling diﬀerent representation of message content. For example, Bar-
ber [10] claims “Uniﬁcation is achieved by reducing all incoming messages to a
messaging-independent format and placed in a single message store. This means
that any incoming message can be piped onwards through any other compatible
means of communication.” None of the ACM publications are about replacing
messaging systems by one uniﬁed system.
This thesis does not focus on common denominator message format reduc-
tion, because it does not focus on central storage and delivery through existing
systems. It does focus on replacing current messaging systems by one system that
can mimic the behavior of the systems it replaces, independent of the format of
the message. Hence, all above mentioned publications describe marginally, to
nonrelated research, with the exception of the one mentioned below.
There are a few related papers describing research that relates to the uniﬁed
messaging system described in this thesis. Like the paper on CLUES [45], that
describes a system that uses machine learning techniques to determine levels
of notiﬁcation that in turn can be used to determine the appropriate form of
message delivery and communication. If proven eﬀective in determining the
right notiﬁcation level, it could prove valuable for selecting a speciﬁc behav-
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ior, per message, of the uniﬁed messaging system. For the same reason the
aforementioned Universal Inbox project [7] at UC Berkeley, presenting an ar-
chitecture that enables redirection of incoming communication based on user
preference proﬁles, might have a meaningful implementation on top of the sys-
tem as described in this thesis. Another such related research is the Mobile
People Architecture project at Stanford University, which views “the person” as
the message end point (not a machine) to maximize user reachability [6]. Like
this thesis it focuses explicitly on user-to-user (they call it person-to-person)
messaging. However, this research suggests to replace end-point delivery with
proxy delivery, unlike the approach in this thesis, where end-point delivery is
but one of the delivery options.
Healy, Barber, Nolan [30] explicitly list the main components of their uni-
ﬁed messaging system, as shown in the left-hand column of Figure 6.1. The
right-hand column of Figure 6.1 lists the corresponding main components of
the uniﬁed messaging system as described in this thesis.
Healy, Barber, Nolan UMS Target / TISM based UMS
A single inbox per user for all
messages.
Many targets per user.
Media conversion (e.g.
text-to-speech). No conversions.
A uniﬁed message store. A distributed message store.
Uniﬁed management of
disparate messaging
components.
A uniﬁcation of disparate
messaging components.
A uniﬁed command set. A uniﬁed API.
Uniﬁed directory services. No directory service.
Rules-based forwarding of
messages.
Emergent behavior
forwarding of messages.
Figure 6.1: A comparison between Healy, Barber, Nolan and Tar-
get / TISM based uniﬁed messaging.
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Another diﬀerence between all the above mentioned research and this thesis
is that none of the research is overly preoccupied with either security or scal-
ability. There exists some research on user-to-user messaging that does focus
on these two important aspects. For example, Wrzesińska [72] shows “that it
is possible to design and implement an instant messaging system [...] [that]
satisﬁes the deﬁned security and scalability requirements.” This research, how-
ever, focuses on just one type of user-to-user messaging (i.e., instant messaging)
rather than on generic user-to-user messaging.
6.2 Work Related to Micro-Objects
The termmicro-objectwas derived from two other well known computer science
terms. micro kernel and distributed object. Micro for simplicity and small size
and object for application building block. Since building blocks, in a distributed
system, have to be exchanged and stored, theMO system could also be viewed as
a data exchange and data cloud store system. This view is taken in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Micro-Objects as Building Blocks
When micro-objects are viewed as small distributed building blocks for larger
distributed-application objects in order to facilitate large-scale distributed com-
puting, its goal resembles the goals of middleware layers, like CORBA and EJB.
Both try to hide certain aspects of the distribution of data over several physical
locations.
CORBA
The CORBA middleware layer has a classical RPC model, most suited for
OOP programming languages with exception handling, like JAVA. Figure 6.2
shows CORBA’s basic communication stack. The CORBA middleware layer
has grown over the years and CORBA3.x has many features that facilitate writ-
ing a distributed application. For example, it has a generic way of describing an
object’s interface to the system (i.e., an IDL). The current version of CORBA
tries to make transfer failure as transparent as possible to the application layer.
When confronted with a transfer failure that cannot be resolved automatically,
CORBA generates a detailed, platform-speciﬁc exception. It is up to the appli-
cation layer to handle the those exceptions. Remote state changing RPCs, i.e.,
ojb.a<-set(1), will suﬀer from the infamous last  problem independent of
the protocol design used [4]. Chances of failure, however small, will limit the
scalability of any system.
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code
application
object−holding
skeleton
object−using
application
object
reference
ORB
stub code
network
ORB
application
object
Figure 6.2: The base CORBA architecture. Only the application ob-
ject and the applications using and holding it, have to be
provided, all the other layers (in gray) are either generic or
can be generated by the system with minimal assistance.
Enterprise Java Beans
EJB provide three important types of client/server communication services:
session tracking, access to entities (usually a database) and message exchange.
Most of the principal workings of EJB are like CORBA’s. Actually, EJB 1.x
used RMI (Remote Method Invocation) built on CORBA’s RPC. After about
a decade of development, EJB 3.x, though vastly diﬀerent from the 1.x version.
Its core still oﬀers distributed computing by remote execution, however. In
EJB 3.x there are three types of distributed objects (called beans), two use RMI:
stateless beans and stateful beans, as shown in Figure 6.3(a), and one uses asyn-
chronous messaging: message-driven beans, as shown in Figure 6.3(b). Actually,
the standard does deﬁne a fourth remote object type, a variant on the stateful
type, named entity bean oﬀering database-like features. All remote objects are
grouped on servers in so called containers. The stateless objects can be used by
many clients, the stateful objects are bound to a single client process, and only
the message driven objects are capable to receive state changing instructions
from multiple clients. The programmer has to implement an application object
class. On top of that, a programmer also has to specify some meta data called
a deployment descriptor. The latter allows the development system to generate
the support code.
CORBA and EJB versus Micro-Objects
In short, CORBA and EJB diﬀer both from each other as well as from the
MO system. The biggest diﬀerence between CORBA and EJB on the one side
and theMO system on the other, is that theMO system always delivers the data
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EJB object
remotehome
network
(b)(a)
object−using
application
proxy
EJB container
application
server
EJB object
interface
network
remotehome
remotehome
Java EE
JMS Message Interface
object−using
application EJB container
Figure 6.3: The base EJB architecture. (a) Simpliﬁed layout for state-
less and stateful remote objects and (b) for message-driven
remote objects. Only the EJB object, its remote interface,
part of its home interface and the applications using it, have
to be provided by the programmer, all the other layers (in
gray) are either generic or can be generated by the system
with minimal assistance. The remote interface implements
the RMI calls, the home interface implements additional lo-
cal methods.
to the processing units, where the other two send processing commands to the
server holding the remote object. Also the MO system has very few processing
operators, compared to the other two systems. This is because the distributed-
computing paradigms of both EJB and CORBA try to transform application
objects into distributed-application objects, forcing both systems to send data-
manipulating messages to remote data with various degrees of communication
transparency. The micro-object system takes the reverse position, where data
travels towards the instructions and there is no communication transparency.
Both EJB and CORBA diﬀer in many other ways from the micro-object system
but most of these diﬀerences are less fundamental than the diﬀerences men-
tioned above and could probably be remedied with additional coding. One
such diﬀerence would be that theMO system is designed to have multiple repli-
cation policies active at the same time for a given single object. Another would
be that the micro-object system features a generic way to connect application
objects. There is, however, another cardinal diﬀerence between traditional dis-
tributed computing and the MO system. Where traditional systems need to
know and use the network address of the peer or server that holds (a copy
of ) the data needed, the MO system addresses the data directly. There are two
related distributed computing paradigms that use a comparable notion of ad-
dressing data: content-based networking and content-centric networking. With
content-based networking, data is retrieved for processing using predicates, with
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content-centric networking, data is retrieved by various forms of determination.
The MO system shares the addressing model of these two only with respect to
the fact that the data is addressed directly and not indirectly through network
end points. However, the MO system oﬀers a generic and simple way for the
creators of data to connect it into one (or many) graphs, and the consumers
can either walk the graphs, or select to be notiﬁed when certain parts change.
Below a more speciﬁc comparison.
Content-Based Networking
As Carzaniga et al. write [16] about the extreme case where no address is used
other than a reference to the content. “Under such an approach, producers will
generate messages, but with no particular destinations intended. The destina-
tions are determined by consumers expressing interest in the delivery of mes-
sages satisfying some arbitrary predicates on the content, independent of the
producers of the messages.” Using such an “extreme” content-based commu-
nication service, receivers declare their interests and senders publish content.
The routing of data between them becomes solely the task of the supporting
middleware. There are three major variants of data exchange. First, a channel-
based variant, where receivers and senders listen to and talk to communication
pipes. Receivers select pipes of interest and maybe even ﬁlter out some data for
further ﬁne tuning. Second, a subject-based variant, where senders add a subject
to each unit of data. Receivers use predicates to express what subjects they are
interested in. Third, a content-based variant, where receivers use predicates for
arbitrary data selection across the entire content of data units.
Besides the three principal ways of data addressing (or “event-notiﬁcation”),
pipe-based addressing, subject-based addressing, and content-based addressing, the
MO system uses a fourth, more primitive form: token-based addressing. With
the ﬁrst three forms data objects are requested by specifying criteria or pred-
icates. With token-based addressing a data object is requested by specifying
the unique token of the exact individual content. With pipe-, subject-, and
content-based addressing, data objects can be grouped implicitly by their ad-
dress. With token- and pipe-based addressing, grouping data objects has to
be done explicitly. With subject-based addressing, grouping can be done ex-
plicitly by specifying a unique group id as part of the subject, or implicitly by
not doing so. Content-based addressing does not allow such explicit grouping,
because it would mean changing the content. Diﬀerent addressing results in
diﬀerent data ﬂows. For example, a token can be used to pull data from the
system, where data is pushed with pipe-based addressing and both subject- and
content-based addressing lead to a rendezvous type of predicate data and data
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objects. Figure 6.4 shows a comparison of these four types of data addressing.
Token Pipe Subject Content
Address provided
by producer
Unique id Group id Free form Implicit
Address provided
by consumer
Unique id Group id Predicate Predicate
Data object
grouping
Explicit Explicit Ex-/implicit Implicit
Data ﬂow Pull Push Rendezvous Rendezvous
Figure 6.4: A comparison of token-based, pipe-based, subject-based,
and content-based data addressing.
Content-Centric Networking
The micro-object system also shares the name-data binding paradigm with the
proposals championed by Van Jacobson [32]. Compared to the micro-object
system, these proposals feature named content utilizing a far more complex
form of addressing, involving augmenting names with time/version and nick-
names. Also, Jacobson’s data distribution is based on dissemination (unacknowl-
edged data push), where micro-object distribution is based on unacknowledged
data pull with optional replication allowing data push as well as acknowledged
data transfer. Like the micro-object system, Jacobson’s system uses end-to-end
encryption. Jacobson’s design is context-aware which enables named content
to migrate wherever it is needed. The data ﬂow is driven by predicate-based
requests and the content of the messages. In contrast, the micro-object layer is
totally content agnostic, it oﬀers only explicit connection between data objects.
The data ﬂow is driven by explicit requests, explicit data connections, and ex-
plicit replication policies. Currently, CCNx1, a ﬁrst incarnation of Jacobson’s
system, is available as an open source project. It trades named hosts for named
content. Like CORBA and EJB, Jacobson’s proposals are about augmenting
relatively large objects, in stark contrast to the micro-object system, which is
about building relations between relatively small immutable objects.
1According to the CCNx homepage, http://www.ccnx.org/, “CCNx® is an open source project in
early stage development exploring the next step in networking, based on one fundamental architectural
change: replacing named hosts with named content as the primary abstraction.”
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Publish-Subscribe Messaging
Sharing blog or news entries is very popular on the Internet. Referred to as RSS
or Atom feed, information is fed to a (potentially large) number of subscribers.
It is similar to USENET, though with a diﬀerent namespace. As shown in
Figure 2.3 on page 51 it would be quite easy to mimic using uniﬁed-messaging.
6.2.2 A Cloud Of Micro-Objects
Forgoing underlying paradigms, from a more abstract point of view, the micro-
object system could be viewed as a data messaging system as well as a data cloud
store. With some caveats, the latter view can be taken to compare the micro-
object system to other data cloud systems. Though it is diﬃcult to arrive at
a canonical deﬁnition, let us use the following high-level deﬁnition for data
cloud: a collection of data-object stores acting as one, featuring fault tolerance,
scalability, data versioning, access control, and eventual data consistency. With
the exception of versioning this is in line with what the micro-object system was
designed for. Versioning can be implemented by creating new objects for every
version and a suitable graph to connect the related objects as we will demon-
strate below.
Comparing a micro-object based system to a data cloud system is inher-
ently unfair since cloud storage is most often used in conjunction with cloud
computing, bringing data processing close (in terms of latency and throughput)
to the data cloud. For the micro-object system to be comparative, it has to
be augmented, allowing user applications to run close to the home servers and
enabling fast access to the local micro-object store. Such an augmented micro-
object system could be compared to cloud stores like Amazon S3 and Google
Cloud Storage.
Both Amazon S3 and Google Cloud Storage provide large (tera-byte sized)
data objects and meta data, grouped into buckets, addressed by keys, and pro-
tected by access control lists. Individual objects can be addressed using URLs
like: <http://store.googleapis.com/bucket/key> (Google Cloud Storage) and
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/bucket/key> (Amazon S3). By comparison, micro-
objects are limited. The payload is in the microscopic kilobyte range and the
meta data is restricted to other object’s addresses (tokens). Also Amazon S3 and
Google Cloud Storage feature more ﬂexible access control lists than the current
implementations of payload and cluster security. Grouping by bucket is rela-
tively coarse in comparison to the micro-object grouping that allows arbitrary
graphs. These diﬀerences dwindle when the logical layout of aforementioned
cloud storage systems is mimicked by building a cloud  as depicted in Figure
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6.5.
cloud
bucket bucket
object object
mark0 markn
data data data data
Figure 6.5: A example cloud  mimicking Amazon S3 /Google Data
Cloud logic layout. In this instance one of the objects has
n + 1 versions, mark0 through markn. Note that data 
can be shared amongst versions.
As stated above, Amzon S3 and Google Data Cloud can keep object buckets
close to the applications running on EC2 (Amazon) or App Engine (Google). To
enable similar processing by the bucket load, proper replication strategies have
to be applied to bucket s. Data proximity allows data-handling systems like
Google’s (nonrelational) BigTable and Amazon’s RDS (Relational Database Ser-
vice), to provide the application with high-performing data selection. The aug-
mentedmicro-object systemwould allow high performing data selection as well.
For example, adding a select  to a queue  would trigger applications
close to the home servers to start a selection, as described in the select , on
the locally hosted objects and cluster the matching ones to a result . Espe-
cially given the encryption overhead, such an implementation would probably
be slower than the Amazon and Google methods. However, the micro-object
version would scale to many nodes and could even run in parallel to data entry.
Similarly, a lot of typical data cloud functionality could be oﬀered by the
augmented micro-object system, though, usually a special  has to be com-
posed.
Using similar augmentation and composition a comparison to the commu-
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nication part of the Hadoop MapReduce paradigm can also be made. Let us
colloquially deﬁne Hadoop MapReduce as a framework to supply applications
with a fault-tolerant way to process in parallel, massively distributed data. Note
again howmuch overlap there is with the micro-object framework. Basic micro-
objects are more primitive than the Hadoop MapReduce object, the ﬁle. As
with the cloud-store comparison, theHadoopMapReduce framework is usually
run in conjunction with HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System). In con-
trast to the cloud-store comparison, there is no need to mimic a distributed
ﬁle system for standard s can take the role of data distributor. Figure 6.6
shows an eq-join  modeled after the Hadoop MapReduce paradigm. The
eq-join
map reduce result
tableA tableB #00A #00B A ./ B
tupleA tupleB tuple
key#00 owner f key#00 horse
Figure 6.6: An eq-join  modeled after the Hadoop MapReduce
paradigm. It holds a map, reduce and result , each
holding tables of tuples. Map applications have to cluster
each tuple  to its designated hash table. Reduce appli-
cations have to join the corresponding hash tables. In this
ﬁgure two tuples are shown to have matching keys. There-
fore, they are mapped to matching hash tables and reduced
to a <key, owner, horse> tuple . Note the reuse of data
nodes.
eq-join  holds a map, reduce and result , each holding tables of tu-
ples. Tuples hold data objects. In the beginning, the map  is initialized by
adding the tables to be joined, tableA and tableB. The reduce  is initialized
by adding an empty hash table object per hash value per table. The result 
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is initialized by adding a single empty table. Assuming several map and reduce
applications are waiting for additions to some queue , the eq-join process
starts when the newly created eq-join  is added to this queue. The map
applications ﬁnd the tables in the map  and each start processing a subset of
tuples, preferably “nearby” tuples. For each tuple a hash is calculated and based
on the hash, the tuple is clustered to its corresponding hash table hanging oﬀ
the reduce . For every matching pair of hash tables, for example #00A
and #00B, a reduce application joins every new tuple arriving with all existing
tuples of the opposing table. The results, if any, are clustered to the table of
the result . As with the previous comparison, performance is dependent
on the encryption chosen as well as on the network connecting the applications
as well as on the replication policies used. Unlike similar Hadoop MapReduce
implementations [13], there is no need for separate map and reduce phases.
Like the previous comparison, the whole process could be run in parallel with
the input process. Note that this comparison is just a conceptual one. Hadoop
MapReduce features important things like trackers to mitigate failure. Besides,
any serious distributed database system based on micro-objects would probably
feature back linked micro-objects to provide an easy way to ﬁnd all tuples con-
taining a given foreign key. This would make the above-mentioned mapping
phase superﬂuous.
6.2.3 Future Work
As expected this adventure is far from over. Both uniﬁed messaging and micro-
objects can be researched further. Though economic and political motivations
will hinder adoption of a uniﬁedmessaging system improving or even re-writing
the existing implementation can give further insight on the emergent behaviour
of super-sized messaging systems. An an industrial strength implementation
should be developed that can be used to research replication policies, incidental-
online devices, and usability. Such an implementation would probably neces-
sitate an expansion of the current implementation of the micro-object system.
But even in its own right, the micro-object system should be further developed.
Most notably the available replication and security policies should be extended.
It would be interesting to ﬁnd a distribution vehicle, for example the Apache
server, that wouldmake it very easy to activate a multitude of cloud servers. This
could then be used to study replication policies. It might also be interesting to
research other uses of the micro-object system like the micro-object based sock-
ets as discussed in Chapter 4 or a MapReduce-like application as mentioned
above.
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6.2.4 Summary
Uniﬁed messaging as deﬁned in this thesis is based on the taxonomy of messag-
ing systems also deﬁned in the thesis. It aims to unify (most) all services oﬀered
by legacy messaging systems by replacing their implementations with one new
(uniﬁed) implementation. This is a novel approach to messaging. To arrive at
a manageable, secure and scalable system, the uniﬁed messaging system is split
in two layers. The top layer is designed to deliver user-to-user messages in a
variety of ways. The bottom layer delivers machine-to-machine messages in a
novel way featuring a system based on the notion of the micro-object and direct
data addressing. The micro-object system as deﬁned in this thesis takes the visi-
bility of partial failures to its logical conclusion and tries to make partial failures
apparent not transparent. It features a unique way of constructing, protecting
and diﬀusing distributed application objects.
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Appendix A
Source Code
In Section 3.3 some code excerpts were given in ﬁgure 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12.
Below is the complete code. The lines that were included in the excerpts are in
boldface. Note that this example code is optimized to produce nice excerpts,
not eﬃciency.
/*
* (c) Copyright 2005 Jan-Mark S. Wams
*
* This file is part of the micro-object middleware.
*
* The micro-object middleware is free software; you can redistribute
* it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* The micro-object middleware is distributed in the hope that it will
* be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
* See the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with the micro-object middleware; if not, write to the Free
* Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA
* 02110-1301 USA
*/
/* Thise file contains some simple examples for using the micro-object
* layer. Sniplest of these examples can be found in my dissertaion.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "mo.h"
#define check(code) if (!(code)) quit(#code, __FILE__, __LINE__);
/* Profiles. */
static void set_msg(bfer_t *);
static void get_msg(bfer_t *, bfer_t);
static void do_chat(bfer_t);
static void quit(char *, char *, int);
static void wait_chat(bfer_t);
static void busy_chat(bfer_t);
static void fprintmo(mo_t, tken_t, void *);
static void pr_cluster(mo_t, cter_t);
/* Main. Call the example functions. Note this function does not
* have any variable of the mo_t type.
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
bfer_t bfer_radix_token, bfer_message;
char *r_store;
/* Alloc ADT's. */
check( bfer_alloc(&bfer_radix_token) );
check( bfer_alloc(&bfer_message) );
/******************************/
/* Demonstrate first example. */
/******************************/
/* Create a new micro-object with a "Hello World!" payload.
* Return its token in radix64 buffer.
* Get and print the radix token as a string.
*/
set_msg(&bfer_radix_token);
check( bfer_getref_store(&r_store, bfer_radix_token) );
printf("Radix token is '%s'\n", r_store);
/* Get a copy from this micro-object,
* get the payload and print it.
*/
get_msg(&bfer_message, bfer_radix_token);
check( bfer_getref_store(&r_store, bfer_message) );
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printf("The message is '%s'\n", r_store);
/***********************************/
/* Demonstrate the second example. */
/***********************************/
/* Chat using callback function. */
printf("Do your thing, type ^D to quit.\n\n");
do_chat(bfer_radix_token);
/*******************************************************/
/* Demonstrate simple example, not in my dissertation. */
/*******************************************************/
/* Chat using busy wait. */
printf("Do your thing, type <ENTER> to refresh, ^D to quit.\n\n");
wait_chat(bfer_radix_token);
/**********************************/
/* Demonstrate the third example. */
/**********************************/
/* Chat using busy wait. */
printf("Do your thing, type ^D to quit.\n\n");
busy_chat(bfer_radix_token);
/* Dealloc ADT's. */
check(bfer_free(&bfer_radix_token) );
check(bfer_free(&bfer_message) );
return 0;
}
/* Create a new micro-object, put Hello World! in the payload, and
* return a buffer to its radix64-ified token.
*/
static void set_msg(bfer_t *p_bfer)
{
mo_t mo;
plod_t plod;
xpir_t xpir;
psec_t psec;
csec_t csec;
tken_t tken;
/* Allocate ADTs. */
check( mo_alloc(&mo) );
check( plod_alloc(&plod) );
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check( xpir_alloc(&xpir) );
check( psec_alloc(&psec) );
check( csec_alloc(&csec) );
check( tken_alloc(&tken) );
/* Fill the components for the micro-object. */
check( plod_put_string(&plod, "Hello world!"));
check( xpir_put_days_to_live(&xpir, 1));
#if 0
bfer_key_pair_from_phrase(&key_pair, "Some Phrase.");
psec_put(&psec, PSEC_ASYM_KEY, key_pair);
csec_put(&csec, CSEC_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* Create the micro-object. */
check( mo_create_new(&mo, xpir, plod, psec, csec) );
/* Fill the output buffer with the radix64 of the token. */
check( mo_get_tken(&tken, mo) );
check( tken_to_radix64_bfer(p_bfer, tken) );
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
check( xpir_free(&xpir) );
check( csec_free(&csec) );
check( plod_free(&plod) );
check( mo_free(&mo) );
check( tken_free(&tken) );
check( psec_free(&psec) );
}
/* Get a (radix64 encoded) token, get a local copy of the micro-object,
* extract and return a copy of its payload.
*/
static void get_msg(bfer_t *p_bfer_message, bfer_t bfer_radix_token)
{
mo_t mo;
plod_t *r_plod;
psec_t psec;
csec_t csec;
tken_t tken;
/* Allocate ADTs. */
check( mo_alloc(&mo) );
check( psec_alloc(&psec) );
check( csec_alloc(&csec) );
check( tken_alloc(&tken) );
173
check( tken_from_radix64_bfer(&tken, bfer_radix_token) );
#if 0
bfer_key_pair_from_phrase(&key_pair, "Some Phrase.");
psec_put(&psec, PSEC_ASYM_KEY, key_pair);
csec_put(&csec, CSEC_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* Get a copy, get the payload, copy its buffer.
*/
check( mo_create_copy(&mo, tken, psec, csec) );
check( mo_getref_plod(&r_plod, mo) );
check( plod_get_bfer(p_bfer_message, *r_plod) );
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
check( csec_free(&csec) );
check( mo_free(&mo) );
check( tken_free(&tken) );
check( psec_free(&psec) );
}
void do_chat(bfer_t bfer_radix_mo_channel)
{
mo_t mo_line, mo_channel;
plod_t plod;
psec_t psec;
csec_t csec;
tken_t tken;
cter_t cter_tracker;
char line[1024];
xpir_t xpir;
/* Allocate ADTs. */
check( mo_alloc(&mo_line) );
check( mo_alloc(&mo_channel) );
check( cter_alloc(&cter_tracker) );
check( plod_alloc(&plod) );
check( psec_alloc(&psec) );
check( csec_alloc(&csec) );
check( tken_alloc(&tken) );
check( xpir_alloc(&xpir) );
check( tken_from_radix64_bfer(&tken, bfer_radix_mo_channel) );
#if 0
bfer_key_pair_from_phrase(&key_pair, "Some Phrase.");
psec_put(&psec, PSEC_ASYM_KEY, key_pair);
csec_put(&csec, CSEC_NONE, NULL);
#endif
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/* Get a copy of the channel mo, and reuse the expir date.
*/
check( mo_create_copy(&mo_channel, tken, psec, csec) );
check( mo_get_xpir(&xpir, mo_channel) );
#if 0
mo_put_replication(&mo_channel, FLOODING);
#endif
/* Start forwarding the incomming tokens. */
check( mo_cter_clbk(&mo_channel, &cter_tracker, fprintmo, stdout) );
/* Create a prompt. */
strcpy(line, "1>> ");
/* Direct all input lines to channel. */
while(fgets(line + 4, sizeof(line) - 4, stdin)) {
plod_put_string(&plod, line);
xpir_uinc(&xpir);
mo_create_new(&mo_line, xpir, plod, psec, csec);
mo_cter_add_mo(&mo_channel, mo_line);
}
/* Stop forwarding the incomming tokens. */
check( mo_cter_clbk(&mo_channel, NULL, NULL, NULL) );
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
check( cter_free(&cter_tracker) );
check( psec_free(&psec) );
check( xpir_free(&xpir) );
check( tken_free(&tken) );
check( mo_free(&mo_line) );
check( mo_free(&mo_channel) );
check( csec_free(&csec) );
check( plod_free(&plod) );
}
#include <signal.h>
/* Don't do anything. */
static void handler(int sig) { /* nop */}
/* Return 0 if EOF. */
static int read_noblock(char *buf, int size)
{
void *res;
signal(SIGALRM, handler);
errno = 0;
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alarm(1);
res = fgets(buf, size, stdin);
alarm(0);
if (NULL != res)
return 1;
if (EINTR == errno) {
buf[0] = '\0';
return 1;
}
/* EOF seen, or error other than EALARM. */
return 0;
}
/* Simple nontrheaded, noncallback, blocking version.
*/
static void wait_chat(bfer_t bfer_radix_mo_channel)
{
mo_t mo_line, mo_channel;
plod_t plod;
psec_t psec;
csec_t csec;
tken_t tken, *r_tken;
cter_t *r_cter;
char line[1024];
xpir_t xpir;
enum_t e;
/* Allocate ADTs. */
check( mo_alloc(&mo_line) );
check( mo_alloc(&mo_channel) );
check( plod_alloc(&plod) );
check( psec_alloc(&psec) );
check( csec_alloc(&csec) );
check( tken_alloc(&tken) );
check( xpir_alloc(&xpir) );
check( tken_from_radix64_bfer(&tken, bfer_radix_mo_channel) );
#if 0
bfer_key_pair_from_phrase(&key_pair, "Some Phrase.");
psec_put(&psec, PSEC_ASYM_KEY, key_pair);
csec_put(&csec, CSEC_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* Get a copy of the channel mo, and reuse the expir date.
*/
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check( mo_create_copy(&mo_channel, tken, psec, csec) );
check( mo_get_xpir(&xpir, mo_channel) );
check( xpir_usec_add(&xpir, 2000L) ); /* Scip experiment 1 messages. */
#if 0
mo_put_replication(&mo_im, FLOODING);
#endif
/* Create a prompt. */
strcpy(line, "2>> \n");
do {
/* If there is a true message, put it on the channel. */
if ('\n' != line[4]) {
check( plod_put_string(&plod, line) );
check( xpir_uinc(&xpir) );
check( mo_create_new(&mo_line, xpir, plod, psec, csec) );
check( mo_cter_add_mo(&mo_channel, mo_line) );
}
/* Print entire cluster. */
mo_getref_cter(&r_cter, mo_channel);
cter_enum_create(&e, *r_cter);
while (cter_enum_getref_next_tken(&e, &r_tken, NULL))
fprintmo(mo_channel, *r_tken, stdout);
} while (fgets(line + 4, sizeof(line) - 4, stdin));
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
check( psec_free(&psec) );
check( xpir_free(&xpir) );
check( tken_free(&tken) );
check( mo_free(&mo_line) );
check( mo_free(&mo_channel) );
check( csec_free(&csec) );
check( plod_free(&plod) );
}
/* Added a bit interactivety by using a nonblocking way to read the keyboard.
* Note that it outputs ANSI terminal (VT100 compatible) codes.
*/
static void busy_chat(bfer_t bfer_radix_mo_channel)
{
mo_t mo_line, mo_channel;
plod_t plod;
psec_t psec;
csec_t csec;
tken_t tken;
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cter_t *r_cter;
char line[1024];
xpir_t xpir;
/* Allocate ADTs. */
check( mo_alloc(&mo_line) );
check( mo_alloc(&mo_channel) );
check( plod_alloc(&plod) );
check( psec_alloc(&psec) );
check( csec_alloc(&csec) );
check( tken_alloc(&tken) );
check( xpir_alloc(&xpir) );
check( tken_from_radix64_bfer(&tken, bfer_radix_mo_channel) );
#if 0
bfer_key_pair_from_phrase(&key_pair, "Some Phrase.");
psec_put(&psec, PSEC_ASYM_KEY, key_pair);
csec_put(&csec, CSEC_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* Get a copy of the channel mo, and reuse the expir date.
*/
check( mo_create_copy(&mo_channel, tken, psec, csec) );
check( mo_get_xpir(&xpir, mo_channel) );
check( xpir_usec_add(&xpir, 1000L) ); /* Scip experiment 1 messages. */
#if 0
mo_put_replication(&mo_channel, FLOODING);
#endif
/* Create a prompt. */
strcpy(line, "3>> ");
printf("\033[2J"); /* Clear screen. */
printf("\033[%d;%dH", 24, 1); /* Goto row, column (24,1). */
for(;;) {
/* Print cluster so far. */
mo_getref_cter(&r_cter, mo_channel);
pr_cluster(mo_channel, *r_cter);
/* Get user input, but don't wait to long. */
if (!read_noblock(line + 4, sizeof(line) - 4)) break;
if ( '\0' != line[4]) {
check( plod_put_string(&plod, line) );
check( xpir_uinc(&xpir) );
check( mo_create_new(&mo_line, xpir, plod, psec, csec) );
check( mo_cter_add_mo(&mo_channel, mo_line) );
}
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}
printf("\033[2J"); /* Clear screen. */
printf("\033[%d;%dH", 24, 1); /* Goto row, column (24,1). */
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
check( psec_free(&psec) );
check( xpir_free(&xpir) );
check( tken_free(&tken) );
check( mo_free(&mo_line) );
check( mo_free(&mo_channel) );
check( csec_free(&csec) );
check( plod_free(&plod) );
}
/* --- Misc functions. --- */
/* The function of no return.
*/
static void quit(char *code, char *fname, int lineno)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: \"%s\" failed (sorry).\n", fname, lineno, code);
exit(1);
}
/* Print a whole cluster. (Use fprintmo).
*/
static void pr_cluster(mo_t mo_channel, cter_t cter)
{
enum_t e;
tken_t *r_tken;
printf("\0337"); /* Save cursor. */
printf("\033[H"); /* Goto top left. */
/* Print entire cluster. */
cter_enum_create(&e, cter);
while (cter_enum_getref_next_tken(&e, &r_tken, NULL)) {
printf("\033[2K"); /* Erase line. */
fprintmo(mo_channel, *r_tken, stdout);
}
printf("\0338"); /* Unsave cursor. */
}
/* Print the payload of the micro-object of the new token.
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*/
static void fprintmo(mo_t mo_channel, tken_t tken_message, void *user_data)
{
mo_t mo_message;
FILE *fp = (FILE *)user_data;
plod_t *r_plod_message;
bfer_t *r_bfer_message;
char *char_message;
psec_t psec;
csec_t csec;
/* Allocate ADTs. */
check( mo_alloc(&mo_message) );
check( psec_alloc(&psec) );
check( csec_alloc(&csec) );
#if 0
bfer_key_pair_from_phrase(&key_pair, "Some Phrase.");
psec_put(&psec, PSEC_ASYM_KEY, key_pair);
csec_put(&csec, CSEC_NONE, NULL);
#endif
/* Get a copy, get the payload's buffer's store.
*/
check( mo_create_copy(&mo_message, tken_message, psec, csec) );
check( mo_getref_plod(&r_plod_message, mo_message) );
check( plod_getref_bfer(&r_bfer_message, *r_plod_message) );
check( bfer_getref_store(&char_message, *r_bfer_message) );
/* Print it out! */
fprintf(fp, "%s", char_message);
/* Deallocate ADTs (in random order). */
check( csec_free(&csec) );
check( mo_free(&mo_message) );
check( psec_free(&psec) );
}
180 APPENDIX A. SOURCE CODE
Index
ANSI-41 MAP, 24
Apparent failure, 61
Bean, 159
Stateful, 159
Stateless, 159
Bearer channels, 24
Blog, see Weblog
Blogging, see Weblog
Botnet, 31
Cloud server, 62
Content list, 97
Fragmentation value, 103
Replacement value, 100
Content-based networking, 160
Content-centric networking, 160
CORBA, 158
IDL, 158
Could computing, 163
Data addressing
Content-based, 161
Pipe-based, 161
Subject-based, 161
Token-based, 161
Data cloud, 163
Ditto-list, 75
Domain Name System
Query example, 13
E-mail, 9--14
At symbol (@), 13
End-point delivery, 26
Mailbox, 10
Naming, 13--14
Point-to-point communication, 16
Post oﬃce protocol, 12
Remote access, 12
Resolving a name, 13--14
Webmail, 12
eBay, 36
EJB
Containers, 159
Entity bean, 159
Message-driven bean, 159
Stateful bean, 159
Stateless bean, 159
Enterprise Java Beans, 159
Entity bean, 159
Facebook, 36
Weblog, 36
Flat rate payment, 35
GSM MAP, 24
IDL, 158
Instant messaging, 17--21
Channel, 18
Chat room, 19
Chat session, 19
Naming, 21
Presence, 19--21
Term-talk, 17
IS-41 MAP, 24
Large scale messaging, 8
Linear rate payment, see Flat rate payment
LinkedIn, 36
Massive messaging, 8
Maximum adaptability, 41
Message-driven bean, 159
Messaging Service
Deleting messages, 44
Name space, 43
Presence, 43
Security, 43
Messaging system, 7
181
182 INDEX
Address dimension, 33
Audience dimension, 33
Direction dimension, 33
Taxonomy, 32--35
Time dimension, 32
Micro-object, 59--108
Additional replication, 71
Basic replication, 71
Cluster, 63
Deﬁnition, 62--64
Eventual consistency, 72
Expiration date, 67
Hello World example, 90
Heterogeneous replication, 72
Home location, 62
Payload, 62
Token, 62
Mix-networks, 70
MO, 62
Mo_create_copy(), 80
Mo_create_new(), 78
Mo_cter_add_tken(), 88
Mo_get_cter(), 84
Mo_get_tken(), 79
Mo_put_cter_clbk(), 85
Mo_put_repl(), 82
Moping, 141--142
MySpace, 36
Network News Transfer Protocol
Extensions to, 15
Flooding, 16
News feed, 15
Newsgroup, 14
Object cloud, 62
Pidgin, 114
Ping, 141
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List of Acronyms
ADT . . . . . . . . . . . Abstract Data Type An ADT is a speciﬁcation of a set of related data items
and the operations that can be performed on those items. It is Abstract in
the sense that it separates the implementation from the speciﬁcation. It is the
cornerstone of programming. Page 77
AIM . . . . . . . . . . . AOL Instant Messenger AIM is an instant message system allowing users to
communicate by exchanging text messages in realtime. Page 49
AOP . . . . . . . . . . . Aspect Oriented Programming AOP is utilizing a way of modularization of
a program to separate concerns, speciﬁcally cross-cutting concerns. Page 60
API . . . . . . . . . . . . Application Programming Interface An API is a computer language deﬁni-
tion, how one layer in a computer system can communicate with the next,
usually consisting of a list of function calls with their parameters and return
types. Page 62
ARPANET . . . . . Advanced Research Project Agency Network ARPANET is one of the pre-
cursors to the Internet, ARPANET was a large wide-area network created for
testing purposes by the United States Defense ARPA in 1969. Page 9
ASCII . . . . . . . . . . American Standard Code for Information Interchange ASCII is a character
encoding. Page 25
BBM. . . . . . . . . . . BlackBerry Messenger BBM is a proprietary instant messaging application
included on BlackBerry devices allowing user-to-user as well as chat-group mes-
saging. It allows exchange of text, image, audio, and other type of messages.
Users are addressed using a PIN code, a QR code, or an E-mail address. Page 49
BBS. . . . . . . . . . . . Bulletin Board System A BBS is a computer with one or more modems, that
allows users to exchange messages. It also allowed users to upload and download
data. There were many BBSes, run by amateurs during the 1980’s and the ﬁrst
half of the 1990’s. Two early BBS are Charles Oropallo’s Access-80 (1977) and
Ward Christensen’s CBBS (1979). Page 52
BITNET . . . . . . . Because It’s Time NETwork (earlier: Because It’sThere NETwork) BITNET
started out as the CUNY (City University of New York) and Yale University
messaging network in 1981. BITNET users migrated to Internet based mes-
saging.
 . . . . . . . . . roBOTNETwork A botnet is a collection of hacked computers that are con-
nected to the Internet. A botnet usually has one or more herders that are able
to control the actions of the so called bots. Typical instructions would include
attacking a website and sending SPAM messages. Page 31
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CAPTCHA . . . . . Completely Automated Public Turingtest to tell Computers andHumans Apart
A captcha is a response test to force human interaction in an automated process.
For example an word is displayed and the user is expected to enter that word.
The word usually is displayed in a manner that is hard to read for computer
programs, but still legible enough for humans. Page 128
CDMA. . . . . . . . . Code Division Multiple Access CDMA is a technology to allow multiple
access to a (cellular) network. CDMA does not assign a speciﬁc frequency
band to each user (as does FDMA) instead, every channel uses full spread of
the frequency domain and a channel identiﬁer. CDMA is also referred to as
spread-spectrum. See also FDMA, and RF. Note, CDMA is not to be confused
with WCDMA, cdmaOne, and CDMA2000, because those are CDMA based
mobile phone standards. Page 27
HTML. . . . . . . . Compact HTML cHTML is a, HTML like, content description language
for i-mode devices describing one screen per ﬁle. cHTML is becoming less
relevant as devices capable of handling (full-blown) HTML andWML become
more widespread. See also HTML, WML and i-mode.
CIMD . . . . . . . . . Computer Interface to Message Distribution CIMD is a data exchange pro-
tocol, developed by Nokia, to communicate with SMSCs. See also SMSC.
Page 8
CMS. . . . . . . . . . . Content Management System A CMS helps separate content form format.
A CMS typically has a back-end that is used to edit the content and formatting,
and a front-end that allows users to access the (formatted) content. Page 22
CORBA . . . . . . . . CommonObject Request Broker Architecture CORBA is a middleware layer
to develop distributed application, featuring an interface deﬁnition language
that is independent of development platform. The basis of CORBA is remote
procedure call. Page 60
CSD . . . . . . . . . . . Circuit SwitchedData CSD is a network technology that oﬀers communicat-
ing partners a temporary direct connection with each other over limited shared
resources. A CSD network has connection setup and release (or teardown)
procedures. POTS is a CSD network. Packet Switching (e.g., the Internet and
GPRS) is the opposite of CSD. See also POTS and GPRS. Page 25
CTI. . . . . . . . . . . . Computer-Telephony Integration CTI is a system that allows interactions
between communication via the telephone system and via the Internet. Contact
channels like E-mail, SMS, fax, voicemail, can be used and managed through
both the Internet and the telephone system. Page 156
DAO . . . . . . . . . . Distributed Application Object A DAO is an collection of related data and
functions in an application program. It need not be an object in the stricter
sense of object oriënted programming (that is, an instance of a class), but it can
be. Page 94
 . . . . . . . . . . . . Domain Information Groper Dig is a program that ﬁnds the DNS IP address
for a given hostname or (with the -x ﬂag) vice versa. Page 13
DNS . . . . . . . . . . . Domain Name System The DNS is an overlay network of servers that trans-
late names, like www.cs.vu.nl, into IP addresses like 130.37.20.20. The DNS is
like a giant telephone book. However, theDNS is a distributed system, allowing
for constant updates. Page 13
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DS . . . . . . . . . . . Denial of Service A DoS attack is an attempt to make a computer resource
unavailable to its rightful users. It is like a thousand grannies jumping the queue
as you await your turn to use the bathroom. Page 105
DSM . . . . . . . . . . Distributed SharedMemory DSM is virtual memory that is shared over a net-
work by several hosts. To each host, reading and writing to this virtual memory
appears to be just like reading and writing local shared memory as if the sharing
took place at one location. Page 107
EJB . . . . . . . . . . . . Enterprise Java Beans EJB is a collection of server-side services that are pro-
vided by the EJB runtime environment. Typically, concurrent data access and
security is provided by the EJB container with some degree of networking trans-
parency. EJB in it’s core facilitates client/server communication. Page 60
E- . . . . . . . . . Electronic Mail E-mail is the largest homogeneous messaging system in the
world. Page 8
EMS . . . . . . . . . . . Enhanced Messaging Service (also: Enhanced Messaging Service) EMS is
extension to SMS for sending and receiving formatted text, images, sound clips,
and ring tones. See also SMS. Page 26
FDMA . . . . . . . . . Frequency Division Multiple Access FDMA is a technology to allow mul-
tiple access to a (cellular) network. FDMA will cut a frequency domain into
several frequency bands or channels. It is particularly commonplace in satellite
communication and the GSM network. See also GSM, and RF. Page 27
FTP . . . . . . . . . . . File Transfer Protocol FTP is a client/server protocol for transferring ﬁles over
TCP networks. It is mostly used to up- or download ﬁles from a local client
to a remote server. More specialized usage includes transferring ﬁles directly
between remote servers. Page 61
GPG . . . . . . . . GNU Privacy Guard GnuPG can encrypt E-mail messages using asymmet-
ric encryption. Each individual user generates a private, public key pair. The
resulting public keys have to be exchanged with other users. GnuPG provides
a way to secure content as well as a way to sign content. Page 122
GPRS . . . . . . . . . . General Packet Radio Service GPRS is a packet switched GSM overlay net-
work. Because it is packet switched it allows more users per network and it is
better suited for data applications such messaging. Practically GPRS oﬀers full
Internet access to roaming cellular devices. See also GSM.
GSM. . . . . . . . . . . Global System for Mobile Communications GSM is the leading cellular sys-
tems in Europe and Asia. See also TDMA. Page 27
GUI . . . . . . . . . . . Graphical User Interface A graphical user interface (pronounced ”gooey”) is a
method of interacting with a computer through a metaphor of graphical images
in addition to text, usually involving a mouse, keyboard, and screen. Page 115
HLR . . . . . . . . . . . Home Location Registers A HLR is a SS7 database containing up-to-date
information on cell phones. It is much like a POTS database, but for the SS7 to
function, the HLR contains additional information to accommodate roaming.
See also POTS, glxrefNSS, IMSI, and SS7. Page 27
HTML . . . . . . . . . HyperTextMarkup Language HTML is a language used to createmultimedia
documents. A typical HTML page contains text, images and links to other
HTML documents. Page 12
HTTP . . . . . . . . . HyperText Transfer Protocol HTTP is the predominant protocol used for
exchange of WWW pages. See also WWW.
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ICQ . . . . . . . . . . . I seek you ICQ is a program, created by the Israeli company Mirabilis int
1996. In 1998 ICQ was bought by AOL, and it is slowly merged with AOL’s
other IM system, AIM. See also AIM and IM. Page 17
IDL. . . . . . . . . . . . Interface Deﬁnition Language An IDL is special language to describe how
two layers in a computer system communicate. Usually IDL speciﬁcations are
compiled into an API and part of the implementation of the API. See also API.
Page 60
IM. . . . . . . . . . . . . Instant Messaging IM allows individual users to exchange short text state-
ments in real time. It could be compared to having a telephone conversation
where talking has been replaced by typing on a keyboard. Page 9
I- . . . . . . . . . . Information mail i-mail is a messaging system for i-mode devices. See also
i-mode. Page 8
IMAP . . . . . . . . . . Internet Message Access Protocol IMAP is a text based protocol for retrieving
E-mail from a server machine to a client machine. IMAP allows a user specify
a subset of messages to download. Typically, messages are not deleted from a
server after they have been copied to a client machine. See also POP. Page 12
- . . . . . . . . . Information mode (also: Internet mode) i-mode is NTT DoCoMo’s mobile
Internet access system.
IMSI . . . . . . . . . . . International Mobile Subscriber Identity A IMSI is a unique (ﬁfteen or less
digits) number used to identify a GSM (andUMTS) cellular device. A IMSI has
three parts: the country code (MCC), the network code (MNC), and a unique
subscriber number (MSIN) and is used to lookup information in the HLR. See
also HLR.The IMSI conforms to the ITU E.212 numbering standard. Page 27
IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Protocol IP is a datagram delivery and addressing protocol, with
store and forward delivery. The routing of an IP packet, as IP datagrams are
sometimes called, follows one simple rule; If the IP address is on the local net-
work, send it directly to the destination, otherwise, send it to the router. It
is up to the router to send IP packets to (a router closer to) their destination.
The IP protocol is used for computer to computer (or host to host, in Internet
speak) communication. Usually for process-to-process communication a higher
protocol with sub addressing is used. See also UDP and TCP. Page 14
IRC . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Relay Chat IRC is many-to-many (including one-on-one) IM pro-
gram. IRC was created by the Fin Jarkko Oikarinen in 1988 and it was loosely
based on BRC (BITNETRelayChat). See also BITNET, IM, and ICQ. Page 17
ISDN . . . . . . . . . . Integrated Services Digital Network ISDN is an international communica-
tions protocol for sending voice and data over digital or analog telephone lines
with a bit rate of 64 Kbps. Page 28
ISP . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Service Provider An ISP is an organisation that provides Internet
connectivity and services to individual users. Usually the users have to connect
to an ISP via a modem over a phone or DSL line. Typically an ISP would run
mail and web processes on the users behalf, allowing the user to be oﬄine most
of the time. Page 12
ITU . . . . . . . . . . . International TelecommunicationUnion The ITU is on of the oldest (founded
in 1865) international organizations and its goal is to standardize and regulate
international telecommunications and radio. Since 1947 the ITU has been an
agency of the United Nations (UN).The ITU has three main suborganizations:
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ITU-T (before 1992 called the CCITT) for telecommunications, ITU-R for
radio communications, and ITU-D for development. Page 25
LAN . . . . . . . . . . . Local Area Network A LAN is a communication network that allows direct
communication between parties over relative short distances. Compared to a
WAN connection speeds are usually high and communication costs are usually
low. See also WAN. Page 140
LRU . . . . . . . . . . . Least Recently Used A LRU caching algorithm, selects cached items to be
replaced based on the time they have last been used. The general idea behind
that, is that items that have a high probability of being used in the future, will
have been recently used. Generally this LRU selection will outperform random
selection. Page 77
MAP. . . . . . . . . . . Mobile Application Part MAP is a protocol for near real time communication
between nodes in a cellular network. For example the MAP protocol is used to
transfer information to and from the VLR and the HLR. See also VLR and
HLR. Page 24
MD . . . . . . . . . . Message Digest algorithm 5 MD5 is a deterministic algorithm that converts
an arbitrary sized array of bytes into a ﬁxed number of bits. In theory any
change to the input, even a single bit, will result ﬂip the output bits with an
even chance. Page 140
MDA . . . . . . . . . . Message Delivery Agent The MDA is responsible for moving messages from
the MTA into the proper mailboxes. Page 11
MMS . . . . . . . . . . MultimediaMessage Service MMS is aWAP based cellular protocol for trans-
mitting images, video clips, sound and text messages. See also WAP. Page 8
MO. . . . . . . . . . . . micro-object AMO is a small simple distributed object that supported by the
MO system. They are the building blocks of more complex distributed objects,
most notably DAOs. See also DAO. Page 62
MSA . . . . . . . . . . . Message Submit Agent TheMSA is the server that queues outgoing messages
fromMUAs, until they are ready to be sent out by the MTA. See also MTA and
MUA. Page 10
MTA. . . . . . . . . . . Message Transfer Agent Server process to exchange incoming and outgoing
E-mail. The MTA at a sender’s site is responsible for removing messages that
have been queued by the MSA, and transferring them to their destinations,
possibly routing them across several other MTAs. At the receiving side, the
MTA spools incoming messages, making them available for the See also MSA
and MDA. Page 10
MUA . . . . . . . . . . Mail User Agent A MUA is a user application for accessing and managing
E-mail. Users often refer to a MUA as their E-mail client. The MUA provides
the interface between the user and their MSAs, MDAs, and POP servers. See
also MSA, MDA, and POP. Page 10
MX . . . . . . . . . . . . Mail Exchange AMX record is a set of prioritized entries in theDNS database
identifying the mail servers that are responsible for handling E-mail for that
domain. See also DNS. Page 13
NNTP . . . . . . . . . Network News Transfer Protocol NNTP is used for exchanging USENET
textmessages. The oﬃcial speciﬁcation is RFC 977. See alsoUSENET. Page 15
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NSS . . . . . . . . . . . Network and Switching Subsystem (also known as: the GSM core network)
The NSS is the circuit switched GSM core network, for traditional services like
voice calls and SMS messaging.
NTA . . . . . . . . . . . News Transfer Agent A NTA is a server process that receives, stores, and
forwards USENET news articles. See also USENET. Page 15
NUA. . . . . . . . . . . News User Agent A NUA is a client program that enables the user to create,
send, receive, and read USENET news articles. See also USENET. Page 15
OOP. . . . . . . . . . . Object Oriented Programming OOP is a programming paradigm that uses
objects to build applications. It utilizes several paradigms like: inheritance,
modularity, polymorphism, and encapsulation. Building large application, of-
ten suﬀers from problems like namespace pollution, using OOP will solve most
of these kind of problems. Many current programming languages have support
for OOP. Note, OOP does not happen automatically simply because a language
supports OOP, it is a way of designing and implementing. Page 130
PGP . . . . . . . . . . . Pretty Good Privacy PGP is a method to provide end-to-end (asymmetric)
encryption and signing for messaging. Most commenly used for e-mail. It was
created by Phil Zimmermann in 1991 but now has been formalized into the
OpenPGP standard (RFC 4880). Page 43
POP . . . . . . . . . . . Post Oﬃce Protocol POP is a text based protocol for retrieving E-mail from
a server machine to a client machine. Usually, once the messages have been
copied to the client machine, they are deleted on the server machine. See also
IMAP. Page 12
POTS . . . . . . . . . . Plain Old Telephone Service POTS stands for the normal wired analogue
telephone system as developed in 1876 by Alexander GrahamBell. Also referred
to as PSTN. Page 7
PSTN . . . . . . . . . . Public Switched Telephone Network PSTN is the international telephone
system based on copper wires carrying analog voice data. Also referred to as
POTS.
QS . . . . . . . . . . . Quality of Service QoS originally stood for the probability that a packed
switched network would a predetermined throughput level. The deﬁnition of
QoS has been expanded to stand for the probability that any communication
service delivers a given throughput, failure, or prefetch rate. Page 68
RDF . . . . . . . . . . . Resource Description Framework RDF allows the exchange of information
on collections of music, books, news articles, or photos. RDF uses XML as an
interchange syntax. Some consider RDF to be the precursor of RSS. See also
XML and RSS.
RF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radio Frequency RF is the frequency of an electromagnetic spectrum that
propagates through space and has wave like properties. Scales range from Ultra
Low Frequency (less than 3 Hz) up till Extremely High Frequency (300 GHz).
Page 27
RMI . . . . . . . . . . . RemoteMethod Invocation RemoteMethod Invocation is the object-oriented
equivalent of RPC. An application object is represented on the client side by a
standin or stub object. Methods invoked on the stub are forwarded to a server
for processing. Resulting values follow the reverse route. Page 159
RPC . . . . . . . . . . . Remote Procedure Call A RPC is a method for two computers to act as one.
The caller on one computer sends arguments to the callee on another computer
for processing and waits for the callee to send back the results. Page 60
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RSS . . . . . . . . . . . . Really Simple Syndication (also: Rich Site Summary and RDF Site Sum-
mary) RSS is an XML format for syndicating web content. See also XML and
RDF. Page 22
SCCP . . . . . . . . . . SignallingConnectionControl Part SCCP is an ITU routing protocol (Q.713)
for SS7 networks. See also SS7.
SCTP . . . . . . . . . . Stream Control Transmission Protocol SCTP is a transport layer protocol
on top of the IP layer. It is message-oriented (like UDP) featuring in-sequence
delivery and congestion control (like TCP). SCTP ismainly used to carry PSTN
signals over IP networks. See TCP, UDP, PSTN, SS7, and IP. Page 26
SDMA . . . . . . . . . Space Division Multiple Access SDMA is a technology to allow multiple ac-
cess to a (cellular) network. SDMA will adapt the direction and the power of
an RF signal based on the relative location of the receiving end. This minimizes
RF interference and maximizes frequency band reuse. Most commonly used by
GSM networks in combination with FDMA. See also RF, GSM, and FDMA.
Page 27
SHF . . . . . . . . . . . Super High Frequency A RF band with a wavelength from 100mm till 10mm
(3-30GHz). Used for cellular networks, wireless LAN, etc. Page 27
SIGTRAN. . . . . . SIGnaling TRANsport SIGTRAN is a set of protocol extension to SS7. The
most signiﬁcant of these is SCTP for carrying PSTN signals over IP networks.
See SCTP, PSTN, SS7, and IP. Page 26
SIM . . . . . . . . . . . Subscriber Identity Module A SIM (card) is a smart card for a cellular device
used to identify and authenticate a user to the cellular network. The SIM can
also contain other data, for example: device settings and user data (for example,
phone numbers). Page 27
SMPP . . . . . . . . . . Short Message Peer-to-Peer Protocol SMPP is a protocol for application to
send short messages to a SMSC. See also SMSC and SMS. Page 8
SMS . . . . . . . . . . . Short Message Service SMS is a service for sending short text messages to cel-
lular phones. SMS messages are typically less than 160 characters long. Page 7
SMSC. . . . . . . . . . Short Message Service Center SMSC is a server that gets SMS text messages
to the appropriate mobile device. See also SMS. Page 25
SMTP . . . . . . . . . Simple Mail Transfer Protocol SMTP is the predominant protocol for MTA
to communicate. See also MTA. Page 11
 . . . . . . . . . . . not the luncheon meat canned by Hormel Foods Spam was ﬁrst identiﬁed on
the Usenet, and got its name from a Monty Python sketch. The ﬁrst infamous
professional spammers was Laurence Canter, co-author of the book How To
Make A Fortune On The Information Superhighway. Page 10
 . . . . . . . . . . . spam over IM (also: instant spam) Spim is spam for IM systems. Spim mes-
sages are sent out by a human IM user simulator, called a spim-bot, to IM screen
names that have been harvest oﬀ the Internet. A spimmer is the individual or
organization responsible for sending the spim. Page 31
SQL . . . . . . . . . . . Structured Query Language SQL is a database query and management lan-
guage developed in the 1970’s, initially by IBM and Relational Software (the
current Oracle Corporation). Page 115
SRV . . . . . . . . . . . SeRvice The DNS SRV record contains location data, for example hostname
and port number, of servers for speciﬁed services. It is used, for example, by the
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol. See also XMPP. Page 19
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SS . . . . . . . . . . . . Signaling System 5 SS5 was one of the precursors to SS7. As an ITU stan-
dard, it was once in widespread use, but has long since been replaced by SS7.
See also ITU and SS7. Page 24
SS . . . . . . . . . . . . Signaling System 7 (also known as: C7, number 7, and CCIS7) SS7 is an
ITU circuit switching out-of-band data exchange (three layer) protocol stack
for telephone networks at up to 64kbps. It was introduced in 1981 for use on
the NSS. See also ITU, SCCP, and NSS. Page 8
SSL . . . . . . . . . . . . Secure Sockets Layer is an encryption protocol to secure Internet commu-
nication. It features: peer negotiation to select one of the supported encryp-
tion algorithms, public-key encryption-based key exchange, certiﬁcate-based
authentication, symmetric cipher-based session encryption. Note: SSL trans-
formed into TLS (Transport Layer Security). Page 121
TCAP . . . . . . . . . . Transaction Capabilities Application Part TCAP is a protocol for SS7 net-
works. It multiplexes connections by adding transaction IDs tomessages. These
transaction IDs are similar to TCP ports. See also TCP. TCAP is used by the
MAP and other layers. See also MAP. According to the SS7 standard TCAP is
part of the application layer. Page 24
TCP . . . . . . . . . . . Transmission Control Protocol TCP is a protocol designed for the Internet.
In contrast to the IP protocol, that deals only with packets, TCP enables data
streams. TCP adds several sorts of error correction and optimization to the
service of IP. Most notably TCP can handle limited IP packet loss and out of
order delivery of IP packets. Also, like UDP, TCP introduces the notion of a
“port,” allowing up to sixty ﬁve thousand distinct connections per IP address.
See also UDP and IP. Page 13
TDMA. . . . . . . . . Time Division Multiple Access TDMA is a technology to allow multiple
access to a (cellular) network. TDMA assigns each user a single frequency band
and ﬁxed interval time slots to use it. TDMA is used in combination with
FDMA (and sometimes SDMA) by GSM networks to support eight data chan-
nels per frequency band. See also GSM, FDMA, SDMA, and CDMA. Page 27
TISM . . . . . . . . . . Targeted Immutable Short Message a TISM is the generic name for a unit of
exchanged data, also referred to by its generic name as message. Page 46
UA . . . . . . . . . . . . User Agent A UA is an application that allows users to communicate with
the underlying IM system. See also IM. Page 18
UBE . . . . . . . . . . . Unsolicited Bulk Email UBE is a synonym for spam: unsolicited messages.
Page 30
UCE . . . . . . . . . . . Unsolicited Commercial Email UCE is a synonym for spam: unsolicited
messages. Page 30
UDP . . . . . . . . . . . User Datagram Protocol UDP is a connectionless protocol that, like TCP,
runs on top of IP networks. Unlike TCP, UDP provides no error correction
to speak of. The main reason for using it rather than using IP directly, is its
introduction of the notion of a “port,” allowing up to sixty ﬁve thousand distinct
sub addresses per IP address. See also TCP and IP. Page 99
UMS. . . . . . . . . . . Uniﬁed Messaging System A UMS is a system that mimics diﬀerent mes-
saging services and can be used to replace the services of all other messaging
systems. Page 42
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UNIX . . . . . . . . . . Uniplexed Information and Computing Service UNIX is a computer operat-
ing system originally developed in 1969 by a group of AT&T employees at Bell
Labs, including KenThompson, Dennis Ritchie, Brian Kernighan. The original
UNIX has split into various commercial and nonproﬁt branches. Page 137
URI . . . . . . . . . . . UniformResource Identiﬁer AURI is an object (or resource) name (or identi-
ﬁer) possibly including location information, within a given namespace. A URI
that does not include location information is referred to a URN, otherwise an
URI is referred to as URL. See also URN and URL.
URL . . . . . . . . . . . UniformResource Locator AURL uniquely identiﬁes an object on theWWW,
it also identiﬁes the object’s location. A URL can contain a scheme (or domain),
host, port, path, parameters, and values. However, in practice most URLs are
of the scheme://host/ or scheme://host/path format. The set of URLs is a
proper subset of the set of URIs. See also WWW and URI. Page 68
URN . . . . . . . . . . Uniform Resource Name A URN is a URI that identiﬁes a resource by name
in a particular namespace, without including location information. The set of
URNs is a proper subset of the set of URIs. See also URI.
USENET. . . . . . . UNIX USEr NETwork USENET (also referred to as NetNews) started in
1979 as a messaging system on top of UUCPNET, later it migrated to the
Internet. Currently USENET is a collection of over 50,000 news groups where
users can post and read news messages. See also UUCPNET. Page 9
UUCPNET. . . . . UNIX-to-UNIXCopy ProtocolNETwork UUCPNETwas a point-to-point
overlay network on top of the telephone network. UNIX hosts would call up
other UNIX hosts for information exchange. Page 14
VLR . . . . . . . . . . . Visitors Location Register TheVLR is a temporary database of the subscribers
who have roamed into the particular area which it serves. Page 27
VIP . . . . . . . . . . . Voice over Internet Protocol VoIP allows transmission of telephone calls, in
the form of small digitized voice packages, over the Internet. VoIP is also re-
ferred to as Internet telephony, IP telephony, and VOI. Page 7
WAN . . . . . . . . . . Wide Area Network AWAN is a communication network that covers a broad
area like a country. The largestWAN is the Internet, coveringmost of the world.
Compared to a LAN connection speeds are usually low and communication
costs are usually high. See also LAN. Page 139
WAP . . . . . . . . . . . Wireless Application Protocol WAP allows users to access information via
handheld wireless devices such asmobile phones, pagers, two-way radios, smart-
phones and communicators. See also cHTML. Page 8
WA . . . . . . WhatsAppMessenger WhatsApp is a messaging application for mobile Inter-
net devices often favored over SMS and other non Internet messaging systems
due to their payment model. WhatsApp can relay text, images, video and audio
messages. Page 8
WML . . . . . . . . . . Wireless Markup Language WML is a, HTML like, content description lan-
guage for WAP, describing several screens (named cards) per ﬁle. This in con-
trast to cHTML, which can describe only one screen per ﬁle. See also WAP and
cHTML.
WWW . . . . . . . . . World Wide Web WWW is a system of servers that support HTML docu-
ments. See also HTML. Page 12
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XML. . . . . . . . . . . eXtensible Markup Language XML is a speciﬁcation language allowing the
creation of customized markup tags, enabling the validation, and interpretation
of data between diﬀerent applications.
XMPP . . . . . . . . . eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol XMPP is an open, XML-based
protocol for server-to-server IM and presence. XMPP is often identiﬁed with
the Jabber program, the best known, but not the only, IM application that uses
XMPP. See also IM. Page 19
Bibliography
[1] A. Agarwal. Retrospective: The MIT Alewife Machine: architecture and performance. In
ISCA ’98: 25 years of the international symposia on Computer architecture (selected papers), pages
103--110, New York, NY, USA, 1998. ACM.
[2] G.A. Agha. Actors: a model of concurrent computation in distributed systems. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, USA, 1986.
[3] T.T. Ahonen. Tomi Ahonen Almanac 2010. Mobile Telecoms Industry Review. http://www.
tomiahonen.com/ebook/almanac.html, 2010.
[4] E. A. Akkoyunlu, K. Ekanadham, and R. V. Huber. Some constraints and tradeoﬀs in the de-
sign of network communications. In SOSP ’75: Proc. of the ﬁfth ACM symposium on Operating
systems principles, pages 67--74, New York, NY, USA, 1975. ACM.
[5] P. Albitz and C. Liu. DNS and BIND. O’Reilly & Associates, Sebastopol, CA, 3rd edition,
1998.
[6] G. Appenzeller et al. The Mobile People Architecture. ACM Mobile Comp. and Commun.
Rev., 1(2), 1999.
[7] S. Arbanowski and S. van der Meer. Service personalization for uniﬁed messaging systems.
In Comp. and Commun., 1999. Proc. IEEE Int. Symposium on, pages 156--163, Los Alamitos,
CA, USA, 1999. IEEE Computer Society.
[8] M. Astley, D.C. Sturman, and G.A. Agha. Customizable middleware for modular distributed
software. Commun. ACM, 44(5):99--107, 2001.
[9] D. Atkins, W. Stallings, and P. Zimmermann. PGP Message Exchange Formats. RFC 1991
(Informational), August 1996. See also RFC 4880.
[10] D. Barber. GlobalCom: a uniﬁed messaging system using synchronous and asynchronous
forms. In PPPJ/IRE, pages 141--144, 2002.
[11] S. Barber. CommonNNTP Extensions. RFC 2980 (Informational), October 2000. Updated
by RFCs 3977, 4643, 4644.
[12] S. Belville. Zephyr on Athena. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
[13] S. Blanas, J.M. Patel, V. Ercegovac, J. Rao, E.J. Shekita, and Y. Tian. A comparison of join
algorithms for log processing in MapReduce. In Proc. Int. Conf. on Management of Data, volume
SIGMOD 2010, pages 975--986, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
195
196 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[14] R. Blood. The Weblog Handbook. Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, 2002.
[15] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer. OpenPGP Message Format.
RFC 4880 (Proposed Standard), November 2007. Updated by RFC 5581.
[16] A. Carzaniga, D.S. Rosenblum, and A.L. Wolf. Content-based addressing and routing: A
general model and its application. Technical Report CU-CS-902-00, Department of Com-
puter Science, University of Colorado, January 2000.
[17] A. Carzaniga, D.S. Rosenblum, and A.L. Wolf. Design and Evaluation of a Wide-Area Event
Notiﬁcation Service. ACM Trans. Comp. Syst., 190(3):332--383, 2001.
[18] M. Castro, P. Druschel, A.M. Kermarrec, and A. Rowstron. SCRIBE: A large-scale and
decentralized application-level multicast infrastructure. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
communications (JSAC), 2002.
[19] D.L. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Com-
mun. ACM, 24(2):84--90, 1981.
[20] L. Chong, S. Cheung Hui, and C. Kiat Yeo. Towards A Uniﬁed Messaging Environment
Over The Internet. Cybernetics and Systems, 30:533--549, 1999.
[21] Cognitive Science Laboratory Princeton University. WordNet: a lexical database for the English
language. http://wordnet.princeton.edu/, January 2000.
[22] D.E. Comer. The Internet Book. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J., 3rd edition, 2000.
[23] M. Crispin. Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1. RFC 2060 (Proposed Stan-
dard), December 1996. See also RFC 3501.
[24] M. Day, S. Aggarwal, G. Mohr, and J. Vincent. Instant Messaging / Presence Protocol Re-
quirements. RFC 2779 (Informational), February 2000.
[25] M. Day, J. Rosenberg, and H. Sugano. A Model for Presence and Instant Messaging. RFC
2778 (Informational), February 2000.
[26] R. Dreher and L. Harte. Signaling System 7 Basics. APDG Publishing, Fuquay Varina, NC,
2nd edition, 2002.
[27] P.Th. Eugster, R. Guerraoui, A.M. Kermarrec, and L. Massoulié. Epidemic Information Dis-
semination in Distributed Systems. IEEE Computer, 37(5):60--67, 2004.
[28] R. Gellens, C. Newman, and L. Lundblade. POP3 Extension Mechanism. RFC 2449 (Pro-
posed Standard), November 1998. Updated by RFC 5034.
[29] K. Gerwig. Business: the 8th layer: e-mail outsourcing sends a message. netWorker,
3(2):13--16, 1999.
[30] P. Healy, D. Barber, and B. Nolan. Developing uniﬁed messaging system apps in JAVA. In
PPPJ ’03: Proc. of the 2nd Int. Conf. on Principles and Practice of Programming in Java, pages
137--138, New York, NY, USA, 2003. Computer Science Press, Inc.
[31] M.R. Horton and R. Adams. Standard for interchange of USENET messages. RFC 1036,
December 1987. See also RFCs 5536, 5537.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
[32] V. Jacobson. If a Clean Slate is the solution what was the problem? Stanford Clean Slate seminar,
February 2006. http://cleanslate.stanford.edu/seminars/jacobson.pdf.
[33] M. Jelasity, S. Voulgaris, R. Guerraoui, A.M. Kermarrec, and M. van Steen. Gossip-based
peer sampling. ACM Trans. Comp. Syst., 25(3), August 2007.
[34] R. Jennings. Cost of Spam is Flattening. Our 2009 predictions. http://ferris.com/2009/01/
28/cost-of-spam-is-flattening-our-2009-predictions/, January 2009.
[35] C. Kalt. Internet Relay Chat: Architecture. RFC 2810 (Informational), April 2000.
[36] C. Kalt. Internet Relay Chat: Server Protocol. RFC 2813 (Informational), April 2000.
[37] B. Kantor and P. Lapsley. Network News Transfer Protocol. RFC 977 (Proposed Standard),
February 1986. See also RFC 3977.
[38] G. Kessler and S. Shepard. A Primer On Internet and TCP/IP Tools. RFC 1739 (Informa-
tional), December 1994. See also RFC 2151.
[39] G. Kiczales, J. Lamping, A. Menhdhekar, Ch. Maeda, C. Lopes, J.M. Loingtier, and J. Irwin.
Aspect-oriented programming. In Mehmet Akşit and Satoshi Matsuoka, editors, Proc. Euro-
pean Conf. on Object-Oriented Programming, volume 1241, pages 220--242. Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York, 1997.
[40] G. Kiczales and M. Mira Mezini. Aspect-oriented programming and modular reasoning. In
ICSE ’05: Proc. of the 27th Int. Conf. on Software eng., pages 49--58, New York, NY, USA,
2005. ACM Press.
[41] J. Klensin. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. RFC 2821 (Proposed Standard), April 2001. See
also RFC 5321, updated by RFC 5336.
[42] E. Klintskog, Z. El Banna, and P. Brand. A generic middleware for intra-language transparent
distribution. Technical Report T2003:01, Swedish Institute of Computer Science, January
2003.
[43] F. Kon, F. Costa, G. Blair, and R.H. Campbell. The case for reﬂective middleware. Commun.
ACM, 45(6):33--38, 2002.
[44] K. Lai, M. Feldman, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang. Incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer
networks. In Proc. of the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems. in-house, 2003.
[45] M. Marx and Ch. Schmandt. CLUES: dynamic personalized message ﬁltering. In CSCW
’96: Proc. of the ACM Conf. on Computer supported cooperative work, pages 113--121, New
York, NY, USA, 1996. ACM.
[46] D.S. Milojicic, V. Kalogeraki, R. Lukose, K. Nagaraja, J. Pruyne, B. Richard, S. Rollins,
and Z. Xu. Peer-to-Peer Computing. Technical Report HPL-2002-57, Hewlett Packard
Laboratories, Palo Alto, CA, March 2002.
[47] P.V. Mockapetris. Domain names - concepts and facilities. RFC 1034 (Standard), November
1987. Updated by RFCs 1101, 1183, 1348, 1876, 1982, 2065, 2181, 2308, 2535, 4033,
4034, 4035, 4343, 4035, 4592, 5936.
[48] J. Oikarinen and D. Reed. Internet Relay Chat Protocol. RFC 1459 (Experimental), May
1993. Updated by RFCs 2810, 2811, 2812, 2813.
198 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[49] M.T. Özsu and P. Valduriez. Principles of Distributed Database Systems. Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York, third edition, 2011.
[50] J.A. Patel and I. Gupta. Overhaul. In Web Content Caching and Distribution, volume 3293
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 34--43. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004.
[51] Pingdom. Internet 2011 in numbers. posted January 17th. http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/
01/17/internet-2011-in-numbers/, 2012.
[52] R. Rivest. The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. RFC 1321 (Informational), April 1992.
[53] J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed, and D.D. Clark. End-to-End Arguments in System Design. ACM
Transactions on Computer Systems, 2(4):277--288, November 1984.
[54] S. Saroiu, P.K. Gummadi, and S. Gribble. A Measurement Study of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Systems. In SPIE Multimedia Computing and Networking (MMCN2002), 2002.
[55] B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography. John Wiley, New York, 2nd edition, 1996.
[56] R. Sexton. Wikipedia entry for B1FF. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B1FF, Unknown 2000.
[57] K. Singh and H. Schulzrinne. Uniﬁed messaging using SIP and RTSP. IP Telecom Services
Workshop, page 7, september 2000.
[58] S. Sivasubramanian, M. Szymaniak, G. Pierre, andM. van Steen. Replication for web hosting
systems. ACM Comp. Surveys, 36(3):291--334, 2004.
[59] C. Szyperski. Component Software: Beyond Object-Oriented Programming. Addison-Wesley
Longman Publishing Co., Inc., Boston, MA, USA, 2nd edition, 2002.
[60] W.D. Tajibnapis. The design of a topology information maintenance scheme for a distributed
computer network. In ACM 74: Proc. of the 1974 Ann. Conf., pages 358--364, New York,
NY, USA, 1974. ACM Press.
[61] A.S. Tanenbaum and R. van Renesse. A Critique of the Remote Procedure Call Paradigm. In
Proc. of the EUTECO 88 Conf., pages 775--783, Vienna, Austria, November 1988. North-
Holland.
[62] D. Thain and M. Livny. Parrot: Transparent user-level middleware for data-intensive com-
puting. InWorkshop on Adaptive GridMiddleware, NewOrleans, Louisiana, September 2003.
[63] S. Vinoski. A Time for Reﬂection. IEEE Internet Comp., 9(1):86--89, 2005.
[64] S. Voulgaris, D. Gavidia, and M. van Steen. CYCLON: Inexpensive Membership Man-
agement for Unstructured P2P Overlays. Journal of Network and Systems Management,
13:197--217, 2005.
[65] J.Waldo, G.Wyant, A.Wollrath, and S. Kendall. ANote onDistributed Computing. Techni-
cal Report SMLI TR-94-29, SunMicrosystems Laboratories, Mountain View, CA,November
1994.
[66] J.M.S. Wams andM. van Steen. A Flexible Middleware Layer for User-to-User Messaging. In
Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems, volume 2893 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 297--309. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2003.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 199
[67] J.M.S. Wams and M. van Steen. Unifying User-to-User Messaging Systems. IEEE Internet
Comp., 8(2):76--82, 2004.
[68] X.Wang andH. Yu. How to BreakMD5 andOther Hash Functions. In Advances in Cryptolog
-- EUROCRYPT 2005, volume 3494 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 561--561.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005.
[69] A. Westine and J. Postel. Problems with the maintenance of large mailing lists. RFC 1211
(Informational), March 1991.
[70] R. Wieringa and W. de Jonge. Object Identiﬁers, Keys, and Surrogates--Object Identiﬁers
Revisited. Theory and Practice of Object Systems, 1(2):101--114, 1995.
[71] D.R. Woolley. PLATO: The Emergence of Online Community. Matrix News, 1994.
[72] Małgorzata Wrzesińska. A Secure Instant Messaging System. http://students.mimuw.edu.
pl/SR/prace-mgr/wrzesinska/thesis6.html, June 2002.
